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"'lnnh1«.. tinn 
The need 11 .. 11 a ll Cll vinll llll t' nt :t l Clhi .; h"s arisen Oll t u f,," incle<Jsing awarCI1('SS IImt 
curre nt human ccuno mic, tcchnologica l. and cultural pr actices have cunseque nces 
that me dest ructive to the natUla l world I 'lI gue that such cOllsequences are largely 
a result of an anthropocentric o rienta tion 10 the world . Since suc h an orienta tion 
plays a substantial role in contriiJuting to the degradatio n o f the environment, I 
argue tha t an anthropocentric appwach to ethic s is logicall y inconsistent w ith the 
development of an e nviro llme nt al ethic. While a n anthropocentric approach ('a n 
become more environmenta ll y informcd, thi s does 1I0t change thc fact that human 
inl eresl~ , will continue to take precedence over non-human il ,terc!;ts 
In liglll. of Ihi s I plead Il lr the <tdupt ion of a Ilon-anthroplll cllllic approach. S ince 
we 1110:;1 commonl y su bscribe to an anthropocentric uu tloo'{ we Illust be plcpaled 
10 rc-think some of our Illost fundamental nltitudt's anti va lues. Thi s entail s 
address ing questions over what has 1110 ral standing, looking into thc possibility of 
al loca ting moral weig ht to nOli -humans indepcndent o f their wort h to human 
be ings. 
Et hica l extcnsionists. utili sing tHHlitional ethica l formulati ons. argue fo r the 
ex tcnsio n of Illoral standing from individual human beings 10 at least some 11 0 11-
human individua ls. Tom Regan extends mora l considerat ion to include all 
mammals of a year or 11l0re~ Peter Si nger argues that all sentie nt indi viduals are 
morally considerab le ; and Paul Taylo r claims that all te leologica l centres have 
inhereJl~ wort h and thus all li ving indi vi dual entities are 11101 ally significant. 
As the~' hold an almost polar opposite posi tion to tradi tional a nthropocentric 
eth ics, extensioni st approaches have in the pa st been SC '!1l to be aligned with 
environmental ethics. However, Ca lli cott (1 995a) argues tl111 descr ibing the 1110 ral 
status debate as a simple anth ro pocentric - extensio ( ist dichotomy ullder-
represell '~ a further po int of view Holism, characterised by Ihe Land Ethic of Aldo 
l .ropoI(1. nhi c l1 is plilllmily ('oncC'I ord \~/ith Ihe biotic COIlHllllllil y a .. a unified 
co ll ective. shotdd be rccogni~ed to be Cl third flncl di~tincl <;ystem of ethi cs. In Lhe 
lig ht or this third point of viev.,. C;dlicol\ argues th<1t the ex lensioni sl appwaches 
(lrc incompatible wi th an envilOl1lllcnta l l"lhic. 
The pU1 pose of this di~scrt a ti oll is to ex plore. in the light of this all eged 
incompatibility. the adequ<1cy and app licability of the ex tC'lIs ;o nist approac hes to 
the fOllllulat iOI1 o f an cllco lllpassillg cnvil Ollment a I el hie . 
Ch<1pler Onc will outline some of the major cll virollll lcnla l issues fitc ing us al the 
beginning of the Iwcnty~ t1rst century. I will argue th:tt the esca lat ing huma n 
population, the current ellergy cris is, a nd the pollution of the planet. together with 
a ho:;' of ot her issues suc h as defOl csl<'Ilion, the rapid ex tinct ion of species and 
climact ic changes, collectively signal an ellvirollmental cri s is of imlllense 
prop(In iOlls. 
In Chapter Two I will argue that , while scie ntifi c and polilieal solutions are readil y 
ca ll eu upon to address aspects of thi s cri sis, they gem'rall y ofTer shun-sig hted 
solutions. Recognising that human action li es at the heart of thi s cri sis. it will be 
suggested that we need 10 question some of the most fundam e11tal human va lues. 
Thi s wi 1i highlight the importance o f ethics in relation to the environmental cr isis. 
Extension ist theories developed as a result of a growing reali satio n Ihal 
ant hropocentric approaches were flo t appropriate to deal w ith non-anthropocentric 
issues. By way of introducing the extensionist approaches. I wi ll argue that an 
anthropocent ric va lue sys te m is not suitable for the deve lopment of an 
environmental elhic. 
Sear~hing fur a suitable non-ant hropocentric et hi c I wi ll explore Tom Regall ' s 
deonfologicai approach, which argues for the equal inhelent va lue of all subjects-
of-a- life. Peter Singer's utilitarian approach, which argues that all sentient beings 
should have their sufTering considered w ith the like ~lIfTering of o ther sentient 
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bc ingc:: nud Pnul T nyhw'q I c k 'f' lngi('nl " pprom' '' , ",hk' l! n r~ ICS Ihnl nil li v i ng hci lllJ,<: 
p()!' se .. ~: an <"qlla l inherel!! worl h. in C haplels '11lI C<" , Four mul Five Icspcctively 
Each of lhese key lheOlist s m.n ks " HlI ther movc " Wel )' flO ,11 the Icsllietivc h Ulll a n -
cent red v<1 lue syste m of a nthropocentric ethics. Wh ile Singc,'s apPIO<1ch predates 
tha t of Rega n' s I will plcsenl the m ill Older o f increasing inclusion of non-human 
ind ividuals in matt ers of 1110 1 al co nsidera tion - mamma Is fo r RegcHl. vertebrates fo r 
Sin ger and all li ving be ings f01 T ily lO1 . 
In C hapt er Six uSing Leopold ' s la nd ethic as exemplar I wi ll introduce ho li sl11 , 
whi ch n lVOUfS the int egrity of the ecosystem over and above the int eres ts ("If the 
individual s that ex ist within it I will argue, in agreement with Callicott. that the 
ex tcll sio ni st flpproaches have 1ll0 le in commo n with a nthropocenllic approaches to 
ethics than they do with ho li stic approaches. fUlthcn nore, , will argue that. 
becau.,e none o f the ex tell s io Tli st approaches s.1tis fi es both the focu ~ and the 
objecti ves of an cnvironme nt al ethic, they arc no t adcfluatc. According to CaJli cott , 
not olly are they inadequate. they arc also inappl icable. In contrast, Johnson 
( 199 1) argues that no singul ar theory is adequat e but mlher that a variety of 
appr<)1ches ha ve degrees of applicabilit y. Acknowledging that solutiolls to the 
curre nt environmenta l cri sis are essential , I will suggest that a synthesis of these 
contrary views can provide an encompa ssing environmental ethic . Along such 
lines I will find that while the exlensiolli st approac hes are not adequate, they can 
be appli cable to the developlllent o r a n enviro nTllent a l ethic. 
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I 
In thIs Ch:l pler 1 \\ 111 <lrguc ll1 ;:H W(' (HC clInclI!l ), facing in unprecedented crisis of 
the er virQ llInent. 
The C! fII "irrnllll f!1If may be loo<:cly c.l c llneu <to;; tha t whic h l ' ll ll stilu! c<> and lllakes li p 
OUI stll roumlings. We .Il e ell veloped and imtllclsed in the l1 a ll1l~1 wod d cOlllpri sed 
of air, earth . waters, pi fl nl s and animals, and the C01lstlll cted world o f arle fa ct .. 
The environll1ent is both animate and inanimate. I1 j .;;; 1101 mel cly the I CSOurccs Ill" , 
wc II S(': . it is al so the Im b it"l fo r <'I ll li v ing species. It is the place in which we li ve. 
that whi ch supports and g ive<; us life As wc oceul in th(' \\1011d. acting upon it and 
being acted upon, wc form part oflh t" environme nt I 
'I hCI.: arc mallY raclo l s exci t ing lIega tive cnccls UII ti,e c llv ilLllllllcnt - the dUlllpi ng 
of toxic waste. non-sustainable conslIlllption, b i~-sphere damaging \Va~ t c 
geJll ~ l ati on , nuclear waste, the decimation of the rain fo .ests and the extin ction of 
speeies, to name but a few. I will consecuti vely d i !'cu s ~ the population ex plosio n, 
the (~ncrgy cri sis and the nega ti ve effects o f pollution 0 . 1 a ir. water and soil. thl ee 
of the 1110St cOlllmon ly identifi ed faclors of e l1 vi[ onl1ll ~ Ita I concern . I w ill argue 
Ih'lI coll ecti vel y these, togethel with other fa cIa l's, plac =:: a signifi cant slnlin n n the 
envir.:mll1c nl , and as such po~c a ~c rioll s thl Cillto the cor linuance ofHre. 
It is estimated that it took Olll" ~pcci es fJufJIIIOlhm abutll 200 000 years to reach il s 
fir st billio n mark, in 183 0. It i ~ predicted that it will take just under 200 years to 
add a fUJ1her e ig ht billio n people to that lIumber (McMichacl 1993 : t t2). In the 
nineteenth century the anllual increase in the world population is estimated to have 
been aro llnd tell millio n people It has been calculated that in Ihe first decade o f the 
twenty- first century this fi gure will be we ll over one hundred millio n people per 
I For a cont rast ing perception of the environment refer 10 Fritjo f Capra 's 711€ 7'urn i ll}!. 
Poinl . Chapter 2. 
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yenr fM c Miclmcl IQ9J 109) These eo.;ca lttt ing figult""i httvt! lilllc 10 do wi lh nnt ur,, 1 
Imvs. and mOle wi ll, sllc i(' -ICdulOlogical dcvelop ll1(, l1 t ~ including inO<'tll<ll i(,llIs 
against diseases, advances ill medical science. cl e<lIl rll inking water. sewerage, nnd 
state welfare proglallls, 10 11<11l1C but a rcw. T hese ha ve ttll stood humanity proud in 
il s quesl to plcservc and save li ves It is a noble thing that is done, but not wi thout 
cons~q ll el1 ccs We tt re no t pruduc'ing more children ))( ' capita: \ve arc mCle ly 
saving morc li ves. 'I hi s rrsull s in mOle people having the sa me Ilumber or 
childre n. amounting to mure chi ldre n. I\s a result thc huma n populat ion IS 
ill crcasing cxpuncnt ially . A proj c(,~tiulI rrolll 1992 maintained that if the world ' s 
popul ation reached the six billion Ilmrk in 2000. it would double in size to about 
twelve billion people by 2040 (Mercha nt 1992:3 1). 
The populatiun C II S IS ral scc:; il p,nticul ar concern that there will be 11l0re human 
be ings on the planet thall rood to Iced them all , ror. as ., ll a mas Malthl1s poilll cci 
0111 in his 1798 '~\,w ~r OH IIIf' I'riHciIJlf"- f?f I)O/JII/orioll , whil c populaliLIIl g rowth 
tends to illcrease geometricall y (2. 4. 8, 16.32 " ) the food supp ly onl y tends to 
incrp.O\se arithmetica ll y (I , 2, 3. tt . 5 .,. ) So, even if the rood supply could be 
doubled o r tripl ed, there is no way that it could keep up with the pace of the 
curr~nt po pulation g rowt h. While it could be argued Ihal genetic technology could 
incr ::: asc food supplies. there is an equall y pressing de mand for clean drinking 
water. The troubles do I10 t cud here, as " th is massiv\! populat ion growth will 
multiply the destruction of f.1! mland and forest , the cc ntalllination of the globa l 
C0I111110ns (air and water). the disluptioll of climate and the extinction of species" 
(M cl\ lic hae l 1993 : Ill). I\n imbalance in resources is inevitable, since infinite 
growth cannot be slIstained in a linite environment. 
"The longer the world proc:rnstil1<ltes over population control, the less likely it is 
that (an) equilibrium will be attained wit hauL widcfo:pread starvation, 
environmental devastation, soda l di snlption and war" (M cMichael 1993 : I 08). The 
seemingly simple solution is to curb population growth. However. this is 110t as 
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cnsy as it soul1ds. for is"u('s or population control l111plllgC 011 flll1d<1Ilwnl.,I 110lioll<: 
ofhUIlI(ln fl ecdolll (~.!l elch"lll I O()2 11) 1 
tll cn~asillg population 11111l1IJel s have a direct inOuencc on the amount of ellerw 
that is required, Thi <: is highl y prohl ematic, for c ll c!,)ly.i nl c ll s ive llctivitics tend 10 
ovetload the planet 's fll l1ctiomd capacitics (McM ichae1 1991 ,98) Much of this 
over (l[tt\ OCCU l' f: as et Icsu ll o r extracling and transpOIlinp. the raw malerials and in 
the la rious stages of cneq;lY PIOdllclion, According 10 the 1992 World Bilnk 
Development Report 88% of energy comes 110111 the l~ Irning of fossil fucls. 7°~ 
from hydl opowcl . and abollt 5% n om nuclear powcr SOII 1'Ces,l 
The production o f encrgy from/os,\il/uels entail s locating large quantities of coal. 
o il , a nd Ilallllal gas - nOIl-lcnew<1ble rcsources pH1Juced OVCI billions of years 
These natural resources l1('ed to be l11i ned out of the ground. a proCCgg that , on a 
large sca le, is dellil11cntallo whole ecosystems, The destruction o('ecosystcllls and 
l G<t rrctt I-Iardin argues in hi s CSStly nil! " mR.(!{~. ' (~llhe ( '()f1l11l01l'i that " relinqui shing th e 
freedom to breed" (Hardin I ()Q) : 338) wou ld be (I ll effective means to averting glob(l l 
ruin According 10 Hardin limiling the g rowth OftJ1 C popu lation does Ilot impinge Oil 
fund :tlllcnt.11111tlmm freedoll1s, mlher it is '\hc onl y way we c m prescl vc (lnd I1ltlture olher 
and more previoll s freedotll s" (Ha rdi ll IQqS: 338), However, Ihe Universal Declamtion of 
HU ,-, l (1n Rights, Article 16, st<tt es tltat all men (llId womenlm',e the ri ght to ma rry and to 
fOll nd a family, ·nus, limiting the number of children per family can be argued to nm 
COIL Iter to tl1(;' not iOIl of rep roduct ivc rreedom as a hum:1II rig'l t. Furthermore, si nce the 
cn ',i rotlm ental cri sis is a res ult o f a host of interconnected fiH,;tOI s such as population, rate 
of ::oll sumptioll , pol lution , deforestntioll , l1 uc lea r waste (ll1d I he extillction of spec ies. to 
name but a few, a solution 1.0 U, e environmental cri s is needs :0 be systemic rather than 
redu(,:tive (Merchant 1992: 32). 
,l lllcse statistics do not account for the use ofbi omass in the plOduction of energy, which 
prov ides about 15% of tll e wQI'ld 's energy, OtJler SOllrces o f ell crgy such as solar power. 
ocean power. geotherm~11 power all(.1 w ind power are a lso not accounted fo r (Mcyers 
1994 :97) . 
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natunti hahitnl<: Icnd5 to thC" di<;appem mIC(' of the cfC"ahH e~ that depcnd upon thcm 
1'01' 5ur'",ival 11I(:I(,'(l , cd dClIl flnd 'i Il)1 c ll(,Jgy have led t<' dwindling ~1J pplic, of these 
natural resource!':. forcing developcd cOllntJ ics to tJ ave l rurther afie ld in an attempt 
to locate new sourccs 'I his OOCll has di sast roLls consl'quences. aC> oi l-bear ing ships 
occasionally loose thei r ca ' go, thcrcby polluting the oceans - not only 
contalll in1l1ing the !ish Ihat many of liS cat, but (1150 othcr llHtrlllC lilc and thcir 
habitat s , A reccnt local cxa1llple is the sink ing of the oi l tanker li'eamre 00' the 
sout hcl n Cape coast in June 2000 
The production of energy frol1l burning fossil fu els has its OWII nega ti ve 
conseque nces. The eart h' s lcmpelatulc is governed by what is known as the 
green house effect. Natura ll y occurr ing carbon dioxide, ill a concentration of about 
0,03 percent, and I1Icth"lIlc ill Ihe earth's atmosphere fonn (I blank el of gases, 
trapping heat energy mdiating Ollt from the ealth (Baarschers 1996: Ill). Thi s 
openltcs very muc h like the g lass P ;\IlCS uf a g lccnho ll sc. le tting the stln' s warmth 
in a"d keeping it in The degl ce of the eart h' s greenhouse effect is directly 
deler nined hy the amount of greenhOll ~c gases oecu rillg in the at mosphere , 
Increasing qUcllHilies o f carhon dioxide emiss ions occurri 19 in the atmosphere, as a 
result oflhe burning of fossi l fu els, contribute to an incr~ase in greenhollse gases, 
causll1g an increase in the earth's temperature. Due to ex traneous variabl es 
calcu lating the potential dcvelopmc nt of the g reenhou se clTeet is difficult. 
lIowever, the general consensus within the sc ie ntific community is that g loba l 
warming is a reality (Baarschcrs 1996: 127) As a resu lt it is estimated that there 
wi ll be dramatic changes in the g lobal ecosystem: severe inland droughts, resultant 
food shortage, coastal nootiing, lIlass extinction of species, and increased pollution 
in overheated cities, Conversely, it is also predicted that plant life will thrive due 
to increased carbon dioxide levels , 
Other pollut ant s, such as su lphur and nitrogen that are released through the 
burning of fossil fue ls forlll acidic chemi cals through a I1rocess o f oxidation , These 
collect in the atmosphere and are deposited back to Earth via various forms of 
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plccipilaliol\ - aci d rai n " Ili s Wft lCI Illl tl s li S wily I11H t 111 0 Itn .... ,,1 1o ... I\ "," .. f' ........... '. 
"'lid increases the levels or rlcidity While no t directly dimgcrnU'i 1o humans. there 
arc some aquatic life fonl1 ~ Il ml canllot tolerat e hi g,h acidi c levels (lJ<1alschers 
1996' I/n). Not only arc bodies of water afTected , the decilllation of vegetatioll has 
been attrihuted to ac id ruin «Tak cl1 together, cOfl l-fired power plnnt s <l lld 
auto mobi les put more acidic ch ('rn i ca l ~ into the lower atmo~phere Ih(ll1 nall.ral 
compensati ng mechani sms ca ll handlc" (Oamschcrs 1996: 128). Some contest thi s. 
claim ing that natura l quanti ties of acidic producing su bstances "are so enormous 
that the impact of the huma n contribution is queslionnble" (Ilaarschcrs 1996' 128). 
Il owcvcr. while vulcCl ni c and naturall y occurring clce.trica l activ it y ha ve been 
linked to the naturol formation o f acidic chemicals, l u('a li ~cd damage to vegetation 
and fresh watc. Ii .,h populations cannot a~ easi ly be expl<l:ncd 
Finit E. fossi l fuc l rcsourccs Clnd high carbon diox ide ell issiuns make the use of 
l~rd"(J,"ecl";c !'oll'el' cl ea rly ad vantageous Kinetic encreY of fa ll ing and nuwing 
rivers has becn used since as ea t Iy as the 17005. TodClY fa' li ng water is used to turn 
turbines, which dl ive generatol s producing electricity, a seemingly 
ell vironmentally fri endl y energy source. They are ab le to operate at full power 
95% of the time, compared to 55% for nuclear plants and 65% for coal plants, and 
have li fe spans two to ten times those of coal amI nuclear plants (Mi ller 1988' 
302). Unfortunately nalul all y occurring falling water seldo m has the required 
velocity. Dams therefore have to be built 10 contain larger volumes o f water, 
thereby increasing the waler force. People li ving in close proximity to the 
proposed dam site havc to be relocated. As a consequent o f the nooding process 
they are depri ved of farmland s, thereby resulting in a loss of li velihood. Flooded 
la nd drowns vegetation, which decomposes to produce methane, another elTective 
g reenhouse gas. thereby adding to the greenhouse efTect. FUllhermore, the 
construction of dams entail s the destruction of ecosystems and the animals that 
li vf! in them - not only in the area where the dam is built. but also dowllthe entire 
watershed of the river below the dam. Each year mature- salmon swi m back 10 their 
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hal l:hing stlealllS to "pawn Dalll" i'II Cllupl tile w(ller now and make Il l;" jOUl llCY 
imposc;ib le fail ing to leach the ir "paw lling grounds they do 11 0t procreate 
Nuclear p OlI·er plant s w('re developed ill a n a tt e lllpt tn provide a clean, le liah le ami 
cheap energy SOIIl (.'e for the (inll lc. " he process QcC'urs as ull st:1blc iso topes or 
lIIalliuTlI decay in the rCClctOl core (S illlpson 1990. 40) Enelgy is released and 
convert ed tu high-Iempcr<tlur e heal in a nll c lea r fhsioll chain re<1clioll (Mi ll f'1 
1988. 273) Thi s hea t is used 10 gener<1te steam, which dri ves a turbine. w hic h in 
turn dri ves a generator to plUduce clecllici ty. " 11 reactors have a coola llt that 
c ircul ;ltes throug h the rcac to l CO I C, , cmoving exces<; heal 10 prevent the fu e l lods 
fro m Illciling (Miller 1988: 27J ) 
Although there arc IHan), c;alc ly l'call.llcs, it is posc; ibl c fOl a nllc lc flr reactor to 
suITe ' a <mchdown' 11 Thi s is onc Ihre nt nuclear energy poises to the envi ronment. 
Tcch r ica l nmll'unctiun 01 ~ loss o f cllulalll Crlll lend tt' the ccntral IC<H.:lor cOle 
over"~atil1g a nd melting the concrete and steel s hields Iha t surround the reacto r 
vesse l. Radioac ti vc matc li ,!I!' are then ab le to leak int c Ihe g round o r into the 
imlllcdi cu e atlllosphcle ill extrcmely concentrated amounts, The accu lllulatio n of 
r~dioactive materia ls in the environment cont aminates the a ir that we brealhe. the 
wa tcr that we drink and the rood th ,n we ea t, not 10 1I1c lltion the damage done to 
the lIo n-human world . It is eSlimate d that Ihe cloud of radioac ti ve material s that 
could be re leased in an <1 ccident li ke thi s could kill over ten thouS<1Ild peo ple and 
eontamill<1te the environment w ith 1 adioact ive isotopes for over a thousand years 
(Miller 1988: 275) , 
An elTect o f the nucl ear process is iodisi ng radiatio n. w hic h is hig hly dangerous 
and w he n " interac ting with the body ti ssues can resu lt in cell s that earry DN" 
abnl.'rmalities and hence a pl edi sposilio ll to ca ncer and heredit a ry defects" 
.. Thl ce of the Illost ta lked about nuclear accidents are thc J979 111ree Mile Island accident 
in America, the 1986 Chemobyl accident ill Russia , and the 1999 Tokaimura acc idcnt i ll 
Japan. 
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(SilllpSOIl 1990:40), It is dini cult 10 nssz"iS the hea lth efTec:t<; 01 human C'<POSlII C to 
low levels uf lIlall-made f(1diHtioll , due 10 extranellUS vuiables such as slIIoking 
and ,'ehid e em issio ns. PllrtherlTlOle, «the body's 1Ia tUJ a l immune system is Cl hl e 10 
wi lhs'and lIIudcrate doses of r(1d iat ion from natural and man-made sources" 
(Simpsoll 19QO,-1I) Still. the pr oblem is that tl eilher tl ~c hUIll<l:Il body, no! allY 
organ ic body is ah le to withstand high levels ofradiatioJl 
FurthennOTC, there is the prohlcm of nuclear wastc. 1\ 1000-mcgawatt leaclor 
ploduces a two cub ic Illeter volume of radioac ti ve waste annually (Simpson 
1 990 . 49) . ~ COll1l1rics utilising thi s type o f power arc f..1ced with the task of storing 
this waste. "The time it takes 50% (lf the p,Hticles of a radioacti ve clement tu 
decay is termed it s ' half· life ', Exponential decay occurs randoml y at each 
subscquent ha lf-life of allY atom Ht a const,l11t 500/0" (Simpson 1990:48). Some of 
the waste from the Iluclear plorcss has a half- life o f a fcw minut es. whcrcas 
UT-anium 238 has a half- life of 4.47 billion yea rs Thi s creates a problem of 
slo rClge, as the prevention uf accidental release needs to be made over periods 
ranging from one thousand years to as much as li ve billion (Simpsoll 1990:48). 
Thi s is problcmatic as there is sti ll " no widely agreed upon scientifi c solution to 
how high level radioactive wastes can be stored sarely for the 10 000 years 
currently required by EPA regulation s" (Miller 1988· 279). Despite thi s, the 
nll cl c~r industry has a relati vely admirable safel y record in comparison to other 
methods ofcnergy production (Oaarschers 1996: 11 3). 
Thi s does little to curb fear o f nuclear power, fo r all(; pound of plutonium is 
potentia ll y enough to ensure thn t every huma n on the planet will get cancer. With 
well over 400 nuclear power plants world wide, many in politicall y unstable 
co untries on the verge of war. we have every reason to fear the wars!. Added to the 
threat of war is the recent spate of lerrorist attacks on the US!\. It remains an ever-
~ It is estimated that an accumulated tota t of84 000 tOllnes of radioact ive waste Ilad been 
produced by 1990 (Meyers 1994 " 123) 
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prCSCIl! p(l s~ jbilit 'l !lInt 1t.'II, ll i <: l <; cou ld dl<lTlgt' ,ta.'ir l fl(,tks n OIl! c'fI :-hi ng planes 
into bui ldings and sending poison via the llIailinf! system 10 c\('toll<lting nuclear 
bOll1bs 
The ~ncrgy c, isis is far !i-om b('ing solved . Esti mates pla,;e energy demands in the 
l1lidiie of the twcnty- fi, st cen tUl y at four times it s presenl level (Baarschers 1996· 
123) . Because o f the slow develo pment of ' so O' ellergy techno logies, w ind a nd 
solar. this will place a signifi cant strain on the world's avai lab le reSOHlces of fo ssil 
fucl~; . Combined wi th int elllational pressure to reduce carbon dioxide leve ls(i, 
nuclear energy <lppcars 10 be tlte only opt io n available 10 ' IS "I th is point 
All li v ing beings (\le depend ent upon the ea rth for their surviv:.t l. The primm:l' 
lIafllrol .~)'slems - air, water, <;oi l - make the ex istence of life pos~ i b l e . rhe earth's 
atmosphere is co mposed ofsli ghlly les<; than 80% nitrogen, and slight ly more than 
20% oxygen. A collection o f water vapour, carbon d ioxide, methane, argon, 
he liulIl , and ot hel trace gases comp lete the 100% (Daarschers 1996: 125). The 
composi tio n of the atmosphere ;s maintained ill a stale of dyna mic equi librium by 
the complex and diven:c m ray of life on this p lanet. 
Ilulllan ac ti vity during the la!"t fe w hu ndred years I:as begu n to affect the 
compositio n oflhe air. Industrialisation, powered by the large-scale combu stio n of 
organic materials, has resulted in an estimated increase il' carbon diox ide levels by 
26% from the 18005 (Baarschers 1996: 125). As dcscTib!.:d above. the combustio n 
of fo ssil fue ls produces carbon dioxide, contributing t o the g reenhouse effect . 
OLhel gases are a lso increasing - the methane concentratio n has do ubl ed a nd 
nitre ll s oxide has increased by an alarming 8% (Baarschers 1996: 125). 
C hlo rofluorocarbon (CFC). now banned, is a synthet ic ~p.s wit h stab le properti es. 
Thi s li lade it commonly used in industria l app lications, refrigeration, aerosol cans 
6 Delegates from 180 nations mct i ll BOIlIl in 200 I to sigil the Kyoto Protocol. l11is treaty 
marks a commitment to reduce the production of greenhouse gases. America , the biggest 
producer of carbon dioxide, rehlsed to sign. 
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and S tyrofOill1l t'(l lllaill e l ~ ' ~ '<t"'llding seven 10 thilty Illile'; nbovc thc Cclll h is (I 
laye r of the cm lh 's <lllllo"pher~ knowll as the s lrfttn~pherc An impo rlfllll 
componcnt or the slratosphC'rc is ozone, whkh shields the (,MLh nom the sun's 
harmrul ultra viulet ('a ys.. eres drifl ed up to the stratusp llCIC and broke down the 
o zune Illulccules. As a Jesu it 07llllC levels have been depicted, leading to increases 
in ultra violct ray pCllctlalioll Thi s (:orrelatcs w ith increases ill sk in ca ncer, 
diseases or the illllllune system. and cons iderable damage to rood crops 
Air can be c lassified flS polluted when chemicals build lip to the puint of causi ng 
harm to humans. anima ls, vcgclfllioll or matcrial s (M iller 1988: 3 \ 9), Air pollu tion 
occurs both al loca l and glohal levels. OZOIlC dcp le tion in the stratosphere and 
increases in atmospheric cflrboll dioxide <Ire g lobal issues. and are both the reslllt 
of industrialisation, closely linked with the consllmption or energy (Baarschers 
1996: I J I). These present problems that affect the entire plflnct. Local air poilution 
uccurs when pollutants released ncar the p lanet's surface react with one another or 
with oxygen 'I lIese rcmain airbome but loca li sed . appealing as smog in busy c it y 
centres. Vehicle ex haust emi ss ions. nitrogen dioxide from combustion. evaporated 
petroleum prodll(~ts. and dust fiOlll industrial processes al l fOlm a part orlhc soup 
that shrouds Ollr c ities . This fo rm or air pollution. potentially hazardous to the 
population within that locali sed area. is correlated w ith scvere respiratory 
pi oblems. 
The existence of life is also dependellt on the presence or woler. While three 
quarters of this planet is cuvcled w ith water, only about one hundredth ofa percent 
is fresh water (Baarschers 1996: 143). Water exists ill 'compartment s' in the 
b iosphere: grou lldwater. cOl11pJising the water ill the cracks between layers of 
rock: surface water, made up of rivers, lakes and the oceans; and the atmosphere. 
conta ining water vapour. WaleI' is no t static. Surface v 'aler evaporates into the 
at1ll0~;phel e where il condenses and returns 10 the ealth via various form s of 
preci pitation, so that it join s once again with surface water. and seeps throug h 
cracks and crevices 10 mix with grollndwater Continuously travelling. sometimes 
as liquid, sometimes as vapour, water rorms a maj or component of the biosphere 
12 
(Baarschers 1996 143) Esselllial for survival, fresh waler bri ngs necessary 
chemicals inl o (Jlg,lnic systenls, and nushcs ullwanted chemicals out . 
The increasing human population is placi ng heavy demands on avai lab le waler 
resources (Baarschers 1996: 145). Not all of thi s is required for human 
con sllmplion ~ industry also uses large volu mes of fresh water in boilers, cooling 
machinery and th t production processes it sdf. An approxi mate 250 tOilS of waleI' 
is requ ired to make a Ion of papc,;:r, and as Illuch as 4400 tons of fres h water to 
make a ton of steel (Marshal! 1974 : 74). Water lIsed in industry becomes 
contaminated wi th chemica ls and dirt. In the past, spent water, ('.all ed efllucnt , was 
Siml>ly re turned to its source in the hope Ihat the pollutant s would be diluted. 
Nat ura l bodies of water do have the ability to break down com plex molecul es into 
sim pl e su bs.tances ( I)aa rschers 1996. 149). However, incre?sing quantities of 
eJll uen t mcrl itx thi s capacity, resulting in water pollution Fortuna tely, in the 
developed world adva nces in analytic chem istry have led to considerable changes 
in all iludes ilnd practices, resulting ill it decrease in the dllln ping of em uent. This, 
howevcl, has Ilot ended the problem of water po ll ulion because th is form of 
pollut ion con ti nues in less developed count ries and air borne poll utants also 
conI ami Ha te water suppli es, as discussed in the sec tion on acid rain. 
With l!vcr- inclcasing population mll llbcrs ":O IlI (:S a high demand for food, whi ch 
has resu lted in a booming Hlnni llg industry. Hig h popUlation numbers demand 
high crop yie lds, which trans la te into big profits for corporations. Traditio na l 
fann ing techniques of crop rotation art: linable to meet the demands of quan tit y or 
pra t-it , and have large ly been rep laced by single crop fa nning, allowing for 
speciali sa tion. Irriga tion in ag ri cu lt ure utili ses three quart el s of a ll fresh water 
drawn from 11u..: ea rth (Oaarschers 1900. 1 ~1 5) . The agricultura l indus try uses 
fert il isers to replace deple ted so il minerals The presence o r large quantities o f 
organic fCI tiliser, in the form of catt le manure, re leases a1111110'li a, a source of air 
pollution, whi li! ma ll ure componen ts tiller in to the grotl ndwaler causing wa ter 
poll ution problems (Baarschers 1996: 148). Fertiliser contains nit ra tes, which are 
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highly solubl e and thus dissolve quickly into ground water. 'While not potentially 
harmftJI to adults, high nitrate levels above 10 ppll1 have been known to cause 
mcthemogiobcnia . a condition in inillnt s that reduces the oxygen-carrying capacit y 
of't hcir blood A slow asphyxiation i!:l the result (llaarschers 1996: I SS). 
Mass planting of single crops has given ri se 10 increased ins!c\ populations. This 
has led to the develop men I and use of pest icides. While pesticides were designed 
to poison the insects. they had unforeseeable consequences resulting in the 
sterilisation of the soil , contanUIl<lliol1 o f groundwat er, (kpletion of wildlife 
populatiol1s, and the encouragement of resistant pests eiimpson 1990:72). 
Depending 0 11 the amounts, pesticides sllch as DOT. dieldrin and a ldrin can have 
seliolls an~cls all both human and animal health (l3aarschers 1996: 148). While 
some pe~licides are insolublt!, and therclbre do not pose a rea l threa t to the 
contamination of our watcr supplies, Illany of them are soluble. This is where the 
problem lies, for treatment procedures are comp licated and often expensive. 
Despite their wide-spread use. " most (synlht:tic) pesticide programmes have been 
decided fa ilures in mecting long tlClTn pest control ohjectiv\.:s and cxact Cl high 
ecological cost" (Simpson 1990:72 ) 
«Despite its importance in providi ng li S with food ... soil has heen o ne of the most 
abused resources" (Miller 1988 : 140) It form s the fo undation of a ll terrestria l 
communiti es, and plays an essential IO le in the decomposition of organ ic matter 
and the rel.uln of minerals in the nUlli(:nt cycle . lI ealt hy soi l i:i a complex mixture 
of inorgal.ic minerals, decay ing organic mall er, water, air, insects. bacteria and 
other micro-organi sms (Smith 1986: 15 ... ) .7 It is an ecosy:; telll in itself, and 
provides tht: lIutrients necessary for plant life, which, direct ly or indirect ly. provide 
food for humans and other animals (Miller 1988: 140). 
-----
7 One hectare of 50 11 may cOLltai ll 300 million iLl secls~ whi le 30 grams of so il can contain 
in the region of one million bactelia, tUO 000 yeast ce ll s and 50 000 bits offllnglls 
myce lium (Mcyt:l"s 1994 : 22). 
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Modem agricn lluntl pr~l.'ti t: (·" oV(,lbll l dcIl the ~{l il It { 'Ql1t ;nuolIs planting {If the 
sa mc cr' Jp leads to a draining of thc snir~ Ilutrients (lilt! lJlill ~ la l ~, If.'';w ing it bnncn 
Unable lu meet the increasi ng yie ld demands, the soi l is fcc with fellili sers . '1 hcse 
arc of thc orga nic and illo rga nic varicty . Orgnnic fertili sers are o f three types: 
aninllll Illallu re, green lllallUl C <l lld {'Olllpost These alc usc ful in lcslol ing ~(l il 
structure. illcl casi ng (lI g<lllie lIit lOgen con tent. <lnd ~til11ulalillg the glowth and 
le production of bacteria . Theil app li ca tion, howevel , is cos tl y I'IS lalge qucllltities 
need to be used, involving tT (lIl ~ pO II <l ti on and stol<Jgc. As a resu lt inorganic 
fertili sers have become increasing ly po pular as they introduce high levels of 
nitratcs illto the soil thereby increas ing the yield al a portion of the cost. Excessive 
applicatio ns or chemical rertili sers. however dimini shes Ihe ability or the so il 10 
ho ld water and thus acce lerates eros ion Added to thi s is the eutrophication of lake 
and I iver syste ms, leading 10 the loss of Ji sh and wi ldlire populatiolls (S il11pson 
1990:71) Thel e is difficult y ill measUI illg the deglec of so il contamination 
becaust' tlw e Oects o f pullution on so il functions and ~o i ~ organisms, uptttke by 
plant s, (tlld passage 10 grolllldwtllCI , ca n he delayed 01 indil ':'c t (Si lllpson 1990:7 1). 
Agriculture. logging , construction, mining. deforestation rUl the ca ttle indu stry and 
other human activ ities that remove plan t cover acceleraH the rate at which soi l 
erodes. Plant roots protect the so il from excessive erosiol . Exposed, bare soi l is 
easily washed away with the rains. It is estimated that the anlount of topsoil til<H is 
lost each yea r would fill a train or freight cars long e nough to circle the planet 150 
times (Miller 1988 : 147) Valuable topsoil is lost, leaving bare, barren g round . 
Excessive erosion no t only reduces the fertilit y of the so il , but «the resu lting 
sediment also clogs irrigation dit ches, navigable waterways, and reservoirs used to 
generat e e lectric power and provide drinking water for urban areas" (Miller 1988 : 
146). 
t 2 .5 cm of topsoi l can take anything from 100 - 2500 yea rs to form. 111e same quantity 
of soil ~a l1 be destroyed in as little as 1U yea rs {Meyers 1994: 37\ 
IS 
There i ~ 110 dCIl )" ing the lISerUIIlC"" (wd \'~ l .. e or chemical plOdllcts, l' orhIll3teiy, 
the ncgclti ve consequc nccs associ(1 tcd wilh chel1li c<l 1 use hilVe beC'1l r('cu~n i sed. 
with the bell er manageme nt or chc l11i cft l use ftncl di"posal heco ming a C01ll1ll0n 
ohjective o r industry. the scic lltili c communit y a lld the regulatory authorities 
(S impson 1990.(8) 'I his howcver doe" nol dimini sh lhe fa ct tlmt '· ,he lllu';l 
devastat ing ftcci dcnl s in indus!1 ia l hi story have lesulted fro m the loss of 
contai nmc nt of chem icals. ei ther ill their tl 3nspOltalio l1 or the i. plOcessing·· 
(Sirnpson 19<JO 'oR) '\'hcaccidcll talr eleasc orchclllic<1 ls inlhe lll anuract1lling and 
processing stages have led to the Illass poisoning or both hUlIlans and w ildlife. 
result illg ill general ions of chron ic ill -hea l! h (S illlpson 1990' 69). 
The United Nat ions EnvirOlllllcnta l Programme (UNEP) cstimated that the total 
world productio n o r organic che micals was 250 mill ion luns annually. in 1990. 
This figure was predicted to douhle over the next decade (~ illlpson 1990·70) This 
information. togethcr with the knowledge that m(ltl cr C311110 ' be destroyed, hut tht\! 
it mercl) re forms or degrades. has made «the inte ntiona l. inc ide nt al, o r accident al 
release of chemi cals ... (the) primary foci o f e nvironmental concern" (Sirnpson 
1990'69) As a resu lt . stri ct inlClnational standards govern the c reat ion, 
transpo rla tio n and use oft hcse products. 
Unfortuna tely. the Third Wurld is one of the largest users o f f.:1rming chemicals, 
pestic ides and fertili sers , A majo r prob lc m is that the hig h standards and 
restric tio ns current in the f-irst World are e ither unknown 01 neglected ill many of 
these countries, leadi ng to the misuse of pesticides alld o ther chemicals designed 
for agricu ltural purposes. This leads to water polllltion~ air pollution and the poor 
containment of hazardo us che micals (Sil11psoll 1990: 74). Most of the legislatio n 
and controls put into place 10 protect humanity and the environment are not 
applied in these countries as the " hand-ta- llIouth subsiste nce needs orThird Wo rld 
peoples tends to overshadow the perceived eonnictE with environmental 
cons id{;latio ns" (Simpsoll 1990: 75). 
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The rC C:: Ollrce~ or the planet - <111 , water, <l lld ~(lil - .11(, finite As the human 
population incfcac::cs so do the dCIIHlIlds for cnClgy <11 1'1 food 'I hcse incleased 
demands exell a ';trnin on the plllll('t's ~yst e1l1s in the form of ovcruse and 
pollu tion ') S toppi ng the abu se and pollution of the planet ' s systems is a dimcult 
task because tilCle is no one 01ctor that is responsib le , Rather it is a cu mulati ve 
eOcc t ofa who le host offaclors, \'vhic h are ultimate-ly a ploduct ofoll r lifestyle a nd 
outlook, 
AccOIding 10 an ecological view oflh e world , the planel as a who le is a c losed 
system,IO Atmospheric te lllpCr<l ture, chem ica l composi tio n and evell the form ation 
of the Ea rth ' s (' rust arc a resu lt ofa homeostalic bala nce , I-Iomeoslasis is the self-
regu lating mechani sm o fa system tl1 (1 l c'<ecutes and moni to rs event s essential to 
the ex istence ofthal system, f' lIsuri ng that the system maintains Cl ste<ldy sta te 
(Smith 1986: 72) , It is possible that the exponentinl growth ufli1(' human 
population, increased tlcllIands for enelgy and food, together with a host o f other 
ractors such the testing of lluc1ear we~po ll s, the excessive ex tinction of specie Si I 
and the decimation o f rain forestsl1, IO Ilame but a few, could place a sign ifi cant 
slrai n on the envirollment IIiat could ultimate ly lead 10 changes in the overa ll 
-------
\I Garrett Hardin argues in his essay I.{fehoot Erhics : 'l11e Case Agoinst /Ie/pillg the Poor 
that because tJle resources oftJle planet are finite access to them sho~ild be restricted 
(I-Iardm 1998: 444), In his opinion only developed countries should ha ve access to them, 
to the detriment of poorer undeve loped countries , Ironic<llly, it is the developed cOllntries 
that C(HlSllllle mllch of the resources alld create huge quantities of pollution , 
10 A closed system "is one ill which energy but not matter is exdlanged between the 
system and tJl e environment" (Smith 1986: 73), 
11 It is estimated thal 50 - 100 species disappear every day (Meyers 1994 : 154), 
t2 Approxi mately 18 111ill ioll hectares oftt opical forests are destroyed each yea r (Meyers 
1994: 38) . 
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g lolJ" 1 C II Vl lt ln lIIC I.1 ., ' I'h ll'i i!'l cnu:"'c It )! \;0. 1\;('.11 , 1111 " t ll e n UI:.1 !'IDlltnl 1! putclltinl 
conseque ncc of g loba l enviro llltlc ntftl change is the Cl osion of Earth ' s life-supporl 
systeJll" (McMichacl 1993 : xiii) . Thi s places li ving organi sms in a tenuous 
position for they are e nti re ly dependent upon the physical (t nd biologica l 
CllvitOlltllCllt This incl lldes humani ty, fo r we are not separate beings li ving ap,lI! 
from IlHt urC, but rather fOlln part or the intricate web or Ii fc (Mercha nt 1992' I ) 
To sUllImari se the tmU II claim s of this chapter, a host of' fac tols are collecti vely 
placing a huge burden 011 the planet ' S natural capaci ti es and ca pabi lities. 
Probl emati ca lly, these factors arc 110 1 independent of one anolher, but rat her are 
linked toget her in et complex web of mutual re inforcel1lo..!lIt. G iven the current 
coursc of act ion of the developing world, there is no doubt that at some po int in 
the fu ture the cu mulative effect l lf these factors will overburden the environment 
and dest roy large part s of it Decallse of this. life on thi s pla net hangs in a 
. b I " prccar IOUS a ance. 
We ca nllot do Illuch about the damage a lready caused . Ilowever, we should not 
accep t that no thing cou ld be done about the future. "The vel y fact that we have 
awakencd to all o r this is ... a sign of progress" (Weston 1999: 47), as no problem 
can be solved wit hout lirst hav ing an awareness of the problem. Purposive action 
U For further information refer to Jallles Lovelock's Caio. A New /.ook (If l .{re ,,1/ '~'rmh 
1987. Oxford. 
14 Object ions may be raised that t.his is an a larmist position. Environmental disasters have 
occurred in tJl e past and the world has righted itself. However, such di sasters have been 
natural and unavoidable, whereCls the current crisis, which could spell a disruption of the 
world 's natural systems, is ent irely at the hands of humanity. We are co llect ive ly acting ill 
ways that contribute to and compound Ole problem. l11is makes the current environmental 
c ris is Cl matter of lllora l coll cem . In add ition, Anthony Weston, in An Invitation to 
f.iwirol1mental h."lhics, says "rather than requi ring prooftJlat our JJresetlt COllJ'se is 
di sastrous before we change it, ... we ought to requi re proof that it is not disastrous before 
we elllbark 011 it" (,,yestoll 1999: 5 1). 
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o,; •• "l lI 0 11\' " 1" .. p" .. I<-.", """'''1·' ''' ,,, .. . " ' ~ .... " '''' ., .,.".", ,,.;1,,, I., .. " .. . 1 ,h ... , .. . ... a. I'" 
danger a nti dC"!llIction that li e" al1('(ld rhis signifi{"s Ih~1 \\c are at a turning po int 
regadi ng our €'nv irolllllclllnl s ilu (l lio n. onc in \.", hi ch. Ihro'lg h exploring alternati ve 
solutions, we can take the ini tia ti ve to address CIl Vil(llllllCnLa l isslIcs in meaningful 
alld lncflll ways It is along ,hc<ic lines tha t we call lIlldNstand the concept o f an 
CIl Vil (IIlIIlClllal Cl is is. a time bo th of dange r. dcs lluctioll 11 Id l os~. as wclI as a l ime 
of as"l!Ssmcn t, ;nnovat ;on a nd t rans f(lI'Inat iull 
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A ll IJlvifntioll tu I~ fhi<'s 
In Clllpl Cr One I <lrgucd t lm! wc ,li e CUIH.>Tlll y facing <111 cnviHHlIllCII I1l1 CfISIS 
Scicmc alld environmental policy me the most C.OUlIllt hl ly accept ed opt io ns tu 
dC<lii.I g wi th thi s el lsis. Whil e c(1ch has a signi fi cClnt C01' ,liblltion to make, I wi ll 
<lrguc that overemphasis o n e ither o ptio n could ca~il y r Ol11pound the problem. 
Furthcl lllore, it is shOlt -sighl cd to rest ri ct the burde.n o f responsib ility to the 
s(.: icntifi c com!llunity and governmcntal bodies since the environ mental cri sis is a 
c0 11 scqucIlce of collecti ve human actioll . According ly, if wc w ish to adequately 
ad(hcss the ellvironmenta l Cl isis we mu st amend those actiolls Ihal are destruct ive 
to the environment. 
In order to facilitate Cl clHtIlgC ill o ur acti ons we w ill necd to qucstio n some 
fund amenta l Ilul11 an va lu es since ali i actions are hu gely informed by OUI value 
systems. This highlights the illlp0l1ance of et hics in relation to the envilOnl11e nl a l 
s ituation . ThclC arc three nw in approaches 10 elhi c~ 1 Ihe01Y - the teleological. the 
utilit arian and the deolllologica l. I will argue tha t the}' <\le, fUf Ihe most part, 
fU fm ., lated and app li ed ill a nthropocenlli c wa ys . 
It is lil y contentio n that an ant hropucentr ic va lue ~.ys t cfll IS in<1dequate 10 
e fTec ti ve ly deal w ith the e nviroJlmental cri sis. 
Givell the magnitude orlhe environme nt al cri sis and the potential threat it poses to 
life or thi s planet, a 'wait and see' attit ude is clearly not an option. One popular 
suggest ion is to turn to apphed science, which helps provide adequate material 
nceds for everyone and a lso extends the ri chness of ollr non-material lives. 
J3ecause it plays such an il1l1'Ollanl and sucially plOlIlinenl role, it const itu tes a 
majo r c le me nt of the 'culluml fill e r ' th rough \\lhich Vveste rn society views Ihe 
environment (Pepper 1996: 240). 
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The i.leolugy l,fdas<.; ica l .';Ci('I1<.' (', \\ hich is ::> Iill very (h'l1lillanl , hl'1<; developed into 
a dualist p.1I<ttJig11l in which thc sciclllili c obsclvcr j ~ ~epalalc ,-,pd distinct frum her 
observaliolls "rhi s h"s CO lIlTihlll cd to a conception o f the world as consisting o f 
independent lll"lcria l ubj ect ~. each hav ing independent properties: with the 
behaviour of the whole c,< plainable by the beh~viour or it s constit uent parts. 
Nature is v iewed as sepan1te nom humanit y. machineli kc fi nd Icducible to basic 
components, whic h can be ohiect ive ly known and pred i cled . l~ For Illany peoplc 
th is sc ience rcprc~c lll s the llI (lst ' Iespcctab le' way Iu know nature and Ihe somce 
ofahsolul e ' truths' on whic h 10 I1I'1<;e dC'cisions 
The dime nsio ns o f envilOll lllellta l issues are seldom, ir evCl , resllictcd to the 
specifi c parameters of anyone discipli ne (Des Jardins 1997 :5). MOlcover. 111051 
major issues fac ing humanit y, e.g . the population problem. the enelgy cri sis and 
the I;o llutio n o f the plimary natural systems, stretch bC)"_lTId being mere sc ie ntific 
proh!C'IHS, in vo lvi ng as they do. socie ty_ politics, law, Ilumal1 I ig ht s, econo mics, 
etc. Covcring such a broad spectrum, it is cvid ~ lit that sci e nce~ wide ly 
di stil1g ui shed by the cOlllpartmc llt a li sa tion o f knowlcdg' ~, cannot del iver abso lut e 
know 'edge on globa l issues (M cMi chael 1993 : 126). -,'he task o f assess ing the 
impacts of ecological imbalances and di sruptions on human and o ther life fo rms 
entai ls s ig nificantly more than the classica l scif ntifi c paradig m of hypo thes is 
fo rmation, data co llectio n and data analys is. Leaving enviro llmenta l problems in 
the ha nds o f science would , til elcfore, effectively result in a narrow understanding 
of the m, and by correlatio n lilll ited. sho rt-sig hted solutio ns to the m. FUI thermore, 
the classica l science ideo logy asse rt s tha t «sc ientifi c knowledge equals power over 
nature" (Pepper 1996: 240) •• md that the manipulation o f nature can be used for 
social prog ress. This has resu lted in science being used in many modern 
deve lopments, of whi ch some are exerti ng a negative impact o n the environment 
(inorganic fel1ili sers, pesti c ides. industrial processes, nucl ear energy and nuclear 
ann ~" to name but a few) In the lig ht o f thi s, sc ie nce sh')uld not be viewed as the 
U TIH' f.ystems view, mentioned ill Chapter One, represents all 3ltemative to this outlook. 
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ultil11nh': l'!(II WCC t.r hope ft.' !he I1l1ul'c . nnd C'lcndy <lInlll" 11('! h e ~IV(" I\ fid l 
Fortulli1lcly ptl! Ad ie lll shin s me OC('llnlllg v., ililin Ihe fi e ld C ltlssicaJ 
UlldC! :-lalldillg<; {l r the wodd (;onsi <;ling (}f ' ind f' pf' nd cnt pt'lIlici es' tllC being 
I ca!,$es~cd . "nd I ('pl (1ccd hy a mOIC holi !Jt ic and ecologicall y informcd 
llllde l stanliing that all things arc inseparable from th(' g lca tc r who le Ihat is the 
universe (PeppCl 1996: 2~7) III this sense some cu !rent scicntifi c t rends can be 
lIsc ful in developing a IIlOle encompassing understanding o flh c cnvironmcnt 
A1lo thc! cOllllllo nl y accepted opt io n ror dealing wit h the crisis at hand is that o f 
I!lJl'ir ollmellfa/ !'o/i,,')' , legislation. and regulation, w hic h, if correctl y impl eme nted, 
mo nito red and adhered to , can prevent environme ntal pollution and improve the 
gene I al qualit y o r thc em:il OIlJ1lent (Merchant 1992 : 26) I lead way is bt~illg made 
w itl, po licies addressi ng e nvir o lllllcntal issues at bo th local a nd g loba l levels . 'f. 
The closc associatioll II Hl t ex ists between po pula tio n growth and the ot her 
cl1vi lo lHnental issucs, as disclI ssed in C hapl e r O nc, mak es it tlpparcnt that o nc or 
th e 1110st important policies would be to cwb po pulatio n growth. This would entail 
a s tabili sat iol1 o r human !lumbers with a gradual levelling o ut at a lower fig urc at 
some point in the fulure (Marshall 1974: 137). UllrOllullately indi vidual 
governments have largely been re lllc lanl to formu la te sllch polic ies Due to the 
d e li cate nature orlhe topic, it would be politicc: ll y sui c idal to include such po licy 
recomme ndations in a party manifesto . 
16 Section 24 of the South African Bill of Rights protects the environment for the benefit 
of prescnt and future citizens . In addition , there is the National Environmenta l 
Management Act 107 of 1998, the Land Reform Programme of I <)98 and tlle White Paper 
on Bi.J·diversity Conservation. Intemationally there arc Clean Air Acts, Water Resource 
Acts. Noise Abatement Acts, etc. 
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Polic it.·", 0 11 r('sou lt:C con~C l vH ti o ll and pollution tllcjuc;t as iIl1p{)ltClnt R" population 
polidcs Unforltlllcncly govClllIl'Cllt c'll 11101 be i so lfl ted n um the ecunomy of the 
country It ther('fOl e bccollle ~ VCI y di ITIcuh to achieve t:o ll t:c.l ed fiction towards 
resource llIanagcme nt and plOtecl iun when most pulitica l programs seelll 
dedicalcd 10 inclcac; ing thc plOspelit y o f the indi vidua l voter and of the Gross 
National Product (M'H sh~ 1I 197-1 . 152). Fill thermOl c, the effect ive imple mentation 
of such acts and polic ies oilcn lies in the hands o f loca l authOlitics and counc ils 
who have thc imlllcdiate ncede; of the communit y 0 11 thcir agenda Generall y 
cOllllllunit y <glOwth and devclopmcnt' ho lds gre(l ler importance than 
environlllental concelllS 
Scie .,tifi c and poli cy options each ha ve distinctive roles 10 plilY in addressing the 
c nvir.lIllllenta l Cl isis. Sciencc is a useful tool for ri evelol:i ng (Ill unders tanding of 
the c r mpl cx it y of life. whil e policies govern and regu late human socia l behaviour 
Ackl.owledging that the environmenta l cri sis is not a !-" Illple issue, but rather a 
colle'.: lion of complex and intelconnecting issues, it wodd be unwise to assume 
that either of these options. on thei r o wn, could efTecli ve ly solve the current 
environmental cris is. S trict reliance on either option could produce "backlashes 
more serious than those they were designed to remedy"' (Gruen & Ja mi eson 1994: 
7). 
Furthcl more, handing over the task to sCIe nce or government entail s a 
relinqui shing o f personal responsibi lit y that will nol make the problem go away 
The point is that we all act in ways that contribute 10 the cri sis, and Ihus are all 
responsible for what happens to the world around us. Accepting responsibilit y 
entails not only acknowledg ing that Ollr individual actions contribute to the 
environmental cr isis, bUI also that we are accountable for our actions. As such, we 
should be willing to amend or change our actions ;n an attempt to remedy the 
currer t situation. 
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lJclic\C' abou l wl1(1 1 i~ g{1l1d. \\ 11<11 i~ lig ht. anti whal is p~ lllli ~,i l )l (' (Piclcc & Van 
1)c Veer 1<)95 ' 1) '1 hel'(' fol c wc need 10 a~k fundamcnta l questions ahout what ,\<c 
as Illllll<1l1 bC'ings vaJut'. why wc v<l lue the thillgs wC' dn. the way wc shoulcll ivc OUl 
li ves. OU I pl<'cc in lIatlll(" [llId thC' kind (lfwodd wc w(l111 lo \eave uehind for I)t hels 
(f)c~ J<l l'dills 1997:5) This pi (I ces {llll' v<l lue systcm at Ihe hem! uf the 
e llvilUnlllCIlI <l 1 cd !'is Clearl y thcn. placing the burden of Icsponsihili ly o n ei ther 
sciencc or govcllll1lc nt pulicy will do lill lc to con'erl the s ituatio ll as lnng as the 
va lues in fo rming our actiolls I CIlH1i n unchanged . Vie can a ltrr our atLitudes ami 
ac tio ns through qucstioning and c.:h<lI1gi ng our va lues. and in slLc h a way w c can 
begin to address the problems of the envi ro llment. 
Que~ tioning our values i, ,HI in vitation t o efhic:.', the hnlllch of philosophy that 
seeh a reasoned exami nation of wha t custom tells us <lbout how we oug.ht to live 
(Dc~ J.ud in s 1997: 16). I\n el lli (: aSSllmes Ihat 11101al norms and va lu€"s govern 
hum; n behav iour. It is the task of et hics to critica ll y exami ne these norms. In an 
cnb ' to provide re sysl c llHlli (' a nd comprehe ns ive snide 10 hUOlcl11 heha vio ur 
elhi(;a l theories arc formula ted (Des Jard ins 1997' 15). These theories prescribe 
mora l val ues, ex plaining to who l11 they apply a\1d what the entailing 
responsibilit ies are, as well as providing a justification for those values and 
respo ns ibiliti es, In no way should thi s suggest that et hical theories ca n solve the 
environmenta l c ri sis on their own, for «e thical ami philosophical analysis done in 
the abstract, ig norant of sc ience. technulogy, and other releva nt di sci plines, wi ll 
no t have much to contribut e to the resolution of environmental problems" (Des 
Jardins 1997: 9). Science, legis la tion , and e thics need to combine fo rces ill order to 
address the crisis at hand. 
Ethical theories have genera ll y been rcgarded as falling into three l1Ia ll1 c lasses: 
teleo logical , uti li ta rian . and deontologica l. Up to date examples o r these, 
recog nised as useful in addressing e nvironme nta l COt1Cl:f1lS. will be explo red a t 
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Aristotle (.HU - JJJ I1(,F) IC('{lgni scs that all thi ngs have a Iclos. a !'pcciric 
purpose 10 which they (Ire inclined (Aristotle I'hysin' 11 . R) Understa nding the 
tclos allows li S to understand the object or bei ng it self. <Good ness' is achieved 
whc n fill object or thing is ab lc to fu lli l its pur pose ur actua li se it s potential (Ues 
lardins 1997 . 22). ThoOl<lS Aqui n<ls (1 225 - 1274) further developed Alistotle's 
theory by synt hes isi ng teleulogy and C hristi an theology All things natural were 
viewed as pails ofaod's di vi ne master plan. Since God is good ness itselr. and the 
natural order wa!' equated with the moral order. an undisturbed nature is good (Des 
Jard ;,,, 1997· 22) 
1Ili/ituritmism is fOllnded upon the writings uf Jercmy Be uham (1748 - 1832) and 
John Stuart Mi ll ( 1806 - 187J) It provides 111l account of lhe good as that which 
produces the g reatest good fN the greates t number (Des Jardin s 1997' 24). 
According to this accollnt <1.11 itct i!'l et hically ;\cceplable if it!'l cOll!'lcquences are 
good for the g rea test number (..If indi vidual s. a nd bad if they are lIot Therc are 
essentia ll y two types of utilitar i;:Hli slTl: hedoni stic uti li tarianism, and preference 
llt ilitari anism. Ilent ham <lnd Mill represent the funn er, recognising that pleasure or 
the absence of pai n is something we all des ire. excluding deviants who prefer pain 
or avoid p leasure. This uni ve rsal acceptance makes pleasure. fo r the hedoni stic 
uti l itarian, something that is objecti vely good (Ues laldins 1997: 25). Preference 
utilitarianis m, on the other hand, identifies the good as the sat isfaction of our 
des ires . 
/)e()lIlulugiclll ethics, founded mainly on the ethical wri tings of Immanuel Kant 
(1742 - 1804). rcsts upon the cla im that we can o1l ly be held responsible for the 
thing: ; that we can control. While the consequcn<:es of our actions are largely 
beyond our cont ro l. the actions themselves are no l. Assumi ng that we are rationa l 
11 Tom Regan 's approach is distinctly deontological, Peter Sin~er 's approach uti litarian, 
and Paul Taylor's approach has a teleological foundation . 
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beings. we act fr rely (111 the lmsis of om rCltiullalil y and the plinc iples that wc 
derive from il IJcolltoh.1y,ic:l1 c lhi c~ roclIseo:.; on these principles and ma,<illls . Kilnl 
argued that wc acl ethically whenever th('o:.;c plim.'iplco:.; arc u\ liollflll y infOlllled flllll 
accepted by all other nlliullCl I heillgs 1\ rational priociple is olle that is ca tego ri ca l 
and uni versa l (Des Jardin s 1997 · 28) Such plinc ipl cs hilve cOllle In he disclIssed in 
te rms o f rig hts with cOlleltltive dllli eo:.; . If an illdi vidnal has spec ific moral rights. 
she Illay c laim cel tClill tlcatlllCllls based on those right s. and others have a duty to 
acknowledge those ligh ts ;md the actions they pl escl ihe 
Ethical theOl ies olfer nun "I criteria III order to detellnille how far onc should 
ex tend moral sfandi"g If <In e ntit y is recognised to have moral standing, its 
intcl-ests lllu SI be taken into account when deciding what actions are permissible 
(Pierce & Van Dc Vecr 1995 . 7) If an entity lacks mO lal stand ing, then its well-
being and interests do not cou nt ill <lily tllorlllly relevant way 1\ va lue theory is 
rmlhropocelllric when it recognises the moral standing of human bcings alone. III 
t lumans are viewed to be "vll luable in and of the msclves ... (while) the no n-human 
world is valuable only insofar as it is of va lue to humans" (Fox 1990: 149 ). 
I fuman s are seen to possess illtl insic va lue, whil e all non-humans are seen to hold 
on ly all instrumental va lue. Uecause or thi s, ant hropocentric approaches arc 
commollly ca tegori sed as instrumental va lue theories (rox 1990. I l I9). Since " the 
base class of traditional Westerll ethics is coextensive with the c lass of human 
beings" (Callicott 1998: 9). in traditional Western et hics only humans are 
recognised to have direct moral standing . Lacking the required qualifications for 
I~ 111e term 'alllhropocentrism' is ambiguous. It is lISed in a variety of ways. It is taken to 
llIeaT'! understanding the world from a human perspective. Furthermore, it is lI sed to refer 
to the understanding that humans are the most significant entities in the universe As a 
result of this, humans arc taken to be the centre of all value. Fc\lIowing accepted practice 
in environmental ethics, (use the term in this thesis in neither ofthe foregoing senses, but 
to refer to tJle view that limits moral standing, and hence direct moral cons ideration, to 
individual humans alone. 
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ethicnl Cl.n!'lith.'lnliulI n~)ll h~lIlInn~ IHC Ilc(lICd ll~ rh irl~:I tU 1l1cnnl'\ 10 hlll1l1l1l c nli!t, 
rather than as e nd s ill the ll1 sc lves (Flliol 1995 · 15) 11('(',WSC (lII1V 11I1111IW int elcsts 
arc taken inlo accollllt. whi le nOIl -human intclcsls are cnlilely neglected. 
tlnthropocentlic e thical approflcllcs l\ave been chClrged with " species islll" (Singer 
1990 6) or «human chauvini"IlI-' {('allicoU 1998' 9) 
Thc three c lasses orcthicalthcori es (teleological. cOllsequentia l and deonlological) 
have. for the must part. been rormulClted and applied in anlhropoeenllic ways. I') 
V/hile Aristotle believed tllnt (Ill living entities have a telos, he allCll ysed this 
rllltlicl into three fillHJalllcnt .. 1 (lctivi ties or powers or life: 'lutritioll . sensation, and 
tbinking (Des Jardins 1997 ' 2 1) All li v ing entities were seen to possess the first 
power. a ll animals the first twu, but oll ly human beings possess a ll three These 
three powcrs were arranged hi elarchi ca ll y, with the power to think at the apex. 
thereby cstablishing rationalit ), :IS a moral c rit e rion Aristotle's teleology, 
specifica lly ravouring huma n beings. resu lted in the view that all «(!nimals ex isl 
for the sake of man, ... ror the use he can make or them as well as for the food that 
they provide" (Aristotle 1962' 40) Aquinas ' development of Aristot le 's teleology 
did little to change the human-ccntred moral c ritelillll. Animal .. were seen to have 
no independent mora l stand ing. it being accepted as ' divine providence ' that 
human beings have the nrrtural world at their di sposal {Piel ce & Van De Veer 
1995 : 15).'" 
19 There are except ions to this gcncra li z.1tion -1lle Pythagorean tradition ; Empedocles of 
Acragcs; St. Francis of Assisi; and Jeremy Bentham all in some way recognised the place 
ofanirnals inllloral considerations. 
20 The teleology of Aristotle and Aqtlinas was not intended to Sllpport all ct1lOS of abuse, 
since buth emphasised the importance of virtues of good character. To act in a cnlcl or 
destru(:tlve manlier was not encoll raged since bad actions refl ect \~d that the agent had a 
bad character. 
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I he 1l('tiOIl' '''; C Illlm ()f ulilitm i<lniSI1I idcnt ific$ pleas1ll c flS fi ll ult imate good I his 
CXJlilllds " the lcalm of IHola l l"oll"icienH io n to includ,:, a ll things that ha ve the 
capa ;i ty tll feel pleasure and P'l'Il" (Dcs Ja rdins 1997' Cn ) t\cc01ding ly $entiencc 
hf'C(H11C'S the mOI<1 1 c l ill'liOlI Iln\Vcvcr, thi s does I1 l1 t Ic<:essitatc that the mOlal 
sl <l llding of <1 11 "Cl1t; (,1I1 CI C".I tUfCS l e:; acknuwledged sinc( it is co mpatihl e with the 
p"lle. plc (lfll tilil y to ICl'oglli <;e diffe lences in the qualit .l o f pi ca sure 'Ihi " a llows 
fo r cel tain kind s of plcaslI! c bcing mo re dcsi! abl e <111< 1 111 0 1 C va luab le than o thers. 
wi th "Ieasu l e~ of the int e llcrt, feeling, imagi nation and 11100a l se lltimcnls being 
placed over plea<;urcs of p il y"ic<!1 sensation (Cooper I C)98: 198). While such ;.) 
formulatio n doc" lIot de ll y tIT .. t lIoll-humans C,lI! have mora l standing. it s 
applicatio ll commonly ig nl\les Ihc plig ht of 1I0 1l- hul1Ians since th(' afTa irs of 
hu mani t Y fire assumed to be of g,1 ra ter siglli li ca ncc 
W hile Kanl did not dCll y Il1nl ani llllll s suITcr. he did de ny that anill Ul ls me persons. 
!>elsons in thi s sense cue understood as rationa l. illltlHlOIllOIIS heings, capable of 
formula ting and pursuing their OWl! conceptions uf the good Ili s rule-based 
deoJltology asslIlIlcd thal o nly hUlII ll n bei ngs have the abilit y 10 thi nk rationall y 
clOd therefore ha ve moral standing Il aving interests ill 0' Irselves as ratiuna I beings 
amounted to the view that o nly the interests and we-It-being of humans count 
lIIon:lly. Accordi ng ly, while it was wrong to Ll se a pelsu' l o nly (IS a means 10 fulm 
anOT her person ' s end , because they s hou ld a lways (a lsc) be recognised (I S being 
cnc!:; i n the mselves, it was accepted tha t lIo n-per:O;OllS ..:ould be lIsed tQ suit the 
purposes of human beings. 
Apart (jom being ma nifest 111 the forl1lulation o f traditio nal e thical theories, 
anthropocentric assumptions ho ld a predominant place in the modern Wes/er" 
I'ullle .\)ls/em . Ilistorica lly, these assumptio ns ca n be traced throug h Western 
re lig ious, scientifi c anu philosophica l traditio ns . \Vcste rn European c ivilisa tio n, 
a llhough in Illany respccts a post-Chri stian civilisation, is dccply innucllced and 
impregnated by C hristian v:'llucs (Auficld & Dell 1998: (4 1). (,re-scientifi c 
Christia n views a ssu med hu man supcrio rit y, placing human existence a t the centre 
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of t hl~ \.111; vcrse (Fo.'( 1990 10), wi t h < 111<111' C l catcd ill God's illluge (Genesis I: 26). 
a frcl: being rcsponsible fur his own act ions. The scriphll es culti vated an 
Clnthmpocclltric view of the world. as the Word of nod instructed that we "be 
ill/itn .! and Illultipl y, and repleni sh the etl rth and subdue it" (Genesis I: 28) This 
ha s b l.!c ll takcn :IS a legitimic:.ing claim for human dominatiull over nature. In 
cUlltra<:.t, Gencsis 2 ' 15 puts ' ma n' into the Garden uf Edell " to \\llI'k it And take 
care of it". This has been int erpreted to place humank ind in a positiun of 
steward ship. w<llching over the earth for the sake of God AccOldingly. 011 this 
reading it was understoud to he humanit y's lule to look uner the I,ord ' s crea tion. 
and nul to 11Ii suse it or destroy it 
The advent of science largely undermincd and alt ered thi s view. In line with the 
thrust of scicntific develuJlment of his timc. Fra ncis Bacon (157 1 - 1626) 
advoeated scientific methodology to manipulat e lIat ure for hnl111111 benefil 
(Merchant 1992: LI6). The expelimcntal met hod of the six teenth century was 
re inforced by the mechanical philosophy of Rene lJeseartcs, who saw that th rough 
method we cou ld '\ender ourselves the masters and possessors of nature" 
(1la ldane & Ross 1955: 11 9). Reduced to a cloekwOIk machine, the natural world 
was !-~CII as someth ing to be cont ro lled, repa ired and manipulated in humanity ' s 
servi{;e. The science of Isetae Newton ( 1642 - 1727). resting 0 11 the assumption that 
matt e-I" consists of indi vidual pmls. with the whole being merely the Slim of those 
parts. propagated a reductionistic view of the world where individual entil ies were 
seen to be independent of their cont ext. These have culminated in a mechanistic 
view or a world, sti ll dominant in the sciences today. in which nature. inert and 
dead, is seen to ex ist entirely for the fulfilment of hlllll aTl needs (Merchant 1992: 
4 1,57) . 
Anthropocentrism, interwoven into Western intellectual development, extends 
beyond the realm of science to be the " single deepest and 1110St persistent 
assumption o f all the dominant Western philosophical. social , and polit ical 
trad itions since the time ofl he classical Greeks" (Fox 1990: 9) 
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Fox identifi es lin er bluat! :Ippro CH.:hcs to the ('mi l () IHll C' lIt 1lI1 'i lng ou t of 
ant lll o pocent l ic ""SlllllptioIlS. whi ch ill Ica lit y are !Iul distillcl alld separa tc, but 
occur in Cl va l icty of combimllions. The eXl fOl1.\itmi.\f ol'I,('o(l(;/' is chmacterised by 
the recognitio n tlmt nature h(l s n purely instrumental va lue to hU lluws. This va luc is 
accc.scd th rough the physica l transrullna tio ll o r the IIOIl -hulI1an nntural world, by 
farming. mining , damming elc . Such practices creale an ecollo mi c va lue, which 
tends to "equate thc phys icnllrnnsfollllation of 'resources ' wilh econo mi c g rowth" 
(Fox 1990: 152) Lcgitimising continuous expans ion and ex plo il(ll ion, this 
ap PIO<lch relies 0 11 the idea that th ere is an ullc nd ing supply of resources. The 
COIIsl'ITnlirm;sl nl'l }rooch, like the first, recognises the econo mi c va lue o f natura l 
reSOlIlCCS II Hough the ir phys il'n l transformatio n, while al the same lime accept ing 
the fa ct that there (Ire limits to these resources It therefore empha sises the 
importance of conserving lI (lt uml ICSO Ul ces. while Jlliori ti sing the importance of 
developi ng the !lOn-hl/IlHIII lUl. l 11 ral world in the quest for finan cial ga in . The 
pre\"en 'Oficmisl approach dirfers from the firsl h V(l in that it recog ni ses the 
e njoy me nt and aestheti c Clll ichment human being" rece ive from (111 undi sturbed 
natura l world. Focusing o n the psychica l 110lll'ishment va lue o f the non- human 
natu ral world . thi s (l pproach stresses the importance o f preserving resources in 
the ir natura l states . 
An Hlllhropoccntric outlook informs a ll Ihree approacbes Thi s result s in a onc-
s ided understanding o f the human- nature rela tionship. Humans are fa voured as 
inhere ntly valuabl e, whil e Ihe no n-huma ll natural world COUllt s o nly in terms of it s 
u se va lue to human beings. As suc h, the li ves o f individua l human beings are 
recognised to have direct mo ral wort h, while the moral consideration o f non-
hUl11 un entities is entirely contingent upon the intererts of human individuals 
(Pi e.-ce & Van De Veer 1995 : 9). As a result , nat ure is understood 10 have a 
s ingular role of servi ng human ity. w hile huma ni ty is understood to have 110 
obligatio ns toward natUl e. The ex pa ns io nist and conserva tio nist approaches 
recognise an economic value, whil e the preservat ionist approach recogni ses a 
hedo nistic, sp iri tual. o r aesthetic va lue They ftccept . without chall enge. the 
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a SSlIlllpti(l1l Ih"I Ill e valllc orlhc lI un -human ml1t11:l1 world is entirel y dependent 011 
hUlIltln need" a lld illlCl csts. A<; a ('~OI1SCqUC II CC, human dlllj(,s ICltli n Cl pUl cly htlllHl l1 
foclIs. thcl coy avoiding the possibilit y that humans may ha ve duties that e~ t emllo 
IIo ll- humans. Thi s l:<lll lead to vicwing the lloll- hulI1<I1l world , devuid of direc t 
moral cons ideration, as a IllCIC rCS(.)U1ce with <l purely in<:tlumclltal va lue of 
servitude. g iving rise to a principle of <tolalusc', \\. hich sees every nalural area in 
tC'1ll ~ of it s potcnt ial culti va tion v<l lue. to be used for humnll cnd" (7.irnlllcrman 
1 99~' I Q) 
It could be argued that there is cssE'lltia lly nothill!! wrtlng with ;1Il anthropocentric 
outlook, sillce it is n<1tlllnl , cven instinctual , to fCl votlr onc ' s self a nd species over 
rmd above all other form s of life lIowever, it is problematic ill that such 
perceptions influence our nctions and dealings with he world Limiting moral 
cons ideration to human he ings has provided a ralio ll Ot I€ for tlm exploitation o f t he 
natural wodd to the extent that tile we ll -being of life on this planet is thlcatened, 
making the comimw. nce of a huge pro po llion or e~ i sting life forms " te nuous if n(lt 
improba ble" (Elliol 1995 : I) As such. I argue thOtI an antilropocenllic outlook has 
heen I" .. gely responsibl e for the present e nvironment,,1 cli sis (Des Jardins 1997 
93) 
The philosophical discipline ofelh ics was sa id 10 ctit ica ll y examine the values that 
gu ide our behaviour. Ilu ma nity has the capacity to trans form and deglade the 
environment. Given the consequences inherent in having such ca pacities, " the 
need for a coherent , comprehensive, rationally persuasive env ironmental ethic is 
imperative" (Pierce & Van De Veer 1995: 2). The purpose of an environmental 
et hi~ wou ld be to provide a rational basis from which t(' decide how we ought and 
ought not to treat the environment. 
The environment was defin ed. in the previous chapter, as the world in w hich wc 
are enveloped and immersed . Thi s includes both indi vi lual li ving creatures, such 
as pilnls and animal s, and nOIl-li ving, non-indi vidual ~ ntiti es, such as ri vers and 
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oc('n"~. rO l c~l s I'llid vdtl ~ rhi 'l vr,.H IHul 1111 illl'lll " i v(' ~phc l l..· ~ 11II1I . ro t I..' ll llc c plt llll 
t.:I Clrily. he Ic fcrr("d I{' a~ 11l ~~ }!."('(flr',. l' III ' ; r Ol1lnt' l1f 
In orde r to accu lIllI fOl the 11101l'11 re latio ns thal cx i ~ t hetween huma lls and the 
g l'ca tl'r c ll vironment , (1 11 (' 11\ i1(ln 11 1(.' 11 UII ethic ~ h ( Iuld lw ve a s ig nifi ca ntly w ide 
range o f fOClIS, Anthro po(:cntTic <l PPlOaehes do 11 0t €'lltClI ain the no tion that 11 0n-
huma n cntiti e,> can havc va lues indepe ndc nt OnnlllHlIl needs and interesls. Because 
u f this, il could be mgncd t ll<l l anthropocentric npproaches al e lIo t c llco lllpas.s i n~ 
enough. 
In opposition. Norto ll cu gues that a weak anthropocentric Clpprondl. which 
c mphClsises the importancc of ' uhjccti vc' humanistic idc1'Il s, j,> sufficie nt tu protcct 
the g lca ter cnvilOlllllc nl. rk C.H1 5C such <111 approach cx t t'~1 t1 S 1ll00al concern beyond 
the imJllcdiate subj ec ti ve int erests ofthc ind ividual to ir,d llde the broadcl interests 
o f the entil e human species. it ca ll provide U a basis for criti cism o f value systems 
whid l tHe pure ly exploi tati ve o f natUl c" (Nol1on 1995 ' 184) I aglce w ith Norton, 
'J'aklllg the co ll ecti ve inl cre!': l ~ of the hUllmll species illl0 account and 
acknowledging that its ex iste nce is ellti lc ly dependent upon the proper functioning 
of the natural world w ill indeed take fI much broader range of entilies. both 
indi viduals and coll ecti ves. int o accoullt when making moral decisio ns, Ilowever, 
because weak Cllllhropocenlri slll makes the continuation of huma n life an ultimate 
ethical goal , it would 110 1. ex tend direct 11100 a l consideration to the g rea ter 
e nvironme nt. Rather, it would indirectly consider on ly those resources, individuals 
and systems that are releva nt to thc continuation of the human spec ies. 
Considering Ihat there arc fair portions of entities that are irrelevant to the 
continuation of huma n life a weak anthropocentric approach, while being 
sig l' ili cant ly morc inclusive tha n the do minant anthropocentric approach, is no t 
c nc(;ll1pass ing e nough 1 1 
2 1 Norton '5 approach is by far the most progress ive account of an anthropocentri c 
ell vil Olllnclltal ethic that Ilmve encountered. However, admitt ing thi s does not impinge 0 11 
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111 "dd iti (m . 1'C"Cfllr"lC" nn el hic i ~ 11 " Y' :ICIH of guidfl llf"C if ' II o llld " Iso ha\-e specifi c 
outCor·1CS towmd which il dilcct~ it!; rocus. Becalls~ ~l r the newness or Ihi s area, 
the object ives o r all cll vilonlllCnlnl ethic C<ln only be .. lIuded 10, however il wou ld 
he lai l to Si1 Y IlIat a n (,IlV;lOlllllcnla i ethic should (1;111 10 ensure thc protection and 
maintenallcc of the grcfll('r environmcnt It is cleftI' IIUlt Ihe expa nsioni st ::Ipproach, 
w hi ch is ptilllnril y cOllcCl"11cd wit h the transformation of Ilall ll e ror econOl11lC 
return, does nol mcet these goalS Neither does the conservationi st approach, 
which is si mil ar to t ile c:-;pflll 'iillllisl i'l pproach. The preservat iuni st approClch dues in 
pi inc iple ~atisfy this rCt ltlirelllclll Ilowever) this is problematic fOI such 
preservation is based upon the Ilccds and interests of humans, and " as huma n 
interests and necds change. so too would human USes fo r the environment"' (Dcs 
Jard in s 1997: 129). NOIl-huma n c ntiti es, held captive by the needs ami int erests o r 
humans, me open to whatever fa ncie" the interests Or hUIll,IIlS 
In li ght ofl lle abovc. I "I guc that all anlhlOpocemric va lue system is no t ;Idequate 
to thl: task of deVeloping a c01l1pl el1ensive ellvironl1lellla ~ elh ic.11 It is fair to say 
that tl' c success of the environment al movcment is l argely :<a result orthe power of 
ant lll ') pOCenl r ic arguments, tor the general population 'ccga n 10 real ise that the 
degradation of the na1ural cnvironment would have sf 'rious consequences for 
human hea lth. safety) and surviva l" (Kat7 1999: 378). lIowever, this is insufficicnt 
when regaltiing the development of an environmental ethic, for the awmeness 
raised by al1tll1opoeentl i~ argllments i s resllicted 10 the consequences affecting 
-------
my argument, for Norton's account is essent ially non- individualisti c and I am arguing fo r 
the inadequacy of anthropocentric approaches that are dist inctively individualisti c . 
2hl11i s is all extremely controvers ial claim, which will not be exp lored further in this 
paper. To do so would sidetrack me from tJl e focllS oftJlis di ssertation. TIle main reason 
for arguing fo r tJle inadequacy of an anthropocentri c approach if, 10 provide an 
illt rodll ct ioJ1 to tJle deve lopment of lion-anthropocentric ethical ;,pproaches . 
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hUlll a n s a lonc ('lcArly <l wid e r and 1l10 rc CIlCOIllP""!'>i 11lt l,t hi c i" Icqlli rcd. onc 
which ex tends mora l concern beynnd hUI1Hl1I b0111H'Inries '-I 
/lIlrill,";": nt/f/(' thcOlies oner a rcftsoll<lb lc alternntiv,'! to in"'tllllnent~1 value 
thcorir·s. Whilc instrumcntal valuc thcories limit 1lI0lal va lue t o humans alone. 
int r insic va lue theories I11tlintain tliat ;n addition to hUlIlans there arc at leas t some 
non- humans lhat have a 1II0ra l val ue. Such a v<l lue is independcnt of any lIse or 
bencfit Ihat humans lIlay dCI ive frolll thcm (Des Jardins 1997: 129) Initial ;H lcmpt s 
at C(l llSll1lcli ng intlinsic va luc thcOIics saw thc reformulation or traditional ethica l 
thcories (teleological, uliliUH; ,lIl <l lld deolltologic<ll). Depnrling fj'OIll mainstream 
eth ica l assumptions. they extcnded the moral criterion beyond restrictive hUlllftll 
ca paci ti es to include <conscious awareness' - animal ri g ht s champion 'rom Regan: 
'sentience' - animallibelat ionist Pl'lcr Si nger; (llld the <good" orall li vi ng things-
biocent ric ethicist Paul T ay lo r In this sense they are re ferred 10 as e'(lel1sifmisl 
Ih(!()1';e.,. widening the circle or mOlal standing 10 inc lude hi g her Older animals. for 
Rega 1; pallicu latly human oppressed senlient animals USHt inlhc COll1lllCICial food 
indw;l ry. for Singcr: 10 all wild living be ings, rur Taylor. 
It is the task or subseq uent chapters 10 ex plore these w idely recogni sed 
extclI)ionist theories in an attempt to see whether they rrov ide an adequate basis 
for the development of an cnvirollmental ethic. 




Torn Hega n: I\lo,.,.lly ( -"ns;II,,";n!! Self-Aware "dngs 
'1'0 111 l ~eg{Hl is pm fC'ssoro f philqc>ophy ~ I NOIlh Cm olin a f} l ale Uni versit y li e has 
wo n tlte Gaug hi t\ \\'at d t( )! Ollt standing lonllihul;OIlS 10 the Animal Rig hts 
Moveme nt and the Joseph Wood Krlltdl Meda l froll! the I IlIlll lt llC Society o f the 
U nit ed Slates. lie is It prolific w lil (>r 011 the suhject of anil11 !l l' s I ight s In 'Ille ('use 
for A llllwllUghls he pui S fu rwa td the cast': thnt. lik e 1111111<111 <; . some animals ha ve 
Illora l light s al1(\ Ilc llce de!wl vc Illora l ('o llsidera t ;0 11 (t lld corresponding moral 
treatmen t. 
Regan begins from the assumpt iOIl that humans have Cl mental life (Rcgan 
1988 18), In hav ing a IlIcntallifc. ' vc ,II C a ware o rlhe \Va lid arou nd us and he nce 
of actions that nfTect us. Such awareness warrants restriction s to these actions, and 
these restrictions ma nifest themselves In the fo rm o f moral theories. While 
dirrerent 1ll0 ra llhcoJics 1'0sllll(\I C differc nl intcrprelal;o ll <; o f thi s understand ing, all 
traditional approaches share the COlll1ll0 n assllmptio n that thi s mental life is 
res triclc;d 10 human beings, and hence moralit y ami moral reasoning have a 
meaniHg ful place only when refclI'ing to affairs conccrning humanit y. Regan 
argucs that some animal s al e not only conscious and sentient. !.Jut also have belie fs 
and dc~ . ircs. can make cho ices of pre ference, are capable (I f intentional action and 
are aut :molllous beings that have emotional li ves. 111 light of thi s, Regan argues 
that arLl lllal consciousness is suni ciently compl ex to establi sh the claim that some 
consci "C" tl s animals have an interest in their welfare. Thi s is the keystone to Regan 's 
argumel 't. If human beings deserve moral treatment because o f their mental 
faculties and ir some animals have similar me ntal faculties, then somc animals 
deserve moral treatmcnt. Accepting Ihat some animal s ha ve certain basi c moral 
rights requires that we mak e rad ical cha nges in the ways Ih(\1 wc tl ca t them (Reg<ln 
1988: x ii) 
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A thorough c:,,< posit ion of Rc!-!:tll"s \\'tll), wi ll ploviclc " 1(lund"li(l ll fmlll which a 
cril iqllC C;lf l he comal ul'll'd 
RCgtHl ' S fir~t step i ~ to mguc that some <1nimals ale (,()!ISCI(JllS. Exploring the 
position of Dcscartcs. who flrgucd Ih<1t <1llimals lack consciousnes<: ill thflt they are 
incapable of thQugll 1 (Rcgnn 1988· 3), Regan acknowledges tha t there is no onc 
reason whieh 011 its OWIl all1 ihU ICS cOIl~ciousness in flnillHlls. '1 herclbre he p, cscnts 
a collection of 1 ('asOlls lilled " 'he Cumulative /,rgullI cn t for Animal 
COllsciousness" (Reg<lll 198R 25) "I h(' fin' reason appeal<: 10 the wi<"le<:plcad 
COl11lnon bel ief !lml ccrlnin (ll1il1l"ls (lIC cOlIscioll .<;. ·1 hi s 1<; 11 01 all attempt to 
fallaciously <lppcal to populRlil y. nor is Ilegan attempting to appea l to common 
sensc in (nder 10 guarantee the acceptability of hi s clai m. Rat her. he pl aces the 
burde n of plOof Qntll those who would deny his position. le,wing il 10 thl' dissenter 
to supp ly adequate rC<"t!'on<; .. " to why the C011lmo n sense view is misguided. A 
s('("om/ reason Regan om:' ls 10 al llihule consciousness 10 some an imals is that 
ol<lil1<1 lY lal1gu'lge is nol distorted when wlki ng of the mcnlCd lifE' of anima ls. 11 
Jocs not seem at nil odd to lalk of a happy pig, but to say that (\ ro ll or toi let paper 
is content c leally st rains the use of common languflge. In an attempt to avoid 
anthropomorphis m ~II\ experiment was undertaken by D. (I, lIebb. who sought to 
rep lace ord inary la nguage with an objecti ve and nOIl -me nta li sti c vocabulary whe n 
describing animals. Genera l In('(lning and understanding for the experimenters 
decrea3ed While thi s does not show that animals ha ve a mental life. il does 
suggest that thcre is no good !'('asoll why wc sho uld lIot talk of animal~ IHlving a 
Il1cntallife. 1\ ,hi,.d reason is a response 10 the view that humans arc different to all 
other animals in thflt they h<1ve a sou l. Regan's positio n is that attributing 
consciousness to some ani mals is in 110 way an attempt to imply that they have an 
immortal soul. As far as he is concerned, a11imals can be conscious without a sou l, 
and lhus ~lIc h a c:1 aim can be madc independent from re ligious justification. A 
JOIl,.,h leason is tha t an imal interaction. wit h human s and w ith their own species 
mcmbers, is entirely cOlI sistent w ith v iewing them as conscious beings. A bitch 
can be seen to interact wilh I'll! pose and intention as she cares l()r and watches 
over her young. 'rhis hardly suggests that she has 110 mental faculties The fiflh 
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f C'r'lIH"l 1l 111 I h a t ·., Ill" 1nl ivo A , t:'- " '"' c ,,' d"Hv" ""'1"'1 .. ,,-1 n H,n ("vohl! i,,"", ), I ha." y , 
which vic\V~ cOIlc;ciOIl"IlC!-;S (IS SOlllcthi ng inhc1cnt in the evolutionary ploce~~. a 
shared charactc l ist ic of higher 0 1 der beings. If c(Hlsc i(lu c; ncss is somcthi ng t hat has 
all adaptive val11e, it is like ly Ihell s imilar Hllilllals will s lmrc s imilar features of 
adaptaTion If is accepted that some anill'1alc; ale very similar to hUIlHlIl be,ings 
physiologica ll y Clud anatumically. It is thelcforc reasoll;1ble to conclude that . like 
hUlI1an beillgs, SOllle .. nimals (lIe consc ious. The CUlllu lative Argument provides a 
theoretica l basis independent of the ability to use language, for allribuling 
co nsciousncss to beings other than humans (Regan 1988'28) Accurding ly, il is nOI 
only l1<lrrow minded to view consciollsness as the sole prooelty of human beings. 
but to deny consciousness in an imals is an expression of human chau vi ni sm 
(Regan 1988:31) . 
Ilaving put fo rward thC' cJflim Ihnt SOI)1e animals <Ire ('ollscious, Regan addresses 
the questioll or which animals are conscious. An anima l is c(ln~i cl ered 10 be 
conscious ir it sat isfies I('asuns (lne tlHough fi ve of the CU lllulat ive Argument 
Accordingl y, it is clear II Ul I many "n imals fil II i nl o the cfllegory of conscious 
beings. It is an accepted. sh<lfed beli er Ih:lt certain animals are conscious. This is 
rcnected in the ordinary ways or speaki ng about and describing Ihem . It is also 
clear that the act ions of certain anilllals indicat e a degree or consciousness. 
Funhennore. evolutionary theory wou ld ~t rong l y attribut e consciollsness to certain 
animals. Consciousness is att ributed to human bei ngs on the basis or the structure 
alld funct ion or their physical bodies 2<1 Given that certain animals have a very 
sim ilar biology to humans, it is fa ir to conclude by analogy that such animals 
would ~ ave a degree orconsciollsness This does not suggest that only the anima ls 
most like us are conscious, but rather that such anim21s have the strongest 
foundation fo r the attribution ofcoTl sc iousncss (Regan 1988 : 28). Regan m .. kes no 
attempt 10 delineate where consciousness in the animal wodd ends. lie seems 
H The centra l nervous system carries iufonn;ltioll Hom the periphera l extremi ti es up the 
spinal cord to the bra;" . 
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cont cn t with ide nti(ying nil l1I ill11l11ills tl~ s<l ti sryi ll ~I the fi ve I('ason" !)r the 
(,ulllulntive I\lgu lllelH. and thcl efi.Jlc de(,llI~ the m to he l:onsciolls hei ngs (Regall 
1988: 29) 2~ Seeing the de finit e delineatiull o r t"u ll sc io llSIl CSS as a task beyond the 
scope o f hi s paniculnr inqui ry. Rrga n1cavcs ;110 other s to arguc the fillcr points of 
the a ttril ~t l t iol1 o ' ·('ollsc io ll sncss 
The nc:'( t task is 10 explore Ihe ("lJml"('xi~r '!f (llIima l {'Oll\chJlf.'ness (Regan 1988· 
34). Fun her pllI suing hi s hUl11an - i.lI1i llla l ann logy, Reg~ll mri vcs at the as"lIlllpt ioll 
that ir hUll1iln heings a lc CO I1 "riOIl" ;Hld have be licfs ,lIlt l dcs ir cs. then nil ani mal ." 
whidl arc si lllilm 10 humane:;, ill r!?lcvall l ways. and arc ilCC{ pl ed to he consciuus, 
should also he seen 10 havc de .. ires find beli efs Orawing rrom the CUJIlulati ve 
Argument. sllch a view is supported hy both C0111111 0 11 sense aod ordi nary language. 
The attribution o f beliefs and des il cs in animals is lugically independc nt of the 
possc5sio n of a sou 1. while nnimals ' behavinr is consistent ", ith asclibing belie f..;; 
and des il es 10 Ihem J7inall y, cvolutitmary theory suppo ll .;; the view that an imal s act 
in th e way that they do because they ha ve beliefs and desires So. cOllvinced or Ihe 
support that the Cumulative Argument prov ides for this view, Rega n chall enges 
others to provide arguments to deny that animal s have belief" and desires. Regan 
notes that the challenge will only be mel ifil can be shown that a dcnial o f'beli efs 
alld desires ill animals does not necessitate a s imilar deni al of beliefs and desires in 
humans. Failure 10 meet this challe nge will provide ralional justifi cCl tioll to accept 
that anin l 31s do have beliefs and desires. 
Two ma jor arguments try to mect this c hallenge. The first clail11s that ("1I1il11aI5, 
unli ke human". do nol and cannot ha v{'" such belier.", a"d desires. The second 
accepts tlrat while anilllals Illay ha ve beli ers. because we cannot know what those 
be liefs are, we cannot explain their heha vior by re ferencing ' vhat they believe and 
what the:. desire (Regan 1988· 37). R. O . Frey, arguing th,; form er, claims that 
while an imals may very well be conscious and have neet1s. they cannot have 
1.~ Regan uses the t erm <animal ' to le re!" 10 the Cf."ltcgory of non ~hUI1l;ln mall1l11als. 
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desires (n, c.!-':" Il I q~H{' JR) 11(> mg.llcs 11t <l' on ly Ih u~(' ind i \ idll<ll s \', hp h<l vC' hcl i cf~ 
cnn ha"e dc~ ir(' s 'I he ahil ity 10 use let ngtrnge j " IIC('CSS,lI Y fo r onc In Imv(' helie fs, 
ac; the ()h.ice! of H Iw li ef is hcli .... v il1g Hmi a paniculnr sent ence is t rue (Reg<rll 1988 ' 
30 ) Si nce anima ls do no t ha\c lingui stic abili ti cs. they C.HlIWt form beli e fs and 
thercrtJl('llrcy ca ll1lO! hfl VC Ct)lr e<:pt1rrrling desiles 
Regal! at gues t1",' linking the Cft Jlacily 10 underslnnd sentences lu the ab ili ty to 
form beli efs is pruulenra tic . As far as Fr ey is concerned , it is nul the case that some 
belie's ,Ire "bmr t lhc tluth ofa pmticular sent ence, bu t rather that all beli efs elltail 
beli e, iug that a particu lar sent ence is true Accordi ng ly. a ll humans who do not 
ha ve the abi li ty to unde rSI<l lld lang uilge do no t IHl ve the abi li ty to ha ve beliefs, 
Ilegml argues th<lt if Ihis is the case, then no human could ever lertm a lang uage, as 
belief" arc essenti al to language m-qu isil io n Young chHdrc n, who cannot talk, 
callnol yet tlndelsl111ld ~enlenccs . According 10 Frey's argument this implies tha t. 
a ll YOll ngchildr c ll ca ll1lotl~''1ll helie fs Ilowevcl. Rcgallllla.intains, til <'lt wt:" need to 
bcli e\'c tliat what wc al c lcHllling has relevance and is illlporu\I1t. otherwise we 
would no t learn il. Without pre-vc!lH11 be liefs we ale ullltbl e to rcceive <'I linguisti c 
education According ly there have to be prc-ve,ba l belie fs . for consistency ' s sake, 
if Ilufllalls can have prc-verba l heli e fs. then so C;:lIl ani mals (Regan 1988: 46), 
1 he refore frey 's argument does not provide a reasonable defence for the denia l of 
the beli efs o f a nima ls 
S Stich 's approach to the complexity of (I1I;mal con~ciou slless accept s that ani mal s 
ma y h<t ve belief's. llo\\-·cvcr, in order to say what animals helieve, we need to know 
the c(ml enL of their be li ef", The only meaning ful way 10 describe thi s content 
would be 10 use concepts that arc human. St ich arg ues thal animal s ca nno t have 
the same concepts as humans. Because we cannol know the content of those 
belicl :;, we do Ilot know what we arc ascr ibing to thc nl whe n we say they have 
belief; and des ires (Regan 1988 : 49). Therefore the la~k of explaining the content 
of an il1 1al's beli efs is impossible . 
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RCg;lIl obs(, l \ c '\ that Stk h utili s('s :111 ' all or non(" <ll'prllflch 10 lIndel"'I~lldil1g thi..' 
concep t. ... Ihal ;111'01111 our hcli t: f::'. \\hi ch i1llpli es 11J .'l1 ;!ll illwl s C<lnnlll iI(1 vC any 
human cOllc<'pls, (tlld thus human bcliers. III respon~c. Regall uners fill alternati ve 
' marc or Ics ... · approach to undcr~t(lnding cOllcept ~ . Such a view sugges ts that 
dilTelcII' gH111pS and individuals (:an sh;ue the same C'l"J1{'cpt to a gleater o r lesser 
degree (Rcg all 1988 : 54) Assessing the two. Rcg an shows Ihat the ' lIIore or less' 
approach account ~ for plOgH'ss ivc <';t'qll Cllti,,1 lecH oing. while 111(' ' all or nunc' 
<tppluach does not Thi s makes the <11101(' 01 Icss' apl"n;H~h logicall y prcrerab le 
Qve, Stic ll 's ' all or 1I01le ' appmiH"'h (Reg(lll 1988 : 51 ). Along these lin e~ we can 
accept that whi le animals du 11 0 1 have a ll our concept s, they ca ll ha ve so me of 
Ihel11 and similarly, while they won't have a ll our beliefs, they ca n ha ve some or 
them Il owevcr. thi s <lues not pro vide adequate rea ... oll to flceept that animals share 
(lny hunmn beliefs 
Regtl I point s oul Ihat Illllllans make choices 10 satisfy particular dc<>il(,s or tn ru1fil 
spcc ' iic purpuses (Regall 198 8: 5R) Making thi s <:ho ic( enta il s a belie f that the 
chos·JIl il em will satis fy the particuiM desire. This ':lel ief, glOundcd in the 
recogl ilion that a connect ion exists hel\Veen the satisfaction of the desi re and the 
ite m to be chosen, exhibits a pf(;,"ferencc toward a particular ite m. Ilcnee it is 
tcn ned a prerercllce bclie r. and is «onc member or the set (If beliers that 
collectively deline our concept " (Regan 1988: 58). Allimal behaviour exhibits a 
similar abilit y to nmke cho ices and hence thcy also ha ve prefere nce beliefs Given 
tha t animal s have preference beliefs. alld that preference beliefs (lie one or the 
classes of beliefs that define our concepts: combined wilh the reasonable 
acceptance of the <more or less' view ~ it follows that animals ca n share a degree of 
our concepts, and thcrefol c a portion orom beliefs (Regan 1988: 60) 
Regall , ill l!lee.ling Frey and S ti ch 's challenge, provides rational justification to 
accept that aninmls do have belie fs and desires. 
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Cmllillu ng to C,'( phH C the I.'o lllplc-.;i ty or <tllill l<t 1 'l\ValCIlCSS. Reg<lll ske tches slImc 
illlpli ('(I ( ioll~ that ;lrisr 0111 OfClll lihuli lll.{ plcfel€'IlCe h(~ li('r.; to (H1iIlHll~ 11; <; !iI SI step 
is to gC'lll:lillisc the attlibu lion or pH:fclcllce hc lic[ .. 10 include a ll a l1im ~ l s. {Regall 
19R8: 7,; ' By way of tlCllIscelllicll ta l algll lll c nt Reg;lll I/I\{;QVCIS 01 hcr cogniti ve 
powers 111;11 a lc IIl'c('ssa lY in o lder !i'H' animals. to have plcfc l CI1C'C belicf" It is wel l 
acccpted that IHllllans (l I e !lot horn wit h ideas. lather wc leal ll II1Iough 
experience.Ut The ex hi bi tio n (If a prcfclC·Ilt'c be lief, whkh i~ Cl gcnf'm li .. €'d helicf 
appiiC'"d to a specific c:ituatioll, I cqu ilCS the existence of H IIlcmory fr u lll il 
previously relev,mt e'<pericll('€' r:(liIUlc 10 remember w(luld lead to .HI inability 10 
form general beliefs, and fhu" th(' inabilit y to fUTllI plcfcrence beliefs. In a simi lar 
m allller the preference heliefs ofal1il11<1 ls are experient ia ll y let1rned. and so an imals 
a lso have the faculty oflllcltlory 
Aside fj'JIIl the illl pOII<1nCe of "I(,11101Y for prelerencf" heliE-fs. ReWlIl goes on 10 
sll!!f~esl ~ 1};I t the <l hili ly tu H:eogni!'e is ec:s(,lItia l. rhi s 11(11 on ly entail .. the ability tll 
peree ive imlividllal items, !Jut al<;o the ability to abstract iu .... ·v id ua l cases in onkr 
to form gencral concepts whl"'" (',ltl thel1 ht"' applied t() par i('ll l<11" Cfl"C" Wi thollt 
these Ilbil iti es there could he no 1(11 iOllfl I a('Cf"lltI11 of how a li i 1I<l ls grasp plefercllce 
bc licl"s (P,cgan 1988' 74). 
f1 av ing good reason to altli!Ju!e jJ lc fere nce beliefs 10 anil1la ls. there is good reason 
to atl libute the ability to form genera l conccpts. Having the ab ilit y lu believe that 
somet hing will satisfy a particul ar desire a lso ind ica tes the abi lity to have 
expcctations, a sense of thi ngs to comc . Thi s ind icates Ihat animals have beliefs 
about the fu lure (Regan 1988: 74). Humans, who have beliefs, act intentionally 
wit h the purpose of atta ining goals, whi ch indicates an orientat ion to the future. 
The Cumu lati ve Argument offers defe nsibl e grounds for viewing animals as 
having beliefs. whil e their aClions plOv ide a bas is for us to int erpret those beliefs. 
26 "TIle Nature·Nurture debate comes into play here. where some .. re of the opinion that 
ideas ale illllate to us, while others such (ts Locke <1rgue that wc arc nom with minds of 
blank slat!~, and ideas form through c~periell ce. 
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J\cconli r~ly. thCIC i .. no logi\-a l 1('(1"'111 \(' (Ir'ny Ihnt an imal .. "c t inl cntil)l1ally tu 
fulfil speci fi c PUIIRlses. TII; s SllggC<;I<;. Ilml lll((IHIlI(4ls h:"t'.c n sell se of Ihe fllllllC. 
The ahility 10 act ill a Illamler III <'It indica tes intelligent int cntiollal "ctivi!),. in 
hUlll illl (eIIllS, trilll slates into Clgrllcy II' agcncy call be I t'cognised in humans 
a<:-corcling to the ;1 <l",;hules. ;md ~llilllrlls ;lr(' shown t(1 have the snlll e tI"liuul es. 
then we fife in a pnsition to view anirnClls "as indi vidual s whu act in tentionally" 
(Rcgctll 1988: 75). " hi s paves the wily 1'(11 Iccogni sing ClllimCll s <I S self-conscious 
beings., It\!" " illl (,lI t;onal action is po"sible o nl y «H' those who ale self 
c"ollscious"'(Regall 1<)88: 75) 
C laiming that some anilllal s have this dcgl cc orcolllplc,<ily Ofcollscinusl1css ;11 no 
way cOlTlmi ts onc 10 the position tlmt illl animal s arc silllil (l rl y conscio us Drawing 
Sllpport (l om cvnlll lio ll <lry thcOlY. Regan cxplains consciollsness as ex isting in 
levels or degrees . According ly. !'OIllC consciollS a nimal s TlIa y have a very 
rudimental Y TlIental life. Ac.;k nuwledging that drawing dislinct lilles could he 
highly controversial , and to (haw a linc ror each parlicull'lf" case wou ld be 
illlplac ti(·ft l, Rcgan makes the general claim that animal s arc not on ly "conscious 
and scnt ient but al so have belier!'. desir('s. memory, a seIl S(~ (If the ruture. sel r-
awarellcs~;. and an emotiona l lire. and Cil ll act intenlionall {' (Regan 1988'77). 
Deny ing the complexity or <I!limal consciousncss was notc I to bc a thcOIctical 
possibility. however, it does lillle to move o nc beyond establ ished prejll{lices and 
practices. 
The problcm is no t scttled , fo r while it may be reasonablc to vIew (lnimal s as 
having complex mental lives. it does not suggest that this level or complexity is 
present at every stage of development. To set clear parameters, Regan stipulates 
that allY human or anima l or onc year or more may be deemed to possess such a 
level of complexily (Regan 1988: 78). The specifics or the age st ipulation are 
largely arbitrary. but it is reasonable to assume that both new-born huma n infants 
and a nima ls neither have the capacity or the capability to hold thi s degree of 
consciousness. A rurther stipulation Reg"n makes is that such a general statement 
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{'ollC('rrllng Ih(' (\C'g rcc (lf l'(llllp l<,'(ity of cnn~c i(\" 'I: "es: . ('ppli('s only 10 nOlmal 
hUlllilllS and 'lIlima l ~. \,ithoul hirlh dele.: t" or mcnlal d i ~ahilitie" In c!;'1imil1g that 
<tlliOlfl ls arc c (lll s('i(llr~ in W<lys ~i milM to hurmlll beings n,<'gtll1 is not stlgge~ting 
that :'l1i"l<lI~ have the ~aIlH.' level of conscioll ~ l1e~s as human hcing~. hut only that 
the) 1l(l\T Ill,.:: S<1l11C kind (\fCOII~cillusl1e~s. uut dinE-relit in dc-g.-ee . 
I\ nil11als ha vc a wet/mc (1S Ihcy can nue " 'c ll or ill dwing the cOUl se of the ir lives 
(Rcga n 1988 82) (,irctlll1st<lncc~ tll<1\ arC' b<.'llefici,,1 1o ~Il ~nilllal. such (1S suOicient 
fuod and walcr. SlIpport that (lnilllal ill a pusiti ve way: whi le a lack of thuse 
Ilcccssary itcms negative ly afTects that an imal 's stlrvi\ al For an animal to benefit 
fi om a particu lar set of ci r(,ttlll stal1ccs assu mes that the samc anin1a ls w ill be 
Hround tu cnjoy thosc bcncfits. Thus tu talk oflhe welfare of an anima l implies the 
c,<islellrc of;tn ide ntit y 27 '1 hi s i" not an attcmpt to bfg a mOlal queslion o n the 
basis of identity. i (" to (!(1I1d udc Ilml the tr eatme nt of <ll1illla ls sholl ld be deemed 
wrong on the bClsis of the f" ,< ir;.;tE:! nce Qron identity ov(.' r time . Rat h~r the r('l;:ogni ti ol1 
of (In identily ill anima ls. in<l ;(,Cll i\ c o r the appcm'Clncc of ple fe lcnces anti the 
ab ility to initiate action w ith a view to sBti sfy ing certain desires. shows the 
possibility thil t an ima ls nol ollly have a physica l identity, but also a psychological 
idenl lty , Anima ls can thus be' ~ccn to be creatUl cs with a "so phist icated mcntal 
l ife" (Rega" 1988-83)_ 
On sllch an undelstandi ng . an imal s can be secn 10 be oulol/O/noll.\'. Regan's 
autonomy slands in contrast to K;:lI1 t ia n autono my whic h is premised on the abi lit y 
to nmJ...e high level moral abs tract io ns with reasoncd det:isions about actions and 
their e necls. providing rationa li ty as the condi tion for ft"cognising moral agency, 
Sueh an undcrsta nding makcs the ab ility 10 act upon uni ve rsa ll y acceptable 
reasons a necessary feature of autollOlny . Regan is dotlbtflll th .. t anima ls ha ve the 
------ ----
21 While plants ,HId micro--organisl1ls, like ~lli lllal s. COlIl fa lc well or ill over the cou rse of 
th eir ex istence, s ince p lants rtnd micro-orgrmislIls are not conscious ill the smne way thOlt 
animals are they C(U1 not have an ident ity . I\s such Rcgan wou ld argue that they do not 
hOlve a welfare in the sallll' way that <ln ir11als do . 
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~l lrih l I1 ec:: IH."('C~5a r \' 10 p(' rltlllll such a lil<:k. b~11 l el'oglli se<: Ihal " indi v idua ls arc 
aulnlllllllOUS if Ihey h~ ve "rCfeICIlt'('~ omd hav(' Ihe <l hilit y 10 initiat e <ll'lion with a 
view to s<lt is fying them" (RegllH 198R:R4). Un(i (,ls land ing autonomy in this liglu 
does 11 0 1 take the d eglec of capab iliLies into account, as the K<lntian concept ion 
does. hut chooses ml her 10 focus 0 11 the ability to initi <l le acti on in Older to sati sfy 
a pa lticular gotl l 'R Recognisi ng the <lu to no lllY of animalc:. has impli cll tions for the 
c lear ullderst<l lld illg of their wdfar c 
Exp loring. the nut ion of ha ving an <in terest ' in .';fJ l-He~hin g. RCgcHl idc lltifi es 
pre/,.:rellcl! illfere.\(S and lI!!.lfiwr..)lIfele'\·(3 . Pre ference inteleslS li re the things wc 
arc inte rested in due to wa nls and des ires. regardless o r the ir direct benefit 10 us. 
while welfa re in terests are those things which arc ill o ur illlc restlo have regmdless 
ofoll r des ires (Rcga n 1988: 87) In OIdcl tu have thi s type o fiut clest it is essential 
I1 wI a being have a welrare. Thi s se rves 10 exclude nOIHllltOI1QIllOUS beings such as 
lower o rder allima ls ( fi s h. inseels. ('le .) . plant s. and no n-living entities such as 
stones and motorised l1l<l chillCl Y. All m8111l11al s, induding hu man bei ngs. sat isfy 
tili s requircme nt: so it ll1"kes sense to ta lk of them as havi ng welfare inlerests . 
Si nce Ihey al e seen to ha ve des ires, it is inte lligib le 10 say that they have 
preference inte rec:.ts . What o ne is int erestcd in nmy not nccessari ly be in o ne's 
int erest (such as hig h-speed racing or drug taking), and what is in one's interest 
may not nccessm il y be wlml o lle is inte rested in (sHch as exercise and healthy 
eating hab it s) 
Ex pa nding o n thi s. Regan ex plo res hefl('./ils - those things or opportunil i c~ 1hal 
cont .-· bu te 10 Ihe wclfale of autonomous beings: and harms - those things or 
oppo~1unities that dimini sh the welfare o f auto nomo us beings. Immed ia te bene fit s 
21 K"I'l ian autonomy is stronger in the sense tll"t the ab ilit y to ~bstract our des ires and 
goa ls i!. a requirement , whereas with preference autonomy the mere presence of those 
des ires and goa ls is suffic ient to recognize alltonomy. Kall tian autonomy requires the 
ability to think impartially if one. is to possess autonomy. while preference autonomy does 
lIot (Regan 1988: 85) . 
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(lIe Iho!'c ha"k bioh1gir.;,d lC'qll;rellll~ nl s . wlli l.: 11 ar(' 11('1'('''''(11 \ fnl <1 11 11l(lllllllals. 
including hUIllans. such :t " (ldcqll3tc norr ri!;hmcllt ... Iwlll" "Il(l , c<;' (Rcg~1I 1088 ' 
88). These benefit s constit ul e \\"el rnl c interests. The dC'grec 10 \\ hieh ~lItonomous 
hc illgs fare well wi ll depend UpOIl the degrcc to whic h these welfare inl crests arc 
m et. Obviously a lack oflhcsc neccssitics wi ll hrH"lll (l being ' s wcmuc Aside from 
bio logical welfare intercsts. Ihelr are al so social and psychological ;nl crcslS Ihat 
contribute tu the full flow i s h;n~ or the capacities of the being '1 hese constitute 
pref{·rcncc interests Generally all mall1nlftl s fare \· ... ('11 if " they get or pur slle Wh<ll 
they prefer: they l<lke sl-tti"Cactiol1 in pl,r!;uing and gelling what they prcrer, and if 
what they pur sue or obtain is ill their interests" (Rcgan 1988 Ql ). Rega n c lasses 
hamr:; ~s infli ctions o f sunc r iug or depri va tions of bencfits. whi ch would have 
llIade life for the indi vidllal more satisfying (Rcgllll 198& : 94). In this regard 
prulongect pflin or discomfort c<tu ~ illg slIfTeling or a restriction 011 a being's ab ility 
to eXClc ise ils physica l. socia l 01 psychological autonomy frus', (l1('s that being and 
ncgatively allccts it s \\'c lrate - whethcr human () r flllima l While humans and 
a"imals (lrc vis ibl y difTere nt , their welfare docs not dilT(,1 in kind becnllsc they 
both lu\\e intclcsts (Regan 198ft 11 6) 
Exploring the diIT'ercnec betwecn human be ings and anilllal~, Regan distinguishes 
hetween ,!!!!rol a}!I..'IIIS alld moral !"'fie",s (Regalt 1988: 15 1) . Moral agents arc 
ab le to know the din'crelll'c between right and wrong. are ab le to choose actions 
bascd upon these abilitics. and me therefore accountable for their actions. Moral 
patie nts, 011 Ihc ot her hand. lack the capabi lities that would enable them 10 control 
their hehavior in ways that would make them morally acclJuntablc for thei r actions 
(Reg:l1l 1988 : 152). Normal human adults are to be cOIl"idered as moral agents. 
whi le moral patients are di vided into two broad calegori( 's: those indi viduals who 
arc (;onsciOllS and sentient. but who lack other mental abilities ~ and those 
indi vidua ls who arc consciolls and sentient. and posscss the ot her cognit ive and 
vo li tional fthilities (Regan 1988' 153). Cel1ain anima ls fall into the former 
category. whi le a ll III a 111 J1lft \s. infant humans and menta. ly handicapped persons 
fall into the latter category. RCgiHl makes it clear that \uhen he discusses moral 
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patient s h(' i.:; I c fc l r ill ~ 1(1 those i ll th(' Inll el Gn l f"g<H ) 1\ 1111 ;11 pal ien ts ca nllot 
disting ui sh lig ht n om \\ Hlng. ~nd il1 I hi ~ I('.:;pee t Iht'Y diner fUlld<l lllCllwll y fro m 
moral agent s "I hI?)' cml howcver be 0 11 the leecivill ,ll. e nu Oflig ht ,HId \V101lP. acts o f 
Illo 'al agent ". ;wd in Ihi e:. !"c"peel Illt'Y ,HC simil<ll to ,pmal ngcnl s 
Explrll ing V,lI iUlIs <lppl u;1I,; l1 c<; concelning the c thical I1 call11ent (I f anillla Is. Regan 
looks at direct and ind ilcc t dul y views. 11I1Ii ,.('<:/ (I"~l ' "iell' .... ho ld tha t the on ly 
duties \'ve ha ve l egmtiil1g an imal s {"II C those o wed im.lil ec tl y 10 other b(' ing" Moral 
slan:ling is limited to 1II00al ag.ents alo ne. and <; (l indil ccl dul y views arc 
anlill o pocentric . Accordingly. whil e we have duties involving anima ls. wc do not 
ha v(' duties to ani-ual s. 111 an attempt to uncover w hich view is mOl C reasonable. 
Reg~ n app li es the philosophi ca ll y controvers ial pro·::edure of appealing to 
intuiliolls (RegtHl 1988 185) This entail s thinking abull' 0111 pre lenecli ve beli e rs 
imp.lI t iall y anti coo lly, and explOTing a ll the rclevant inf(· rmatioll. whi le bearing ill 
mind the importance o r heing rat ional and co nsistent. followed by criti cal 
Icnec tio ll (Regan 1988. 187) 
Follow ing thi s method , Rcgan develo ps the be lie f that it is wro ng to kill , or to 
cause sutfering. or 10 dcny the opportunity for mo ral agent s 10 sa ti sfy des ires that 
wo uld benefit their welfare. Underl ying thi s belier is the common unify ing feature 
prohibiting harm. Out or thi s Regan ac tuali ses the harm principle. which maintains 
that we have a direc t prifll<l fa cie duty not to harm indi vicilm ls, o wed 10 the 
indi v idllal the mselvcs (Rcga n 1988. 187). In questio ning the ~copc of the harm 
principle. Regan recall s tha t animals call1lo t on ly be harmed throug h suffering, but 
alsu throug h the denial ofbenefil s (Regan 1988: 188). Oecause animals can also be 
harm,,;d, intllitively the harm principle sho uld also apply :0 them . Regan feels that 
"thclc is no non arbitrary way to narrow the scope of this principl e to exclude 
moral patient s" (Rcgan 1988 : 189). Reg an velifi es hi s intuition by ca lling lip the 
rcquilemcnt s fo r making an ideal 11l00al judgc me nt, (tilt! checking the harm 
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pri nt;iplc agtlil l ~ t Ill(' nil c l ia ,,(' I ('ut fl\! va li ( II IlO ' fll l ~ l i ll {'ip l es 2'1 ACCC'lllallt:e tlf the 
hflfll l lll i lll' iplc IIlld" llIlilll'C; thc plausihi l ity (l fany I I1<1 i l c<.:1 duty view (Rcf..!.<t ll 1988: 
192 ) FIOIlI thi s fi1l d in g. he dis(;ICdil <; ;dl i1ll1;1(~'c t duty IhCOlics. sc('ing that "110 
indilecl dulV view call IlIov idc 11<; wit h a n <1 dcqlltlle ll10ra l thell1 i' (Regan 
1988 19J) 
I Jir{'c ! duO' \'il.'lI'S recognIse tlint Ihcl e <lie il l least some ti il c(" du ties owed to 
tl llilll a l<: <t lll..l rite thcref(l rc tlo t «ul'enlu l ite ohjectioll of 1lI01al a riJ ill ar illess fala l to 
all v{' l sluns orindil cct duly " iews" (Rcg:lI1 1988' 195 ) 'I he cruell y - kindncss and 
act ut ililati an views Ilml Rcgan c'<phm,"s impl y that an fl dcquale accOlln t o f the 
duties to 11101a l pati cnt s C1I 11 be provided w ithout appea ling to the ir rig hts, The 
cruelty - ki nd ness vie",,' propounds tlmt we have nega ti ve and po<; itivc dut ies owed 
d irectl y to nnilllal s. whi ch ca n he accounteu fo r w ith rc ff'rcnct' 10 " the plOhib il ion 
aga ir.sl cruelt y fi nd to the injunct ion 10 be ki nd" (Regan IQR8 ' 1(6) Thi s relics on 
subjc,;tivc feelings ill ururr to lIJake mora l decisio ns Rega l! demo ll ~tl a t cs tha t ~uch 
prohlh itions .mu injunctions do 1101 provide adequate gl(lUllt..i S 0 11 which to base 
slIch :l ul ies, as the " morality of w hat perso ll s do is ... logica ll y dist inct fi'o Jll .,. 
their lIIent al stales" ( Rcgan 1988 ' 19<) 
Act utilit ariani sm, appea ling dil(~cll y to the consequences of acts alone. does not 
make thi s mi stake 110wever. Reg<ll\ find s that ac t ulilil",riani s lll 0 11 a w ho le «ra ils 
to p ro\ idc an adequate basis for the sll ingcncy of the I'f illla f flcie d i n~'cl duty not to 
!9 Reg<H1 outlines the requirements for mak ing an uleol moral jUrif!,IIU'lIf as: conceptual 
clarity; openness to relevant information; rational ity; impa rtiality, exercis ing justice and 
fairn ess; detachment from emotional influence; and support by valid moral principles 
(Regan 1988: 126) , 111e crit eria that are ofTered to evaluate such moral princ iples a re, first , 
lh:ll allY mora l princ iple needs 10 be cons istent in its "'ppli c-<ltion; second, moral princ iples 
need to be applicable to a broad range of circumstances. nley shoutd therefore cover an 
adequ ate scope, 111ird, in <111 att empl 10 a void v::tgueness fi nd ambiguit y. which Me 
detrimelltalto mor::.1 princip les, sll ch princ ip les need to be extremely p1 ec ise. Last, moral 
princip les should conform rcn ectively to Ollr intu itions (Regan I Q88 : 13 1), 
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h<11111" (I~t"gal1 1 9~8 22~). ill Ilmt i"di\idual ~ ca n Ill' }ISll'iflhly llflllll~d . pltlviu \!d 
that fbe ngglegalC' l',;lin outweigh<; th,..ltI<;<:('!' HI 
FlllfllCr more. such applO<lch('s fn il tu ofTer a soli u f(lllnuafioll fOl tll{! better 
trC:llmcn\ of ;'lIi lllal<; There ,He flO cle,H lines or 1lI1es in the lItilit ;,u iall flpproach, 
which I clies r(lt her 0 11 the outcomes of (l ct ions to cl etC' lIlline moral light cmd wrong. 
\Vhilt, utililalianis1I1 is fi eqllentiy ht'!':l ld ecl for it s e8n lil fuian npproi1ch. cfJua lit y is 
no t a fhrlllal basic plinciplc. l athel ulil it y i<;. plaeinv. the oll tcome'" of <l. sit uatioll 
ove!' the i1l1CIC'515 oflho')C' ill\o lved 1)C'IIl(lllstrating ti le inadequacy of the clllcily -
kindness and acl uli l i ti1rii11l view!', \{ C'gfllllll<l.kes a pl climinary case fUI the rights of 
m oral palie nls (RCP.H I1 1 9~Q \<-15) 
Searching fOl tile IC)ulldnf il..lll to n till'my 'hat will specify the direr.! duti es of moral 
pat ient!' Regan looks to I he r('quil ~1\1C'tl l <; of making an idect l moral judgement (see 
llul e :: 7) One such requir ement is impartiality, undersloo·:l as cOlllpl y ing with the 
pri llciple of justice in the sC'llse that all individuals are to be given their due. 
Treating individuals di ss illlilad y. in a partia l l ight , is thero.:- fore a failure to act in a 
just llJirrlllC I (Regflll 19R8 232). Rcgan explOl cs utilil .1lian alld perfectionist 
thcOflt;s o f justice <lnd, seeing 111<1' in thei r respecti ve W ,lyS they do not treat all 
indi vuluctls in a n impartial ligh t. lind~ thelll undesirable 
An altf~rnat i ve interpretation o f ju st ice is next explored . which recognises that. 
indiv iduals have a dist inct ive kind u f va lue ill and by the mselves. irrespect ive of 
outside factors or circlImstances. Regan fC:'fers to this as inherent va lue, which i s 
he ld equall y by all indiv iduals. nho lishing the need to establi sh a non-arbitrary 
basis for determining varyi ng degrees o f value. Inherent va lue is seen as something 
whi ch ca nnot be earned. does 110t depend upo n (lne's use l1.dness and is 
JO Rcgan explores two fo rms of act lItilil(lrianislll : classica l o r hedonist ic utilitarianism and 
preference utilitarianism. with spec ific l eference to Peter Singer (Regan IQ88: 2001206). 
Rcgan's pos ition towards uti litarianism wi ll be discussed in the critique ofSinger"s theory 
in the lalter ha lf of CI .. tpter FOllr 
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indcpenden t of hcing the o l)jcct Ilf SOlllcone elsc's ill le l c~ t " (R<'IPlII l C)RR 217 ) 
Such ? vn ltlc is c1 llscly linked w ith the nolio n of j u ~ t ic(". fllr pro ... ided Ih l'y have 
inh('fc)l t \<t ltle, 111 0 1 ill ".!LC ll tS me S('CI1 as eq ual and Ihc lcf()lC dc!'crviJlg ll f sim ilar 
tre<1llTl f llt . 
Ex tc nd lng his nrgu lllcnl 10 include !lIora l patient s. Reg<w clairns that l est ricting 
inlic lcLI va lu e lO l110 ml agents a lo ne is (Hbitlary (Rcg'lIl '988 2.'9 ) It has been 
shO\vn tliat some o flhe hallll s that mUlal J.mti c llt s suITe I' cl.l C the SilfllC halm s Ih il t 
11100al agcnls suHe r a nd according ly it would be arb itmry lu rega rd mo ra l patients 
as no t having inherent v1't luc. f'urth eIIlU.lre. inhelcnt va luc is indepe ndent of 
ex ternal fac to rs o r CiI CUlll SI<lnCcs. <met so it would be ;l1bitrm y to cl aim that people 
have 1110 rc o f it than :lIlillla ls because they have mo re fulfilling li ves, o r because 
they ha ve specili c vinues. or bE'c<l use thcy can enjoy life mo re. In lespo nse to the 
o pinio n that mo ral pa ti ent s l1I ilY havc some inherent va lue', Regan statcs that if we 
I'('cogni sc tha t inhercnt va lue is c\ItlCll ill moral agent s thcn wc " re " Ia tio na ll y 
u bliged to du the sa me in the cflse u f Illo ral patient s" (Rcg<H1 1C)8S .240), fo r 
inh erent value is equa ll y possessed. v. helllel by moral agents 0 1' mo ral pa ti cnt s. 
Inhere, t value is there fo re r.:at egOlicftl - it is eithcr po s<:.cssed o r it io.; 1101 - alld those 
who possess it do so equall y 
T o l11 al:e the categori cal ca ll for inherent value inte lligihl e anu no n-arbitrary. 
ReBan Ide ntifies similarities be tween mural agent s and mo ra l patients as' bel iefs 
and de~ ire s; perceptio n; I1lcmory~ a sense of r\lture~ sentience. an emo ti u nal life; 
pre fe rctlce and welfare interests ; the ahilit y to initiate ae li c. n: and a psycholog ical 
identity (Rega l! 1988: 243). These charac teri stics arc encapsulat ed in w hat Regan 
terms the · ... "l~jecf-()f-a-I{fc· criterion (Regan 1988: 243) . Inherent value is 
possessed equally by a ll subjects-of-a- life. This is independe nt o f a being 's utilit y. 
is categorical , illuminates why wc ha ve dilecl duties to mo ral agents and mo ral 
patie nt s and why we exclude those who arc mere ly ali ve. 
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The vicw o r ill<;tit:c 1'<1<;<,(1 nil ("111<, 1 ; 1111('1 Cl1t \'(llIw j" on it " (l \\n unl ,I Illoral 
prim.:ipie as it dl..l cS IHlt dircct us to (let in p(lrticulnf wClys . Hfl ther it informs to 
who III we nHlsl <let As slleh. RCgfl ll proposes the I"t/.':jwcI /wiud[!i..e. whi ch requires 
tl1(1t "\I\IC arc totre<lt those indi vitlu<ll s who ha ve inhcl cnt \'Blue in ways that respect 
their i nherent va luc" (Regal! 1988: 24R) This requit es Ihe l espccl fiJi trC<ltlllent of 
all those w ho snti sfy thc slIhjcct-ur- Cl - lirc c rit c lio ll . It doe" 1I0 t, however. stipulat e 
the kind or respect that is Icquircd Rcgan points out thnl we rail to !rent 
indi viduals who have inlic tcnt va lue with l espect when we Il efl t thcm BS tht1ug h 
they have no inhcrent va lue (Rcgan 19R8: 248) This happe ns when they are 
tre<lled as I1ICle receptClc\ es or vnluc. whenever thei r va lue is determined o n the 
grou nds or Iheil utilit y to liS, or when wc harm them in an <lltempl to attain the 
1110st bene fi c ial outcome for ~II cOllcelnecl , The respect principle however entails 
Illore than ab!'taining fi'olll IUHllling entities. It also imposes a duty to assist the 
victims of injustice at the hand s or utllels (Rcg,m 198&' 249) foollo w ing thi s, 
Rcg<lll derend s the respec t plinciplc by applying the l equirelllellt s ror (!laking an 
idea l moral jlHlgclllcnl. making a I <1l ional case for (leeepl ing the respect pi inciple 
Exploring the cOllcept of rights, Rcgan dist inguishes bef\vecn Ipgnl rillhls and 
moral r;ghfs (Regan 198R: 267). Legal right s de pend upon the respective 
governing body at any paltie lll"r tillle and place and <lS sllch are liabl e to change 
and C;1n differ from onc slflte 10 the next They are transitory and illlpcnmlllent. 
Alternative ly. moral right s are said to be universal. ' I 'hey arc equal to a ll that they 
apply 10 HIllI, unlike lega l righl ~. ale lIot determincd by onc person (e.g. Ihe 
president) or group of persons (e.g . a legis lative body). and are apt to be more 
permanent. Regan explai ns Illoral ri ght s in tell1lS of claims with duties and 
obli gations. To have a right means to be in <I posi tion to claim something, or to 
assert that treatment i s due to the claimant (Regall t 988: 271). To have a valid 
claim, onc needs to have a claim-fo , i.e . something tang ibl e Illust be able to be 
satisfied by the person one is claiming rrolll; and a claim-againsl. i .e, the person 
onc is claiming against mllst be ~how ll to owe one what is claimed . A claim-to 
requires those one claims 1'1'0111 to act in (1 CCI lain way as they are morally obligated 
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10 do so. while a claim-againsl rcst s upon an appeal 10 a va lid moral principle 
(R~gan 1988 272.-273). In this sense mora l rights ha ve correla ti ve moral duties. 
llaving nICHle the case 1(:11' the rational acceptance of the respect principle as a va lid 
pJillciple of just ice (Regan 1988: 258), Regan's ta!>k is to make a case for the 
recognilion orlln! basic rights of tile possessors of inherent value 101' the rcspeclnd 
treatment ~ hat th~ respect princ iple prescribes (Regan 1988 : 277) . The respect 
pi incip le, 11~1 ived direct ly from the principle of just ice. is a basic right that rests on 
the posw lale of inherent va lue. Justice can be rationally claime-d as something onc 
is due ur it c3nIJe claimed 011 onc' s behaJt: as it is someth ing tbat one is owcd. It is 
largt!i y unconte~ted that wc have a rig ht to just treatment. To make the claim to 
just Ircatlllt!nt a va lid onc, there needs to be a c laim-to and a claim-aga inst. The 
d~mand fo r sl1ch a c la im is va lidated on uoth counts when informed by the notion 
of r~spcct - central tu the respecl princip le. The c laim-lo is va lid when the 
treatment spccilied accords wi th the respect principle and is wi thin the powers of 
those we mal..e the c laim againsl The claim-against is va lid when those we make 
the claim against are clearly idl!ntiliect , provided the c laim is sll pponed by a valid 
moral principle - tlte respel:1 pi inci ple As the daim to respect ful treatment is a 
val id cla im, there is a 1I10ral right to be treated with respect. 
Such a right is no t meant 101' onc pel :::;011 "lone, but belongs lu all indi vidual s w ho 
possess inherelll va lue. All possessol S of this va lue have an eqLlal right to 
respect fill lrcalillcnt. Those who have sllch a value ca n make a valid mora l claim 
to trea tment, which is respectfld of the va lue that they hiwe Since moral <Igents 
and moral patients sha re inherellt va lue equally, a ll members I)f both classes can 
claim the right 10 respeclfid treatment "The case for recogni tion of the right to 
such treatment canllot be argLLt!d stronger or w..:aker ill the cas\! of mora l patients 
than il is in I.he (;dS~ of moral agent s" (H.~gan 1988:279) Respt!ctlla l treatment or 
animab, Ihf? II, i ~ lI o t performed (IS an act ofkincll1css, but rather it is their right . <lnd 
jLlst ice denlflll(i:::; it. 
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Clalirying the is"lIt.'. RCg;lIl lc it cl<ltC'c; Ihat the li!!hl h11l'''pccl t1l1llcalment 11(11 onl y 
enta ils duties or 1I011- lIal"ll1. but (1 \-:0 dnlies o r (1s-: i.slfUK·\' (R('g~ n I q88 2R2) This 
el1 l ;l d ~ Ih<ll \\,e ilssist Illura l p<llicnl $ ill ge lling their due. "incc ;,11 stl ujcc ts-ur-a-lifC 
fire tu be treated ,,,,, ilh equCll l espcct. This makes ck:tr se lse, for " the less cognisant 
ind i',idua ls <lIe ortheir li .t~ II ''''.' . less power they h;l\'(' to dcrcnd them, the more 
wc \\ho unticlstaml and f ecl . .lglli se tll cir lights must do rw- ,ilc lll in defe nce oflhcir 
riglll s" (Reg:m ]()R8 ·23J1). Not only .lre \"C bo und III Icav('" animal s alone n"d not 
;ntcrfclc w ith thcir li ves. wc ille '1150 bound to help them when help is needed. 
Second ly, while a I ig ht needs to he clnilllcd thi s does nol Il1 cnll that in Qrdcl 10 
claim a right onc llecd vocil l c~pab ilili es . Deillg Hblc to clilim a I ight is 1I0t 
dependent upon thc ilt l o r clClill1ing. but rather un fulfillin g the applOpliale 
requirements or the Tight. Lastl y, 11100al paticnts do 1I0 t have dutics to respect the 
lights or othcls «01l1y moral agents can havc dutics, and this is because only these 
ind ividuals have the cogni ti ve find ot her abi lities necessilry ror heing hcld morally 
accou ntable I'o r whflt they do 01 rail to do" (Rega n 19R8' 285). Therefo l e the right 
to r.'; "pcctliil treat mCnt can only ue claimed by a IHur?1 patient agai nst it moral 
ageld , and 110 1 agai nst fl110thcl mmill pntienl. 
1 he ,espec! principle gives all ind iv idll <l l s who have inllt'": ent va lue the prima facie 
rig ht 10 be ttcated with respect Accordingly. sllc h iT ptinciple ca n nevel be 
justifiably ignored or overridden. except " in except iollt> ci rcllm stances, and only 
whe,- wc havc done Cl II that wc can rcasOImbly be cxpccl~;d 10 do berore overriding 
it" (Regan 1988:297). Regan states that to override such a principle requires 
adequate justification anu an nppea l to another valid mo ral princi ple (Rega n 1988: 
287). Adhering to the rights view means that one ca ll never appeal to 
cOllsequcntialist principles or maxim ising the tot,,1 aggregate. This scrves on ly to 
negate the inherent value of the indi vidual , treating her a5 mere receptacle o r 
va luc. lat her than Iccogn ising her (IS a valuc in-herse lf'. 
In order to override the right Ilot to be hm-med , Rcga n acknow ledges that not all 
harms al e equal (Rega ll 1988 : JOJ) . Dine r-cnt harms hurl the Sil lllC individual in 
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dirTclcnl W<1y~; :111(1111(' :;;allle h<'1J1l 0111 hnll {\irrcICIH iu(\i\idu<ll!' ill dirr(, I{, 1I1 ways. 
\Vl1t!11 in(\ividual <; <lIe lu be hmllled ill cVlllpalablc wn"., (lnd" cho ice nc{'c1s 10 be 
made cOllccming a rew subjec ts-or-<\- lir(" heing l!(tllllcd as nppo1't'd 10 ma ny, the 
miflirhle princil'le (ll1inimi" illg (lV('ltiding pTincipl e) applie!' (ltegan IQS8 305). 
The cOIl')cqucnt ialis l lIlil1illlis(' harm IJl illcipl e is I (jecteci. ror Ihe light .. vicw 
ca ll11o l accepl Ih<11 indi vidtta ls cnn he IC(!I\{:t,d 10 I c('('p l ac1es or va lll f:'. the sum or 
whi ch C<1 11 be aust rm: tl y fielded 1 he lIlinil ide pi inciplc 1'tatcs that when '""ccd w ith 
choosing ovcl ,iding the righl s of the many or o verriding the rig ht s or thc rew. 
whel c a ll Iho,>e COIICCIII<'<.I will be h,HIlICd in cOlllpar<1ble ways, wc "llOUld choose 
to ovt!ITidc the rig ht s or til e few ( Regan 1988: 305). Thi s {~ec i s i o ll is taken 
not because the aggregatc o f h,Hllls that would result floll! this choice would be 
less bad tJ1<\lI if we ch('lse to act otherwise, it !"('qu ire's thi s becallse thi s is the 
cho ice we I1llt sll1l~ke if we ;"lIe to 5how equa l !"espect f(U Lh e inhere-nt valtle of lhe 
individuals ill volvC"d :Hld if \\' 0 :"Ire to cOllnt tJle ir cq llall lghts equa ll y (Reg:lI1 1988: 
307) 
III the case of Il o n-co lllpnrabk harms. where a dlOice tlced~ to be- made between 
two or mo re indi vidua ls, the HOi".\e-(!f!priflcil ,lc applies. ,,,, hereby the o nc w ho will 
be len the WOlst ofl"shoulcl tak e preference over the ot hers (Regan 1988.308). The 
c,(tll11 pl c Hega n ci tes to illustrate is the harming or o ne indi vidual badl y Of the 
minima l harming of many COllscfjucntia li st reasoning would have the o ne su lTer. 
A rig hts app li cation or lhis principle would have the ma ny sufre r s lig htly . 
III addition to the principles o f respect, harm, l11illiridc and worsc-off. Rcgan 
proposes a liflh princ ipl e, namely the liberty P";/lcil"e (Regan 1988: 33 1). The 
Iibel'l}' plinc ipl e states that as subjects-of-a- life have a welfare. they are at liberty 
to do w hatever they may to advance thei r welfare provided Ihat all suhjecls-or-a-
life arc treated wilh respect. find there arc 110 special comJi1.ions. even if this e nta il s 
harming othe r innocents (Regan 1988 : 332).31 
J I Reg.1Il argues that human mo ral patient s do IlOt have the c;tpacity to do what is right or 
wrong and a re tJl crefore to be considered;ts innoccnts. Similarl). non-human llIor;t 1 
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Regfm ' ~ 11('\\\ ~t('p i~ \0 c"( phlle ,>(1111l' or the practical implicatioll'> Ichllcd 10 the 
Ilt~<1I!1lC"1 of flninlClI~, rO('"l'sing spct:ili(;a ll y on <1ni11l,,1 :lgriclllll1lC'. endangered 
species. fllld the u~c or <lnil11al~ in scientifi c: expclimC?lI ts The libert y principle 
appears 10 act (IS n defence again">l the COTlllllCrci11 1 fanning and eM ing of animals, 
as it could be argued that \-\€'I e humalls not 10 ('at me(lt. then hum"lls could be 
nmde worse-ofT Iclalive 10 <my of the animals w hic h were halllle.cI ill the plocess 
(Regim 1998 3)3) l"2 Therefore it conld he (lrgued Ihr.t , ... c .ue within OUl righlS to 
1"<\T1ll and e(ll lIle<11 F xploling thc l1o~sible ;" gulll el1 t~ offelcd 10 justify harming 
farm animals (taste and culinary challenge, nutrition, habit and convenience, 
economic consi deration. I('ga l ownership of a nimal s and the exclusio n or certain 
fanll allilll~ls flOIll the I igllls view). Regan find s thnt !l(llle treat animals with the 
ICSpcct that they dcserve. "I hcrefore they do not ju"tify overriding the rights of 
allil1l.al~ 110t to be hanlled Accordingly. Ihe rights vie\'! sees vegetm iani S!11 as a 
monl obligat iun (Regan 1988" 351) 
1·7I"c)" (1983) pu int s t'u t that establishing the wrongncss er haJ ming an anima l does 
not {·"tai l thc wrongness o f eating it There are clear differcnces between those 
who kill aninla ls and those who ca t them. Granted. animals are killed to be eaten. 
Iloweve r, " it is killing, !lot ea ting" which carries the moral force in the argument 
11'0111 killing and w hic h is heing cO fl(lemned" (Frey 198) ' 29). Regan would argue 
Ihal recogni sing the rights of animals to be II ca led wilh respect entails " I he related 
dut y 10 defend them against those who vio late their Tight s" (Regan 1988: 353) So 
while eating animals may nol be mOl (lily w l ong, wc owe a dul y to animals n01 to 
paticllts, unable to do what is right or wrong, "canllot be allyth ing but innocent"' (Regan 
1988: 295). 
n Re-gan's argument for the rights of anima ls is inclusive of a ll mall1nulJs involved in tJl e 
meat industry - cows and calves, sheep <md lambs, and pigs. '11is appears to exclude the 
rang(\ of birds abused by the meat industry (chickens, turkeys, ostriches etc.) However. it 
would be possible to extend Regan's argument of COllsciollSnC'iS and the accompanying 
ment al attributes and faculti es to birds. 
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harnl ' hell1 <llld to p"ll("el Ihf'1ll lioll1 11;11111 I f ('ati ng (lldll1;1 1 ~ cllnlllhlllrs 10 the 
o ngui,lg ll<lrll11 hey c" pc , it' nc(', thl'n \\\..' c:houkl not c:lllhf'Ill 
"he ri,!.!hts Vle\-\, clot's lwl lec()gTl I ~e the 11 101<1 1 l ight of p,luu ps of ind i\' idua ls o r 
spcciC''' "to illl) l hing, including "iu rv iva l" (Rcg<lIl 1988' 359). '1 he fact that an 
a nimnl is the IIIcJ1I ber o f a n endangered species con lc l s no addit io na l l ighls o nto 
Iha t animal. 'I he respect pl inc ip le deems tha t a ll w ho have inhe lcnt va lue mu st be 
Ire tll ed w ilh the respcct Ilml they dc-sef ve, and no t be ha ll11ed Any anill lill' s ri g ht 
fl ot to be harmed «must he weig.hed equ itably w ith the ri g ht s (If <'fly o thers \vho 
have this rig h!" (Rega n 1988' 35Q ) , According ly, Rcga n's rig ht c: v iew does not 
one!" spccia l pl o tect io n to mClllbels o f c mlangcred spccies 
In ins (I!lees w here a choice o f prescl va t io n is to be made between a member o f' an 
e nda ngered species and a member of a plentiful !':pecics. the plillc iple of respect 
has 1("1 be. oveniddc ll by the greater prima facie har m (Rega n 1988'359). The 
minil ide and worsc-o n' pi illc ipl cs a le o ITe red as tools 10 ju stify the overriding o f 
the n!ipect pl inci ple Ilowevcr, Ihese o fTe r no solut ion It . the endangered ~ peci es 
pre-diC11mcnl , If' the illdi vidual fr0 111 the ple ntiful spccies 'Nould be wOlse-ofTthan 
the ind iv idua l fr0 111 the endangeled species, then the indi '/ idua l fr om the ple ntiful 
species would be saved . A specics on il s own is mcre ly a co llection o f ind ivi dua ls, 
Any and a ll indi vidual s have the ri g ht to respectful tfeatmcnt. This does not 
incl ude coll ections o f indi v iduals, and hence the worse-o rT princ iple cannot apply , 
Rcg an makes it clear tllat the light s view is no t ad verse to effort s to save 
e1ldangered species, ju st Illal it canllo t ethica ll y SUppOlt it . 
Regan ana lyses the u se o f a llinml s in sc ience in three areas: biology and medi ca l 
ed ucatio n. toxit-olog y testing and appli ed research (Regan 1988 . 363) Regarding 
the fi rst, he find s tha t the di ssecti on o f li ve (l ll il11 a ls for the purpose o f educatio n is 
unnecessary and unju st (Regan 1988: 365). The trans fe re-lIce o f knowledg e does 
no t ju ~ :tify the ha rming of a nimal s He does acknow ledge Ihat many o f the animals 
lIsed i ll sllch situations afe !lot mammals. However, the} may still be conscioll s 
and h ?ve degrees o f attributes possessed by subjects-of-a life (Rcgan 1988: 367). 
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Second l y. <luilll<lls (tIC' routinely It <:(' (i ill loxic(l lugy I f· ~ ts I hnt TlH.)IIi l llr (hc threat of 
cOlllllle'H.·ially Ilmnufaclulcd produ t:l ~ (lht"lt.lpClIlic alld no tl-thcnlpeu li l:) fo r human 
use and CO IlSlIllIpli (ln Thee;c t ~e; t s c~u~c pain ;n th l" cHlilll<1 1 and (1<; ~lI c h Ihey vio late 
Ihe rig hl to Icspcclfu l tlcallllCI1! of the labOlalory animal. Neither tile lIliniridc 110r 
tile Y/OIsc-ofTprint:iples 'tI C applic<lb lc illlhi s in stanct". A.:-cording ly s\l(~ h I('sts atC 
Ill()laliy wrong (Reg<lll 1988 ' 375). ;\pplied scicncc IIft e; a domin ant tendency to 
hallll animals. cflusing di stl css in Ih(' fo rlll or JlAin or ilJlpaiTillg their l10rnml 
functioning The lig hts view doee; lIot accept the OVCHt ll human benefil ga ined 
from sllc h practices. a<: Ihi " <:imply reduces the inherent vn lu(" of Ihe Rllinl<ll to a 
utility value t1e tclIll;lIcd hy the inl ('le<: ts o r ot hel s (Rcgan 1 9R~' 3Ntl ) . Thi " violates 
the ir has ic rig hts to be Il cated \\; lh respect. Regao leminds liS that an <lnimal's 
vfl luc is ind epencient of the goals of science (Rcgan IQ88' 385) AccOl dingly the 
rig ht s view ... vhieh re-quilCs a qulic<l' change in thc l'l acti ce~ of science. ca ll s fiH' 
thc tOlal abolit;<.1I1 ofanilllal l'xpclilllc lIl<I,i on (Regan 1988 389) 
Rega n prcscllts a elcal and concisc alg111llcnt for the Illo ralligllts of al l beings that 
posse!;s inhercnt valuc ;\1\ subjccls-of-a- lirc are argued to have inherent value. 
Beings that are sclf:'conscioll", pUlposive and aware ,HC deemed 10 be subjects-of-
a- life . All mammals of one year and older are argued to Ijualify as suhjects-of-a-
lifc. "s slIch, all mamll'lftls m c il cknowledgcd 10 have 1Il00al righl s Posscssi ng 
moral rig ht s ensurcs that cCltaill dulies arc owed to Ill :: lig ht -holdcr. ;\s such 
RegaJl 's approach provides "a philosophical basis Cll! plil cipl ed ohjections 10 the 
worst c'rms of moral prejudice" (Regan 1988: 31 3 ) . Such ml out look condemns 
the animal agricultural industry and the use of mammal s in scientific 
experimentation. Funhermorc, Regan 's case for animal rights makes a 
commcndable contribution to the extension of e thics by introducing mammalian 
anill1als into the moral spherc; thereby shifting accepted ant hropocentric moral 
outlooks. Regall announces thal " IIle Illyth of the plivilcged mo ral status o f moral 
agents Ila s no clothes" (Reg::1I1 1988' 2RO). 
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/\ s id(' fWIIl Ih(,sc posi tive attl ibutcs. thcOlclica l and plil(·tica l (" lit;cis IllS cftn be 
levell ed aga inst Rega n's approaC" h Firslly. Fl cy (1 081 ) indi cn tcc;; 1I1al there is a 
prob cm with grounding light s nil inhliti ll l1 s Hcg<l n p(I,,'ulales lite fittld alllental 
hasi<: rig ht 0 1' .. 11 individuals w ho possess inherent value to be uni vcrsa l, equal, and 
ind ependent o rJega l I ight ~ (Regan t98R ' 267-8). MOl al I ighl s, 110 1 bound by legal 
and polili c(11 inst itut ions. pl cccde suc h institutio lls il l1d SHve as constrn;nl s on the 
types nr in stitut ions that we should have (Frey I q8:l : 84:' , fJei ng pl c- institutional. 
such light s arc nat ll rllllighls Natlll <l llights theOl if.."<> <lrc (,nen g l(Jlllldcd in human 
nature Rf'g(l ll . however. glOllllds hi s l ights on intu ition (Rega n 1988. 113). This is 
problematic si llce moral rig ht s cannot he drawn rro1ll what is thought to be wrong, 
as simil C1 r1 y they ca ll1lo t bc dnl wn nom what one desircs (Frey 1983 ' 48) Doi ng so 
rendcrs such an approach 10 he " nil' less a conceptual trulh and IIlllch more (I 
substantive mora l jUdgeme nt " ( FH'Y 198.1: 48). /\ s such. il could be argued that 
this makes Reg3 n's Ihetu y wCR k fi nd open to rriticism Rcgan is aware or th is 
controversy regaluil1g appeals to illtuiliol1s, and in lespOHse prescribes a method 
based on rat ional pre- re ll ecti ve thinking followed uy cr itica l lenection (Regan 
1988: 187). 
Secondly. Frey rejects the import ance placed 0 11 rig hts, as "obsfucation is nearly 
always the result" (Frey 1983: 46). Arguing about right s leads to arguing about the 
moral princ iples that underpin the rig hts themselves. This is generall y not 
const ructi ve ftnd leads to fUl1her argumentation as moral princ ipl es are never 
agreeo upon - a position easil y understood when one thinks of the differing 
opinio ps on issues such as ca pital puni shment , abol1ion, etc. The reason fur thi s is 
that the criteria ror accepting moral princ iples are o ften a point o r cont ention (Frey 
1983 : 50). The real moral issues then become c louded behind speculative 
argumentation. Accordingly. it is Frey"s o pinio n that moral right s are "supcrnuous 
to and distracting rrom argume nt about substanti ve moral issues" (Frey 19R3 : 85), 
Having explored direct and indirect dut y views Regilll would di sagree, cla iming 
Ihat a rig ht s based approach i ~ the Dnly <lcceptablc, no n-arbitt ary way to ensure the 
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l'OIl Cl'1 lIlolal IIcttllllCllt of anilllttl<.: 1\" such. he \',uuld di !' llIiss rrcy's claim that 
lig ht" dn no t ha ve <l ... iv.nifi c(lnl 1(,1(' In phv ill ethi ('"" 
/\ fwthcr ar e:l o f COll':CI 11 i<: li lt;' Ilrnhkllll'f collni ct illg values and their 1'(,,50Iuli<'I1. 
\Vhit c Rcga n's npP,o<lch is cgalitmiflll <lod respccts the valuc of the indi vidual. it 
does not plOvidc 'l.IIy guidall(:e 10, dl:'aling with cases where vfllucs conl1ict (Singer 
1<)9 1' 347) Rcgan g rant s th£" 11101<11 lig ht to respectt!.d LrC1 ltne nt to all 11Ioml agents 
and mora l palients 1\11 w ho have inhercnt va lue have I1 cqually. whct her moral 
agcnt or Illolal patient (Rcg(l ll 19R8 :240) Thi s makes tile assumptioll th<ll moral 
<tgen ts and moral patienl') htwe cqtu:t l moral worth and should ue tr ca ted in ways 
tha t arc cunsistcnt \\'ilh recog nising their equa l possession u f inherent value 
(R ega ll 1988:327). 
Whil c thi s assumption is log ical . there is <I ll appmclll failure (} II R<,gan 's part 10 
apply it. A lifeboat exa mple is ollbcd to illustrate when harms m<ly be overriddcn 
(Regn n 1C)88: 285 ) On thi s hoat <lIC fi ve survivors. all of ("qual weight Four of 
the ll! arc humans. the nnh a dog. The boat is designed to ho ld four . To ensure that 
the bOfl t does not sink . onc is requ ired to leave thc boat In terms o r justice and 
equality. drawing straws would be the fairest optio n. ror all li ve are equally 
illno.:cnt and have cqual illhclcnt wllue . Regan argues diffcrently. The dog. 
according to Regan, is the onc 10 go overboard . Ilis rJ eci ~ion is made on the basis 
of lh ~ worse-ofl'principle, whic h algllcs that those to be Ilrad e worse-orrshould be 
given prererence. I li s reasoning is that death is a h<trIll , and uno reasoTl<lble person 
would de ny that the death or any of the rour humans v'ould be a gleater prima 
facie loss, and thus a greater prima r<tc ie harm. than wOl ld be true in the case of 
the dog" (Regan 1988:324). 
Implicit in Regan's thinking is the fb ct that humans get III00e satisract ion fiom lirc. 
and so the harm of death for humans is grea ter than lltc dea th of any non-human 
This is 1101 entirely acceptable. Reg<lll makes it c1eal' th~1 all those who have equal 
inherent va lue Im ve ,Ill cqual IHima rhc ie light not to be harmed. !Jut then rtlns 
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c oulll e r 10 hi'! nppc-nl to Ctlt'ulil y 11l1d i .llflll .lil1lil y hy ~c("ill g (I ('nlll (h . th e d l 1g os tI 
lesser 11 ;' 1111 Il c g ives 110 qtLalific:l lio ll 10 ,"i.uppoll how Ilc dClclmill<'s stl c h a 
position, {llhel theL11 to do o tlJcl\vi"e would he «to give Ihc dog more than his due" 
(Rcgan 1988,32'1) Surely death tOI the dog a ~ well as fC"lI 11IlIn(\ns ent ail s ex treme 
suffcling th rough th owlling and the pl e nllt tlll e ending o fthell life. a depli va tinn o f 
ruture welf;" c illt e l c~ t s In tlte ahove example both harms of inniclioll 'i and 
t\epl i val iuns arc (111 0 \\ ed to ocelli under t he right s view wil ha lll successfu I 
nrg.ulller l. thus cloding tile Plillciple foundation upon wllic h il was buill I1 is 
"ppm cl11thal, hy favOI lI ing ".Iman illl cn"sts ovel" a11il11 <1 \ in\{'lc<:I !' . Rcp.;' 1l is unable 
10 completely le linqlli sh alUlll'OPOcclltlic ways ofthinkillg . 
lIe dc fends him self against the chat ge o f speciesism by claiming that the decisio n 
to choo~c the dog is !lo t made 0 11 the basis of spec ic ~ mClllbelship, but rather 0 11 
·'assessing the losses each indi v idll ~ll face~ a nd as~ess ing the<:e losscs equitahl y" 
(Rcgan t988 '325 ), Two cliticisms G(lTl be laisetl al tlti s point. The firsl concerns 
Regan's lejec tion o f ut ilit al i<1 11 i Sill Whil c dcnying the va lidity of appealing to 
consequences when making Illornl judgement s, Regan look s to future impli cations 
in ord er to dctermine losses In so doing. he makes a direct appeal to the outcomes 
ofactiulls ill order to nlake a llIoral ,judgemcnt , thercby appca ling to consequences. 
Secondl y. he makes an assessme nt of the losses to be expel ie nced 011 a bi<"sed 
opi nio n that hllmans have glellt cr prererence interests and more to lose than any 
animal Accordingly. human h 3 1111 is recogni sed as the grea tcr harm Surely then. 
in many si tuations whele an ecolog ical perspective would ha ve led to a different 
conclusion, human harms would be vicwed as the g rC'ater hal m over and above a ny 
and a ll other hanns to othcr animal s. Regan would cOllt est that the life boat 
exampl e:' has exceptional c irclImstanccs that justify harming lite dog, wh ich would 
not be there in ot lier cases. lie does not , however ex plor,! whal COllstitllles an 
e xceptiona.l cil cUllIstance. no r does he give guidelines rhl" determining when 
exce ptiona l circumstances occllr. Thi s allows for lIIany s ituations to be considered 
exceplional . thereby plOviding every opp0l1unity to uvcllidc the rig ht s of animals 
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Since the lip.h'~ VI('W pltoritt'ics tl l(' i,.tclc'iIS or nll'!lllnn liRII in<ii \' idll <l ls. ami in 
IKuticu lal thllSC or InUll<lIlS. OtiC is k·fl v.olldclillg how such all (lPIHt l(lch could 
o fTer <l1l)'lhing subslcHllial lowilrds nd(lI css ing isslles o r the CI1\'inllllncnt Rc-gfHl is 
confidelll th<lt by rocusing 0 11 the ligl ll s or the individufll. the c nvilOlIlIlcllt it selr 
w ill be Ireat("(\ I'lOp("ily 1(11 ""'(, l e wc fO show propel lespect IQI' the rig hts or the 
illd ivi duals. who nmke lip the hiolic COTllllllllliLy. would 1101 the communit y be 
preservedT ' (P .. pgnll 19R8 J61) rhe Icspect principle sWtc<; Ill ,,! .Hl indi vidual is 
given tlt e respect she is due. by vii tlle of the inherellt va lue she possesses. 
Respecting the right s of imlividuals el1t<li ls not harming them (the hall1l pl inciple). 
Ind ividual s arc harmed when they are depri ved oflheir basic bio logical necessities 
(welfare interes ts) . IlIdividunl s acquil e such nccessiti es rrom their phys ical 
environment Indi vi duals will hCllefi t the 1110St from thei r environment when it is 
in a ncalthy state. It fo llo\\ls that precautiolls shou ld he taken 1I0t to disturb the 
environment 1'01' it is that very e nvironment in w hi C' h thJse indi vidu(ll s li ve [tnd 
rely upon to live a full lire 'I hcrefore. hy respecting the ri l!.hl s o rtlle ind iv idual our 
lespcclful ac tions wi ll pCllneate through to the e ll vilOlllll ellt ill whi ch they live 
While this seems to make sense ill the nbslT acl.lhe pICtcti cal f1:pp lica lio ll of Regan 's 
nppro~ch has questionable outcomes. '1 he rights view a llocates mora l pre ference to 
indiv idual beings. in and by the mselves The e nvilOlIlllenl is not nn indi vidual ~ but 
rather is comprised or collections o f indiv iduals toget her with non-indi vidual s. 
There is nothing in the rights \ic\V that will acknowledge the collecti ve whole of 
nat ure. as the rights view rcjects appea ls 10 the aggreg<He (R egan 1988 : 362) . 
Regan 's identification of the individual is restricted to "mentally normal mammals 
ora year or 1110 re" (!tegan 1988 : 78). This limit s moral co nsideration to the group 
ofma11111lals w hile neglecting l11ilny other members of the bio tic community. The 
implication of this is that o nly the envirollments in whic h mammals exist would be 
indirc(:t1 y pro tected, while llll ea te llcd environments thC't conta in no mammals 
would have no protection whatsuever (1Iargrove 1992: 8 1) 
furthermore, sillce moral I ig ht s only apply to the actions r f moml agen ts, the 110n-
human world is deemed to be et mOlal- fl ee zone. Along such lines. it makes sense 
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to wlk or Ihc IHo,,,1 right " (If ('ovule ill COllllect ion \\'ilh IUIIII (,I!' \ .. II(t Il ftP (l lId kill 
Ihel11 (\Hlvcrscly. it i $l ;dindo\l~ 10 1[llk oflhc 11I0"d li~~h l " 01 "[llmoll v .. illl Icspect 
10 the h('<lrs that hUllt thclll . ;111<1 si lllilml y wc have 110 1110ral duly 10 SIOI' a lion 
nom hunting a 7(:1.>,<1. As such. Wll('l(! 011ly 1110lal pCllicllls al"(' concerned Ihcle can 
be 11 0 ri ght s 01" duties 10 be claimed. including inslall(,cs when I1wlal agents ,He 
ubservels (Rolt;ton 198B· till) . This uccre(lses Reg:m's c<ltegol Y or llH.ually 
cOllsidcll\ble individuals. Cons idering Ilml there are inlin;Iely nrOle Cl ccHures on 
Ihis planet thell do Ilot rail illto Rcgall ' s notion of Ihe illdividu<ll. ther e would be 
ext l cmcly lalge po,tions of the cllvirulllllenllhal would have no protection. Such a 
hamls-olTapploach has gr(lve implicat iuns for wildlire management (lnd the biotic 
comllllrllity at large. In many instClnccs this would not ncces"ft rily be the best route 
to n,lIow. With the plohibition orhu llting. natural predator~ and dangclous exotics 
wou ld he len uncontrolled {'VCIl w h(' l c cont rol ofthelll i os ICqUilCd to pI C",CI ve the 
divcl sit r oCall ecusystem (Piel ce &. Vnn 1)c Veer I QC}C; · 257} 
A final criticism IS that the rights view reduces a spect~s 10 the sum or the 
illdi vidrmls that const itute it. 11 is Regan's opinion that whel the individual is well 
on: then the spccies is well olT Ilowever, there are occasions when w hat is good 
i'or the species is not ncccssarily good ror the individu(l1 such as sick ness and 
discClst!. whi ch .. \re potentiall y damaging tu the indi v idual , but afTer opportunities 
for the species to strengthen ils genetic make-up. Alternatively, there are occ(lsions 
when what is good for the indi vitiwt \ is not beneficial to the species. sllch as the 
saving of hU111(11l li ves, which is good ror the individual concerned. however not 
necessaril y productive for the species. Favouring the individual and lIeglecting 
species is a dangeroll s route to follow, for while lire on thi s planet cannot exist 
without individuals, the indi vidual cannot exist without the species. All indi vidual 
member or a species is replaceable through reproduction. Killing a species 
permanently shut s the door till the possibi lit y of a grour of indi vidua ls ever 
existing again (Rolston 1988: 144). In light o rthis Rolston slates that irkilling an 
indi v idual requires adequate justifica tion 10 override it s right to existence, then it 
makes '·more sense to claim that one ought not to kill the species w ithout 
superjustifical ion" (Rolstnn 1988: 146) 
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Rcga l '~ rig hl s-btlscd <l ppl ondl e.'ot: tend s the 11101<11 sp herc to Iccogllise the rig ht s of 
intii \ ltiua l clllinml s that l)u :l lify rI~ suhjccts-of-a-life . ·1 his e ll"Ules Ihtll. we .. ti C duty 
bound 10 respect {I ll c0 I1 5cioll". sel f-nw<lre bcings i e 111<lllllllals Ilowever, 
ex tending right s from htllnalls to inc ludc a ll mamilla Is s imply ill'rodllce~ Il('W 
demands into the 1110ra l rea lm. while " failing to provide a consistent prescri ption 
for action" (Singer 199 1: 147). Furt hermore. s ince only certa in indi vidual s stand to 
bcnc rit fi·olll slIch lig ht s. nOIl-IlHlltll11alia n animal s. p la nt s alld non-individual 
en tit ies arc morally neglected . In my opinion. RegclIl 's attempt to construct a 
st rong pos ition for the lig ht s of ani mal s is Oawed by hi s strict reliance on the 
Kantiall model \Vhil e a clear con nection is established between self-awareness 
and mora l trea tmcnt , it is not c1car why only self-aware subjects of a life have 
inherent value. rather than a ll living beings. 
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1',-1('" Singer: MOI"l,II.v Consilii-ring S" ,·,lienl Being' 
Pe ter Si nger is the J)c('rnnp Pro fes'>OI in the Uni ve rsi ty ( e n\Tc fo r IlullHlII Va lues. 
Prill '; elo n Uni versity _ lie is a lso the current president o f Animal Ri g hts 
Int ell1 ~ ti ona l : co -i{)l l1ldc r <llltl pres id ent of The Orc,ll ,"'le PJOject, a nd srie ntili c 
cH.lv isor to A ,![k/(inmJ! /l1Il1 A"/"ifik Ili" main inte rest is illl inlal ethi cs. but he has a lso 
pllb li shed book" and ~Hticl e<; on huma n rights. genetic eng inceli ng. inHHll icide. 
Ilegel and M(l1 x In A lIimal I i hernlioll S inger posi ts that i f we value the ntcia l and 
gender iibcl<II;o n moveme nt s of the si'< ti es, then the liberatio n o f an imals is the 
next logica l step (Singel 1990 viii) . lie chall enges accept ed assumptions by 
ex tending moral considclalio ll beyond the scope ofhul1l(ln" . 
llu oug h exploring conceptioll s of hutlla n equalit y. Singer identifies the principle 
o f equality , according to whic h the interests of e very being .. nected by an action 
should be " taken inlo account and given the same weig l·t as the like interests of 
any c. he r being" (Singer 1990: 5). Sentience, the capacity to feel pa in. i!' identified 
as a : Irerequisite fOI having int clcsts. Sillce animals (Ire sentie nt . the interests o f 
anilllils ought to be cons idered becallse they have int e rests and there arc no 
justif; 11) le reasons to exclude them from lIlo ral cOllsici-!-ration. Looking at the 
practi .!es of scientific experimentation and the animal H \~ri cultural industry, it is 
clear lhat the interesls of animal s fire cOll1pletel y lIf'g l'!cted Accordingly. such 
pract;,.:es are deemed to be Il,o lally reprehensible. III lig ' l! of thi s, Singer argues 
that it lS our Illoral responsibilit y to bring an end to aninml farmin g by becoming 
vegetarians. Furthermore. while scientifi c experimentatio n is bc nefi cial to 
humanity, it should onl y be allowed to continuc provided that the experime nts are 
so important that they would warrant the use of human babies as test subjects. 
Moving away (i '01ll issues o f pain, Singer explores the more compl ex issue of 
killing. Avoiding the charge of speciesislIl, the sanctity of life is defe nded by 
appealing to Ihe categOlY of person hood Singer' s response to the isslle of killing 
entail s adopting a two-pronged approach, applying pl cferc nce utilitarianism when 
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dealing w ith pel soll<;. and cltl<;<; icct l hf'do llistic utilit cuianislIl \\hcll dea ling with 
non-pC'rsol1s. 
/\ th'Jf(mgh exposition or Si llger'~ et hic will plOvide thc fiHlndalion for a critical 
discussio n. 
In sc- \rching for an acccptable approach to ethics, Si nger argues that Illora lity 
~houkl be grounded upo n somct hing broader than a relati vist or self-int clcsted 
point o f view, which oITels a weak 110 tion of ethic .. with no accept able means of 
addressing conllicting int clests (Singer 1979' 6) This sllgl~est s that an ethic should 
be grounded in that which is universal (Singer 1979: 11). This does not imply that 
particular moral judgements ale absolu te and should be uni versa ll y applied to 
every situatio n, s ince "circumstances <llter causes" (Singel 1979' 11) Rather, the 
reason for adopting a uni versa l point of view is that it minimi ses the import,mce of 
our own interests, whil e et' the sa me time recogni si ng Ihat the interests of a ll 
re levant parties COll nt equCllly. Accol(jingly. when making ethica l decis ions. the 
interests of all those arrected hy the decision to acl should be considered . The 
choice ofactio l1 is then determined by the best consequences for all those affected . 
This provides «a pervasive, although not conclusive. rea<;on for taking a broadly 
utiliti1lian position" (Singer 1979: 12). 
! ';qua!;/y among humans is a widely accepted cont empc)lary political and ethical 
creed (Singer 1979: 14). All form s of racism and sexi!an are considered to be 
morally abhorrent. Recognising that dilTerences exist between the human sexes as 
well as the races, il is clear that human equality is rot based upon phys ical 
charaeteristics. Neither is it based upon 1110ral or intellectual capacities, for there 
are no log ica ll y compelling reasons to assume that diff{:rences in abi lity justify 
differences in treatment (Singer 1997 : 18). Equality in this sen.;;e is «a basic ethical 
principle, not an assertion of fact" (Singer I 97CJ; 18). Accordingly, Singer 
identifies the basic principle (!f equalify as the equal considerat ion of interests, 
whereby Clll impartia l weighting o f interests is given 10 all those who ha ve interests 
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(Singl' l IQ79 IQ) The ~)li1H: iple llfeqlla lity is the (lIIly " ',),;o;; il>le ha~is fi.u cla im ing 
the cqllCl lil y of hunHlI1 5, <I S it .. Iltnvs onc to defend ~ fO llll (If equalit y while 
cmbracing the dilTclc llcc<.; Ih .. 1 cxist between Illllll allO;; (Singer 1979. tl2) 
Singer's argull1cnt for the libel:\lion o f anill1a l ~ is based on the cla im that 
discriminating ag .. inst bei ngs so le ly on the basis of the il speci es membership «is a 
form of Plejudi ce, imllloral and inde fensibl e in the same way Ihal di scTi minatio l1 
0 11 the basis o fl <lce is immoral and indefensible" (Singet 1990. 243). Singer labels 
thi s form of discriminatio n speciesisl1I. A speciesist openly and without restraint 
has no problem to hurt. mi streat or kill an animal, while she wou ld never consider 
performing such actions 0 11 any human indi vidual. Thi s is because the sanctity of 
life hi confc lred onto humans a lune . 'fh e be lie f that only human life is inviolable is 
" for m of specicsislll (Singer IQ90. IR) . Singer feels that there are no good and 
Ilon-<l rhitrary rC<l sons to 'iUpporl Ihe posit ion that hUlllan ~ire is more valuable than 
a ninl:JI life. In order to avo id ~pecicsi sm , we llIu st "allow that beings who alc 
Sillliill in all relevant lespccts have a sim ilar right to life" (Singel 1990: 19). 
Acc'~p ting the princ iple of equalit y as a sound moral basi ., for hu man e(ltlality, "wc 
are al: .o cOlllmitt ed to accepting it as a sound moral basis for relations with those 
outside of our own species - the lIo ll -human animals" (Singer t979: 48). 
The principle of equa lity is Singer's key philosophical posi tion with which he 
establ ishes that all a nimals, buth human and non-human, are desetv illg of equal 
moral consideration . The equa lity described is no t till actual equa lity, but rather a 
type o f treatment that is prcscribc-lI, i e. equa lity in humans is not an attempt to 
elaim that men and wome n are exactly the same find are thu s deserving of the 
same treatment. Rather d ifferences are acknowledged and acceptable treatment is 
accorded in light of the similarities. Along these lines, the ca ll for animal equality 
is not an absurd one, as the extension of the princ ipl e o f equalit y from one group 
to an'Jther does not entai l that both groups arc trea ted in the sa me way, but rather 
Ihat Ihey are considered eq ua lly. " Equal considenll ion fo r dilTercnt be ings may 
lead 10 different treatment amJ dilTerenl rights" (Singer 1990 2) Because it does 
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not rJiClate cqllfll 111(\1,11 Ir('<l lmenl, the pri nc iple o f equnlil y ('n n llc ~(l id to be a 
min iln(l \ ega\it al icHl plinciple. In cC' rlflin circutl1 stflncc~ . the nppli c<1 t io tl o f thi s 
ega lit arian princ iple could lead 10 IlIlCqufll trcalmcnl. 11 J1lll st be rC1I1cmbefcd that. 
in sllch instance!', 1Illcqu<11 IlcatfllC'llt is all <lltempt to plOduce the mosl ega lit aria n 
resu lts (Singer 1979. 2 1) 
Many would consider it ahstlld to include (llli11l~ls HS J1lC'mhers of the moral 
cOllllllunity, which is understood fl S a socia l grot'!' "colllposed o r interacting 
autonomous beings whcle 1110 1<11 concepts and precepts can evolve and be 
understood" (Gruen 199 1' 343) Accordingly, only me mbers or the moral 
cOl1lmunit y arc lIlo r(lll y cOI1", idemble . Ilumalls arc mora l heings and therefore 
descrve 11101(1 1 consideration, whil e animals are not moral and therefore are beyond 
Illoral concel n. Singcr d isagrees with thc logic of thi s <IIgUIllCll1. It is true that 
humall beings arc mura l crea tures Wc have the capacit y 10 int e lligently nssess o ll r 
actions and make c hoices 0 11 Ihe basis o f that assessment. As suc h wc call be held 
mora 't1 yaccountable It is nl so true that non-human beings are incapable of rational 
consi( lcra tion or mo ral ren cction 111 thi s sense they ('a l1l1o t be held morally 
aCCOlllllab le f'or the ir actions (Singer 1990: 224). The pro: b lem lies in making the 
capacity to reason in mon'" ways a necessary requircment for bei ng morally 
considered . The former is an illle ll ectual abi lity and the la' tcr ent ail s the receiPI of 
respectrul !realment. Possession of lhe rormer illlpli es the l<"lll er. but the hlttcr in no 
way Icquires the fo tltlcr. 
The principle of equality requires that our ethical concern fo r others ought not to 
depend upon what species they belong 10 or what abi liti es they possess. but o n 
whether they have interests (Singer 1979: 49). Singer identifi es one fundamental 
characteristic that is a prerequi site for having interests as the ('opacity to sl!ffer 
(Singer 1979: 50). " If a being suITels, there can be no moral ju s!ifica tiof1 fo r 
disregarding that suITering or for reJi.lsing to cUlIn! it equally with the like sufTeling 
of any o ther be ing" (Singer 1<;)90: 171). According 10 the principle o f equali! y, a 
being'!. suffering must be counted equall y wilh the s imilar suffer ings of allY olher 
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he ing Thi s c:occludcs nil be ings tha t cannot suller, rur th("le is not hing tn Iflke into 
aCCOllllf." Singer IlIm ks scn lic n('c <IS the «only derensihle bOlllltia l y (lr concern for 
the in terests ofOII1 CIS" (Singer 1990: 8), since drawing Ihi " l1Ioral line II I allY other 
po int is as fllbitrary and <lS WIOllg (lS scx is lIl or lacislll . 
Thosc who do nu t cxtcnd equa l Illola l considcl <1t ion to anima ls are g uilt y of 
specicsislll Like racists who ravour their OWI1 race while vio lati ng the int e rests of 
o thel s. anti SC'XiSIS who ra vour their own sex in vio la tio n of 0 lhcI5' intc rests, 
"spcciesists a llow thc intere"'" of their own species to overridc the grea tcr interests 
o r mcmbers of other species" (Singel 1990: 9). Singer reels his demarcation is 
non-arbitrary, as those being,; that are senticnt are the o nly being.s that will 
cxperience the outcomes of any particular actions . 1\ child ro r exa mple w ill suffer 
te n-ible pain ir kicked by all adult _ and the lesult o r thi s act io n will se riOllsly 
interfere wi th both the physical and psychological hea lth and well being of the 
child . A stone, o n the other hand_ w ildl y ki cked across the road willll(lt be afTected 
in any way. ci ther imllledi a te ly or at any point in the fUiure . Usi ng senti ence to 
deterllline int e res ts prov ides a po~ ili on that does not ail c-w the considerat io ns of 
Ihe p\ lJasures and pains o r sume 10 he ig nOl cd ovcr lilt; pleasUl es a nd pains of 
othen (Rcgan 1988: 20 I) This enables S inger to Illove moral considcration 
beyolt,t the human sphere to includc a wide range afTlon-hulllan beings 1'1 
In opposition to thi s is the view tha t animal s ca nno t su l er and hence have no 
interest:;. Thi s comes in two form s. The modesl d,(wKe rests upon the 
u 111is is supported by Callicott, who slates that " if it is p(till and suffering tJlat is the 
ultimate evi l beset ting human life, and thi s not in virtue of our humanity but in vi rtue of 
ou r 3nima lity. then it seems only fair to promote freedom from pain for those ani mals who 
share wi th us ill thi s Illode of experi ence" (Callicott 1 Q05a: 42). 
3.1111C capacity to fee l pain is <lttrib\1led 10 a being's biologica l struct\lre - 111 e ex istence of 
a brain, a central nervous system and it verteb ral column . As such, Singer argues that 
because all vertebrates have the capacity to fee l pain , Illey are alllllorall y considerable. He 
draws the line of Illoral consideration at AlIlphipoda - freshwater shrimps . 
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ullder~t C\nd i ng Ihat ani lll " l ~ do no t and c,mnot ~lIner in thl'! same \\ays that hu mans 
sufTc~. 1\ l1 i 11 1<1 Is, lack ing the degree of emotion and int ellect that humans possess, 
ca nnot slInc r the disappointment of economic l(lsS or the knowledge that a 
ma ligna nt cancer w ill ctluse an untill1c ly death . The !lIen ta l ctlpctc it y of hUJ1I ans 
ca ll . III cert ain circumstances " 'e'ld them to 5:1I0rr 1ll(l I"C than animals woultl" 
(S inger 1979: 52 ). 
lIow.:ver. an inabi lity 10 slI llcr psychologica ll y (hig hl y deba table in higher order 
maml lla ls) in nu way implies an inabili ty to suffer physica ll y. nor does it mea n that 
we ca n exclude non-human an il11a ls from moral consideratio ll . Furt hermore. 
hig her mental acti vit y does Ilo t necess itate a greater sulTering 0 11 the part of 
humalls, as an animal Illay sufTer mo rc th rough a limil £"d understanding of what is 
happening to it (Singer 1990. 16) . A war ca pti ve, for instancC'. is like ly to sufTer 
less knowing hi s release is cont ingent o n the ending o f the war Ih ft n an animal who 
is caged with 110 underst<l l1di ng of why or for how long . The animal is likely to 
experience increased sufTer ing alld terror, being unable to distingui sh between 
being overpowered in the attempt to confine it fi'om an att empt to kill il. Along 
such li nes, a being that does 110 t have the ability to lInd er~l a nct what is being done 
to it i ~~ arguably in a position tll ~d lTer more. 
The ('xlrem e chwJ!.e is that ftnim als do 11 0 t suITer at all , a view 1110st prominent III 
the wl ilings of Rent! Descart e~ Animals tire seen as ullconscious machines. devoid 
o f thcught s, feelings, or ft mental li fe (Singer 1990: 10) lJesca l1es saw that the 
world was composed of two spheres: the material, phys ica l world of e:"( lcnded 
substances, including lite bodies o f human beings; and the spiritual, non-physical 
world vf consciousness. All matter in the wolld is part o f the former category, 
whil e o nly human minds (and presumabl y God) are part of the latter category. 
Evidence o f conscioll sness in humans is rationalit y and the abilit y to convey ideas 
th rough language. Descarl es saw 110 sllch evidcm:e in any other beings, concluding 
that only humans (a nd God) are of this rea lm. Pain is a state of consciousness and 
since animals are not conscious, Descft rtes reasons, they cannot feel pai n. 
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III r(!):po ll sC, Singer point'" oul tlwt ,,11 externa l hchaviOllral sig llrll s observable in 
humans to ind ica te pain can also he cleally seen in nOI1-hum<ln animal s (Singer 
1990: I I ) , 'I hcrc is also conclusive pi 001' that lion-humans and humans share 
nen!)u<; systcms Ilmt respond in si lllilm ways w hen c:< posed 10 p<lin Singer adopts 
a pa 'SIIllOIU OllS <lpproa<'ll whe n seeki ng cxplanatio ns, fnv()1Ifing the explanation 
t hat makes the {"ewesl assumptions. Accordingly, si milar nelVOllS systems and 
silllill.lr behavioun:1i patterns can only mean that our experiences of pam are 
sim ilar. rilla ll y, evolutionary 1I11derstandings of p~i ll recogni se that it has a 
dislinclive biological lIscHIII1(,ss as a survival technique . Il would be ex tremely 
narrow-minded 10 assulIle thal ours is tlte o nly species to develop it. Singer 
concludes, " therc arc no good l caSO Il S, sc ie ntific or philm:;ophica l, for denying that 
animals fec i pain. If we do 110t doubt that o thcr humans feel pain we should not 
doubt that other animals do so too" (Singer 1990: IS). 
«Pain and sutTcli ng are bellI" (Singer 1979. 54) Actions that cause p~Hn and 
sutTering do no l take thc interesls of the being into accollnt , and are therefore 
wrong. Accordingly, pain and sufTering shou ld be sto ppc'J or at least minimised. It 
bCC01 ICS our moral dut y 10 avoid innicting pai n or suffering on those who can 
experience it. The badness of pain dcpends upo n it s intensi ty and duration.lS Pains 
o rthe same intens it y and duration are equally bad~ 110 lH fl li er whether humans and 
Iloll-humans alike experience them Such pain and sufTellllg "should be prevented 
o r III nimi sed, irrespective o f the race, sex, or species pf the being that sulTers" 
(Si n,~er 1990: 17).16 The prevention of pain and sufTcl ing is ullprobl ematic fo r 
Sing(~ r , If one is in a position to slop thc sufTering of <ln~)ther 5:enlicllt being, then 
onc i!' morally bound to do so. The principlc o f equal considerat ion of pain or 
3 ' TIle problem of measuring pain wi ll be discussed later in this chapter, 
36 'nlis is misleading since Singer adopts a ' hands-off' approach toward wi ld anima ls, 
foclI sing entirely on domesticated <lnd ttgricllltura l animtt ls, which suITeI' the most M the 
hands ofhullmllity, 
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pleasurc is "a su ffi cic nl bas is rOl idcnlifying and plOte!'t ing a~ain<; t <1 11 the lllaJor 
abuses o r a nilllals that hUlllan bei llg~ rraclisc" (Singer IQ90 17) 
A C( 1I\1110 n response is th ll t if slIrrering is bad, how can we be sUle that plants 
cannot feel a nd if they do , wouldn ' t it be bad to ea t thcm? Ifit is. then the w hole o f 
humanity is either doomed 10 be morall y wrong ill cau sing surrcling to whatever 
we eat. o r wc <Ire doomcd 10 starvation by heinq morally rig ht. Singer 
ackll owlcdgcs tlial this ques tion alises less out o f collcern for the wclfare of plants 
and more as a response to the cflll to end meat ea ting. lie rej ccts thi s question a s 
being "weak in bo th fa ct ,md logic" (Singer 1990: 235 ). The ca tC'g(lrY of surrering 
is ex tended rrom humans to animals o n the basis or three fa cts. Observabl e 
behavio r in the presence o f pa in. s imil arity o f nervous syste ms. together w ith the 
evolutionary expla nation o f pa in as a surv ival technique, all support an 
unde rstanding that humans (l il t! a nimals will reel pain and di scolllfOlI in llluc h the 
same way (l lld 10 a g reater o r lesser degree. Singer sces no evide nce 10 support that 
pla nt s reel pain. either IIH OUgh obscrv(lbl e behaviur, n(' rvous system or 
evolutio nal-y expl analio n (Singel 1990' 235) According ly, Ihere are no justified 
grounds to believe it 10 be so. In telms of logic, Singer cl aim s that even if they did. 
we would have to decide cither to eat plant s or animal s in o rder to survive . In a 
s ituation w here suffering is imminent. he recommends that w c choose the route 
Ihat causes the least amount of sufTering (Singer 1990: 236) . Along such lines we 
shou d choose to eat the plants, even if they fe lt pain to the same degree thal 
animals do. This is because the rcaring of animals uses a lmost ten times as many 
plams as it would t(l kc. to feed humans (Singer 1990: 236). Therefore, c(lling meat 
would not only cause suffering fo r the animals, but also for the plants used to feed 
them 
Looking into practices that cause pain and suffering in anima ls. S inger focuses on 
the lI se of animal s ill sciel1f~fic experimentatiol1. lie g ives a detailed account of 
animal ex.perime ntation by the milit ary, psycho logical instit utes, and cosmetic 
compani es, o rrering a convincing argumenl that many humans are speciesists. 
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S l .. ~al· i" "ppIlIIO( 1 Ih"1 " "\nIl Y 01'\ 1'<' 11111 0 111 :1 l.,nlCI ~CVCI t' p lll l l Wl! lI l )U I tile I Clno t est 
prospect of signi fic(l lll bene- fit s fOl human beings Of allY OII1 ('T animals" (Singer 
1990: 36), whil e fhe h.m1ls ,md losses experienced by th~ an imals ale very renl. 
Animal experimcnta tion Ims turned int o an industry. with muncy being acquired 
th rough governmenta l fu ndi ng and profit s being made th rough Ihe selling of 
' I<lboralo ry animals ' and other specia liscd experiment a l equ ipment (Singer 1990' 
38) Thi s industry n Olll ishes to the detriment of the weFaTe of millio ns o f animals 
evelY yem . The rat iona le I'chind Illany of these expelime nl s is tlutt a close 
bio logica l correlation ex ists between the experimental tlnilll (l l and humans. Thesc 
are simi larit ies of organs, nervous system and internal ~ I ructuring. Il owever. if the 
cX f1(·rience o f pain for humans is a result of their bi{,logica l be ing and animals 
have a simil ar bio logy then it is impossibl e 10 deny tha/ the animals invo lved also 
feel pain, and thcTcfOlc sull"cr 
If suHe ring is bad, and C'<pcl illlenlation causes suffering. what can be done about 
animal ex perime nt atiun? All easy answer would be to put fI Slo p to all pain 
induci ng expe l i menta tio ll . I !t",yever, thi s flpproach does 110 / aCCOllllt for instances 
where the suffering of many could be ~flved by the sufTering of a few Si nger is not 
aga in st ex perimentation per se, but rather is appall ed by the llIany !';cnseiess and 
meaningless experiment s whidl c,lIIse unnecessary pnin " nd !'ufTering for animals. 
Experiment s that have no purpost' or serve 11 0 higher moral good. such as saving 
another life o r creating a cure 10 a terribl e di sease, yet inllict sune rillg upon 
sentient be ings, arc mora ll y de fi cient and therefore wrong. Those experiments, 
w hich serve no direct and lll gent purpose. would thereflll'e have 10 stop 
immediately (Singer 1990: 40). If direct benefit s 1re to be deri vcd fro m 
experiments then such actions could possibly be justifi eG . Singer ' s position is that 
if uolte, or even a dozen animal s had to sutTer in o rder In save thousands, I would 
think it right and in accordance with the princ iple of equa l cOllsider(t tio ll of 
intel{!sts that they should do so" (Singer 1979: 58). Therefore he would not 
demand the closure of all laboratories, but would rather insist 0 11 !'tricl regulations 
governing which experiments were conducted, and to wh:lt de~H'ee sufTering would 
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Ihe use of Cl blain-damaged hUIll:\lI \\ould al<;o be ill~lifhhle" (Singel 19QO· RS) 
Such a concession C'lIcOllrngc<; the (l,c lcOllling or Olll spc(:ic<; bi"" in II ml WE' are 
encounlgcd 10 considcr lI si ng lummll beings for pain lid experimentation. while at 
the same lime cllslLling 111<11 on ly the 111051 illlpOI\ clllt of'exl'e1illlents <He done. 
A 11 even bigger display of i ndiffcrcncc I QW;U cl the SlI rTer ing of tlOtl-hUIll<l11 animals 
is the Ol1illlO/ 0Xr;";u/(ura/ iJldlls/J)·. whi ch Si nger dce-Ill s to he " the Illost ex tcnsive 
exploitation of ot hcr speci es that Iws ever existcd" (Singer J 990: (5). ()vel one 
hundrccl million cows. pigs and sheep, and over fi ve billion chickens are 
slaug ht<'l"cd in the Un ited States every year.\? The sutTering innict ed upon animals 
in the f()od industry is a nalural outcome of our speciesist views. for "once we 
place non-human "niumls outside our sphere of Illoral consi{'erat ion and treat thcm 
as thing:; we use to satisfy uur own desil es, the outcome is predictable" (Singer 
1990. 9 " ) 
I'arming is an age~old way of li ving. with traditional farm" CO IlJllIlIIg images o f 
harmonious integration betwccn plant. al1 imal and nature, with humans reaping the 
benefits of this relationship. However. times havc changed . Increased population 
numbers have resulted in an incrc<l scd dcmand for produce <HId with it the 
realisation of profit potential. transforming the traditional farmyard et hos into an 
industry of factOl Y farm s. The farming industry is competitive and new methods 
are constantly devised to produce food quicker and cheapel, theteby increasing 
prolit margins. " Animal s are treat ed like machines that convert low~ priced fodder 
into high-priced nesh" (Singer 1990: 97). Such an ethos ensures that chickens, 
cattle and pigs have a miserable life from the moment they are bom until their 
deaths. Their world is an artificial one, where surroundings, .bod, temperature and 
even lig ht are manipulated to yield the hig hest possible profits. "The plinciple of 
J1 It is eshlltated that worldwide 175 million tonnes of meat w~s cOilslI llled in 1000 
(Meyers 19q4: 32). 
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C(l lI il l c'lIlsidCltt,iOIl ('Or interests doe" 1101 allow nmjol illlell'~ls 10 be ~ilelifi cc( 1 ror 
minor intelests" (Si nger 1979 55 ) Accordi ngly, the tl e~t l l1ent of <lninl~ls by the 
farming indu stry is mora ll y lepl C' he ll siblc. as the min ima l IIlIll1<1n intclests or taste 
prefc rell\,;e and pront arc given Ill ll rC weigh t than the major interests of the 
su fTer ing o rthe aninmls involved 
Little ca n be done to alter the suffering whi ch the <l ll illl<l ls expen ence. for it is 
impossible to rear animals Il)r profit w ithout inflicting conc; idernble suffer ing 
(Singer 1990: 160). The OI1C wily to challe nge the atrocities which fa ctol y nu J11ing 
innicts on the anima ls concclned is to not support the industry. Singer algues Ihat 
the more people stop buyi ng these products. the less dema nd there will be and the 
less profits th ere wil1 be madc. Dccreases in profit and demand will slowly reduce 
the indu stry. thereby leduci ng the alllOll l1t or suffering. Sin ger does no t condemn 
the eating o f 1'I nil11ctl products. for ud('(l th . though never pleasa nt , need not be 
pai nfur · (Singer 1990 I;"';') Il owevcr. we shuuld nul eat aninwl n esh unless we 
can be certai n that it W<lS nol ploduced by the animal agricvlt ura l business (S inger 
1979: 51,) Living in urban areas. it is difficult 10 know the process of production 
i.c . wh.ether sufTering has or hasn' t been involved . To thi!' Singer has a simple 
answer, don' t eat any meal or an imal products - become a vtgctarian 
A particu lar response to the closure of farms is that there would be nowherc to 
keep all these a nimals, and with no one prepared to feed them they would sulTer 
more from sta rvation a nd ex posure. Therefore. the animals are bell er ofT in the 
factories, whcre al least they arc sheltered a nd fed. Singer acknowledges that those 
industry anima ls - call le, sheep. pigs and chi ckens are nol wild animals. and that 
they would probably 1I0t survive ;n the wilderness. lIowever, the abolition of 
faelOIY farms wou ld no t entail a returning of farm an imals to the wi ld. The whole 
process would be gradual (S inger 1990· 227). A decrease in demand would 
cOITelate with a decrease in the market size. fewer farm s would be operational . 
resulting in a s low decrease in the !lumber of factory a nima l,<; being bred fo r these 
operatiol's . In th is regard the cho ice is u not between Ii re 0 11 a factory farm and life 
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in Ihe wild. hut whether an il111tl s ciestincd 10 li ve 011 f"clory farlll!' :1I1d Ih(,11 killed 
I('}f laod shou ld be b0111 al illl" (Singt"1 1990: 728) 
I\. 1t~toll to this is tlial fa ctury farms g ive these flllimals an 0pPOIlu nil y 10 live. 
SU ldy then fHctory fanning is nut Ih<l t bad , as il allo\'/<; Ihe existence of certain 
anima ls 10 occur, for without it Ihey would never h"ve been born Singer is 
appalled at the suggestion that \\e me doing these an illl(\ls a (;wour by e nsuring 
the ir birth, unly to mistrcfl t and s laughter them. This presupposes that ex istence in 
any forlll is itself a benefit. ra ther than an ex istence free frolll sun"erillg heing a 
benefit. Singer is firm in hi s respon se that "10 bring them into cxiSI(,l1cc fOl a life 
of that kind is no benefit to them. but rather a greater harm" (Si nger 1990· 229). 
An unborn animal is belter olTthan an anima l born into the food indust ry and a life 
of slIlTering. The botto m li ne for Si nger is that actions fire wrong if they cause 
unnecessary suffering. but they arc right otherwise. 
A 1110re complex mallcr 10 flpp ly the pi inc iplc or equal Cll ll sidenll ion of in terests to 
is tllat of killilll!. SufTerillg is ofTcted as the determining factor of what is right find 
wro:'lg. This is prob lemCltic for no! all ki lli ng involves 5urrering - a sentient being 
can be ki lled reasolli1lJly quickly wilh a single falal shot to the head, or simi larl y 
can be given an injection whic h rut s it to sleep. wh..:-rc it ca n then be killed 
painlessly. Alternatively. killing cou ld be the on ly means to all eviate suffer ing. 
whc"'c an injured being whu is in ex treme pain and in no posilion to receive 
medical ass istance. could hav!? their sufTering great ly reduced by a painless and 
sudd(;1l death. One certainty for Singer is that the wrongness ofinnicting pain and 
suffering on a being canllot depend on its species membership, for "the biological 
facts upon whi ch the boundary of our species is drawn do not have moral 
significance" (Si nger 1979: 76). Similarly then, the wrongness of ki ll ing canllot 
depend upon species membership. Accordingly, appealing to species me mbership 
cannot defend the sancti ly uf hu man li fe. 
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ul1derslood as a bcing l lHtl is ratinnal a nd st' lf-consciolls (Sing.er 1979' 78 ) Tile 
c haracteris l ies o f person hood. 1 al i(II1<11il y and sel f ,collsciou c; aWilI C I1('S'i at e 
observabl e tlll ougl! a being's heha vio t Si nger rejects t lte cOll victiulI that thi s 
places human life ttbovc the lives o f other animals. as members of ot her species 
can be considered to be persons. such as primates, whales and dolphins: while 
some members of our own species ,lI C nOIt -persons, such as new-born infant s a nd 
some devclopmentall y delayed humans (Singer 1979:97).111 In an attempt to see if 
pe rsOnhCl,)(i carri es a special vtl lue Si nger contrasts persons agai nst non-pc1sons. 
finding that a being that is rctt iuna l and selr-conscious will have des ires about the 
ruture, wlll le a be ing wh ich is Iltcl ely consciolls and sentient will not 
According to the classin1/ ufi!itm ion \new. ;,ctions arc judged by their tlbili ly to 
maximi se pleasure and minimi se pa in (S inger 1979: 79). Therer01e the ability to 
have desi res abou t the ruture has flU direct Iclevancc regarding the wrongncs.s of 
killing. Ilowever. it could bc argued that personhood plays an indirect role in the 
classical utilitari an approach . Knowil1g that one is going to die . and hence that 
one's ruture desires are no t going to be achieved, w ill in some way aObel our 
happiness. Indirectl y then, killing a pe rson is, under certain conditions, mo re 
serious than killing a non-person. Speci fi ca ll y, this w ill be the case where the 
pc rson knows o rher illlpending deMh. Si nce il is most onen Ihe case that a person 
does not know when she is goi ng 10 d ie (eg natural dea th. death by sudd en 
accide nt. murder. or po isoning). killing, fo r the classical utilitarian. is 1101 a 
mora lly reprehensible act. 
Preference utilitarianism, 0 11 the othe r hand. sees a person's int erests as 
synonymous w ith hcr prefercnces. Therero re. any «aclkl1l cont rary to the 
preferences of any being is, unl ess tlti s prcrere nce is out weig hed by contrary 
31 Singer admits that the task of determining Ihe se lf-consc iousness of a being is extremely 
diffi cult , but th<H in cases where we ;n e unsure we should g ive that being the benefit of the 
doubt (S inger 1979: 98) , 
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prcfCICIlCCS. wrong" (SinJ,.!cr 1 (>79 8 1) Sentient being" [IIC cOIl<.;cinus and cC\pable 
ufcxpcricllcing plcasurc C\nd pain. hilt C\IC non-peu;flm: if Ihey me not I(lliulI<11 or 
sclf-c(l ll ~ciolls They C\re loclltcd in the pI esent fllld as. suc h " Cl1 11 propclly be 
regarded as recept<lclcs for CXPClit'IlCCS of pleasure and pnin'" (Singcr 1C)7Q • 102). 
Death for a nun-person is. " the ce<;~ll t iOIl of experiencc" (Singer 1979· I 02). and as 
a receptacle of happillcs~. can be Icplaced with a. simi lar being Provided that the 
nOli-person has a pleas<lnt life. i<; killcd Jl<1j1ll ess ly. it'l death does not cause any 
sulTering to <lily othcr beings ;lIld thtH il is Icplaced with <l 5il1l1 1al being who will 
ha ve fI sllllilaTly plea"allt life. the killing of such a being is Ilt)t TllOl.dly wrong 
(Sing"r 1<)79 104). 
In contrast, persuns are lIot only conscious and senticnt. but also n'11101l81 and sclf-
awarc:. They are indi vidual s wit h lives ur their own . They ha .... e a present that 
extelds with desircs into the futul c. Their lives count in ways that are unique to 
their being, and as slIc h arc not leclucible to recepLack j containing a va lue of 
happill( ss. Along thi s linc. taking the life of a person is m')rally worse than taking 
the life of a 11011-person since persons ha ve a concept of themselves cxisting into 
the rutu re with desircs and prefercnces to fulfil , while non-persons don't (Singer 
1979 . S I ). The prelerellce utilitarian approach thercfore provides direct reason 
why it is wrong to kill persons. This is 110t a categorica l po.;;itioll. fur uti li tarianism 
never accounts for only onc being but takcs all those in volved into account 
Accordingly, " the preferences oflhe victim cou ld sometimcs be outweighed by the 
preferences of others" (Singer 1979: 81) . 
Singer adopts a dual approach to the rightness or wrongness of killing animals, 
since the term <a nimal ' covers such a diverse range orbeiJlgs that it is improbable 
that one princ iple will apply to all (Singer 1979: 103). fie suggests utilising the 
preren'nce utilitarian approach when dealing with the killing of persons, and 
classical utilitarianism when dea ling with the ki lling of nOli -per SOilS. Killing is bad 
ror those beings thal have desires for the ruture, for such an act would lead to 
psychological suffering at the knowledgc Ihat one was flo t going to be able to 
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satisry those dcsilcs . FllllhclIllOlt'. stllTering wuuld be experienced hy thuse 
pcrsons that (Ire close to Ihal bring. ror there would be ruture e"'pcclalions and 
plans that would not he ahle to be rulfilled . In such instances killing cnn cause 
sutTe ring o r u ne rorm or the other. Accordingly. the killing o r persons is morall y 
wrong 
This <lpproach does 1101 apply to bci l1 gs that arc not ca pable or havi ng pl crelences 
and desires ror the future. Singer reCOllllllCllds the classica l utiJitm iall .,pproach 
when determining the rightness or wrongncss of killing non-pelsons (S inger 1979: 
99). In such c(lses the pain and sulTel ing experi enced by the being that is killed 
count s in conjunction with the pain and sunering expelienced by those who arc 
direc tl y affected by the death. i.e. the being's mate. dependants and social group. 
to det t' lIlline the wrongncss of the act. I lowever. thi s apprnach oOels "no reasons 
101' oppo"ing killing when it i ~ pai lll es~ and no othel "lIill1<1 l" "le "fTected"' (Singer 
197<).9") 
The animal right~ vicw, explured in the previou !'i chap ter. allocates equ<l.1 light s to 
all indi vidllill s. This oHcll result s in conllicts of interest s that arc dimcuh to 
resolve. Singer's ega li tarian approach, which focuses on the equal consideration of 
interests. avoids thi s problem of conOicling interests (Omen 199 1: 347). 
Furthermore, by emphasising the impol1ance of the consequences of our actions 
sllch an approach dc-emphasises fin adherence to strict rules and regulations. 
S inger's work otTers insig ht s to our dealings with nOli-human beings. making us 
aware that the interests of other beings count morally and to understand how they 
count morally (Johl1son 1991 : 19J) Credi t is due to Singer~ whose challenge of 
accepted attitudes toward animals not onl y provided a moral foundation for the 
animal liberation moveme nt (Oruen 199 1: 343), but is aho responsible for the 
growing public awareness of the (ltrocities of animal agr iculture and animal 
experimentation (Rcgan 1988 : 200). By making us aware that the concept of moral 
sign ili cJ llce may appear in different form s, he has not only contribut ed toward 
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new ,u ett s orpuhlic Cl lld I'hil tl~(l ph it-a l debate. hut <llsn In a ge llcltl llll(lra l progress 
(.Iohllsol1 ItJ9 1. 193) 
Rt'ga J. 's cr iticism or the utilitarian <1JlProflch is that it Ictiuces the va lue or 
indi vidufll beings C I<1s:-i cfll IItilitMiallism, <1pplying the prillcipll! '?f 1IIml),. 
determines the best consequences o r a n action by detellnining the "optimulll 
balance of pleas lire over pain fur evelyollc affected hy thc n\ll l~ollle " (Rega., 1988 · 
200) This, combined with the pi inci plc of equalit y, plcsents a suitAblc option for 
those who feel that wc should have dilect duties town rd$ animals. as il does nol 
a ll ow the pleasures and pains or sonic to be cOllsidered, while o thers are ignored . 
Each being that has jllt ere~t s is coullted equally with the interests of the other 
beings involved . However, what count s is not the indi vidu(ll per se, but rather that 
ill a ny given situation the SUIlI of positive interests should outweigh the Slim of 
ncga Li ve interests Theref()J c. the indi vidual is reduced to a mere receptacle of 
inter. 'sls 
S illg,~r's utilitarian approClch is unable 10 avoid this. f7o(,l1sing Ott thc criterion of 
senti ence, provided that the aggregate balance of pleasulc ove! pain is achieved, 
no wl}ral wrong is committed even if a sentient being i:: killed. Thi s amounts to 
vicw il1g sentient beings as not inhelcntly va luable in -\ hemselves. but as mere 
rccep:l1c1es or va lue (Rcgan 1988: 205). Sentient beings ::lre no t va lued ror the ir 
own sake. but for the pleasure and pain that they cxperience. With the best 
aggregate of pleas lire ovcr pain as ultimately illlporlant. an individual being can bc 
replaced provided that that being is replaced with a being that is similnr in every 
respect. Such a view has '\111 S::lVory moral implications" (Regan 1988· 206). 
In an attempt to avoid reducing humans to the status of receptacles of value, 
Singer adopts a preference utilitari<lll approach when dealing with the issue of 
killing persons. Along these lines the consequences or an action arc good when 
they further the preference interests of those affected . Accordingly, it is wrong to 
kill an individual who has preference interests "because it is an ::l c t contrary to his 
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or her prcfc l enn .",," (Rcgnl1 IQRR 2(7) Bccausc P CI"OIlS 11<1\(" plclc\('nces about 
their ruture, they me 11101 (' thell1 receptaclcs of va luc 'hie: ,l\vard ... pcr<:( U1 e: a 1ll0rClI 
sta!(ls hig hcl th"l1 that Ofllo ll -pcrsolle: 
I ' oV/ever, Singer su pplies Jlll <lrgulllcnt to Sllppull Ihi !:, he merely HSSUrlIeS IhM 
havi ng prefere nce interests is better than jusl ha ving the capacity to experience 
plcH sure ami pain FurthclIll(u e, Singer's reliance on ul ;lilarianis ll1 e njoins him to 
fucus on the best aggregate ou tcollle uf any situntiol1 The interest s of all those 
affected are counted equi tably, and Illell ba la nced tu find the aggregate of best 
possible consequences. Accordingl y. a person with prefercnces can be morall y and 
justifiably killed pruvided that slIch all act would " bring abollt Ihe optimal 
aggregate balance of satisfaction ofprererence inteles ts" (Regan 1988 : 210). Thi s 
impli es that preference iutel ests can themselves bc coullted This amounts to 
taking preference interests as a va lue in-themsel ves. residing within the illciividuC'l1 
receptacle. Followi ng the aggl cgar e goal or utilitarianism. per~olls are jusl as Illuch 
replaceable lecepl(lcles. given prererence utilitarianislll . as they ale wi th clllssieal 
utilitaria ni sm (Regall 1988· 2 10) 
Reg 'lIl ·s second major cli ti cism IS that Singer's posi tion "can allow for the very 
thing it ostensibly rules out, namely speciesislII" (Regan 1988: 226). 
Utilitariani sm, with it s cgaJit(llian pi inciple that COUllt ~ the interests of all those 
involved equall y, appears to be the fairest and lc<lst discriminatory moral 
approach . However, because of the principle of utilit y, a distinct lack of harmony 
arises between «everybody 's abiding by the equality (,rillciple and everybody's 
havi ng their interests forwarded equally" (Regan 1988: ~:27). This principle places 
the maximisation of good outcomes over the equal treatment of all beings that 
have recognised interests This allows for very inegalitarian results, as a minority 
of indi viduals, who are affect ed ill significantly adverse ways, can be justifiably 
sacrificed provided that a majorit y of indi vidual s stand to beneftt. This in itself 
does not make Singer's approach specif'~i~t , for provided that the interests of all 
concerned arc taken equally. then all stand an equal chance to bene fit or loose in a 
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mo ral decis io n It is fo r Ihi .. reason tlmt Sing(,f illt rod uces S(' l1l i(' Il (~c as « the o nly 
de fen sibl e uounda lY o f' concern for the int eres ts o f o thr n; ' (S inger 1979. 50), 
impl ying that all other boundaries are arb itralY allocat ion .. 
If sentience alone determined 11 l{ua I consideration Singer would lIot be guilt y of 
speciesislll , since thi s categolY includes many 111 0 l e being I IHlIl humalls What 
confounds hi s approClch is the addition o f sclf-collsciou<: ness ClIH.I ra liomdit y as 
crit eri a for determining the va lue of 'I being's life . )') This is dOlle ill a n attempt to 
allow " be ings w ho are sim ila r in fi ll releva nt respecls have a simil ar rig ht 10 life" 
(Singel' 1990: 19).'10 Offering t w o diOc rc nt sets of c rit e rh. olle to detelln ine the 
va lue o f a being's life in issues of death ami another 10 make choices where 
suffering is concerned, result s in in '\lances where persons Me regarded as morally 
equal. while sentient nOIl -persons are not considered morall y at all J\dmitl ing that 
some li ves arc more va lll<lbl e than others implies that those beings should be morc 
protecled. Whil e Ihe interests of all are counted equall y, thi s is dOlle ill ways that 
arc de trime nta l to infe rior bei ngs. Conseque ntly, sent ient no n-pe rsons. seen to hold 
less ora va lue then PCISOIlS. al e pl ane 10 be d isad v<l lltaged dllring moral decisio n-
making . 
Singer w ould agree that III certain cases persons receive higher moral 
consideration Ihan non-persons. but that the charge of speciesism is unrounded 
39 For Singer these criteria avoid the charge of species is III as they are not exclusive to our 
own species . Because they are not species ist, Singer feels that we can l1l<lke a legitimate 
cla im "that there are some fea tures of cel1ain beings which mak~ their li ves more valuable 
than those o f other be ings" (Singer 19QO: 19) . 
40 111is places the life ofa normal adult human over that ofa chicken, but at til e same time 
places the life ofa monkey or a horse over that ora deve l opmenl~lI y delayed humM or an 
adult in :m advanced state af senilit)'. Singer's intention is not to cheapen the li ves of 
developmentally delayed infhnts and the senile. nor to make the li ves of some anima ls 
overl y sacrosanct. Rather, he wants to bring sentient animals into tJle moral sphere in 
order to put an end to the treatment of them as expendable items (Singer 1<)90 : 20) . 
80 
!'ince the ca tcgolY of pc r~ollhood ex lC'lId s beyond hum ans 10 include higher-Older 
mammals. Il owevcr. fa voul ing sclf-cons,"iousncss and r<1ti(l1wlity «pui S ~ prcmiulll 
on the wcllbeing. of tllOf'e ", ho cnn cOl1ccplucllise their wellheing Ilcc(i,," (.I ohll c;on 
1991 : 197) Such needs count Illor;li ly on ly if a being ca n fo rlll pl c felcnces about 
the m. Emphas isi ng the abilit y to fOllll preferences lesull s in ullfflid y recugnising 
Ihe moral status of those beings that al C similar 10 humans. w hile ignoring the 
moml status of non-human-like beings. It is cl ear tha t the biHs is ill fa vour or 
beings thrtt posscss huma n-like qua liti es (Johnsoll 1991: 197) '" furthermore, this 
wrongly assumes that self-consciousness and rationality, whi ch (Ire sumc ie nt 
conditiolls of mora l significance. are instead necessary conditio ns, thereby fixing 
lIlo ralit y to suit interests which alc velY muc h our own (Johnsnn 199 1· 198). 
S inger's ~ pecies bias becomes evident \·vhen the interests of a nail -huma n person 
conflicts w ith the interes ts of a human pel son Lori OlUen illustrates this by 
applying Singer 'S utilitmiani s lll 10 Regan "s lifeboat exa mple (Omen I q9 1 344). 
Oecause the utilitarian view considers <111 those afTected. the family and fri ends of 
those on the lifeboat also need to be taken int o consi demtio Tl These outside 
variables are removed /i·O Ill this thought exper iment by assuming th(l t all lelatives 
and friend s o f those in the boat are eit her dead, or wi ll in no way be atTected by 
any loss. F1II1hermore. to avoid the complications o f the pain and sutTering 
experienced through drowning, the being la be thrown overboard will be given a 
lethal but painless injection . The class ical utilitarian view, which aims to increase 
happiness and decrease pain, would throw the least happy being overboard . Since 
dogs are easi ly satis fi ed it would in all likelihood be the happiest of all be ings in 
this particular situation. l-Iumans are much harder beings to please and would. in 
this situation, be less happy than the dog. Therefore, it would seem obvious that 
the dog should remain, while the lea st happy human should be the unfortunate soul 
to die . 
·11 It is a facI that rationa l beings ha ve " interests involving thei r ratior alilY. interests that 
non ~ rationHI beings Jack" Oohl1sol1 t 99 1: 198) Singer"s mistake occurs when he allocates 
gre<'lter mora! significance to rational interests. 
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S inger would refuse this dec ision. demanding that <I plclercnce uli\itarhm view 
must be applied when dC(llill~ wi th issues o r killing pelsons Self·consciollsness 
and rationalit y. the c(1paeities of a nur lllal human adult. <Ire the crite ri Cl ofTclcd to 
dctermine the va lue of lirc. Since humans have the (,<1 pac it y ror sclf-awmencss, an 
ab ilit y 10 develop close pClsollal r("I<1l iol1s, ~lI1d the abi lity to pl<tTl for the rutllf e. 
w hile dogs I" esu T11 ably do !lo t (or have less of a capacity) . Singer would concl ude 
that «ir we Iw ve to chonse hctwf"cn the life of a human being and the life or 
another animal wc should choose to save the life orl he human" (Singer 1<)90. 21) 
Singer would ju stify this decision by re minding us that, while his approach ca ll s 
for thl! equal cO Il 'i idcla tio l1 o r all beings thal hcwe interests. equal considera tion 
does not necessaril y clltai l equal treatment. It is clear thal normal human adults 
will possess more of these capaci ties than any other b~!i llg . even if that being 
qual ifi es as a person. It is thererore morall y ju stifiab le to kill the dog as opposed to 
any o : the humans. ror hUIllIIIlS IIlId clop.s are not relcv~ntly equal. 
If this i'i the case, thcII the int eres ts or allimals «are allo\!led to count o nly w hen 
they do not clash with human int erest" (Singer 1990: 2 12). When there is a clash 
of interests it is morally acceptable to trea t animals in a n unravou rabl e manner 
provided that such trea tme nt hi ings about the best aggregtHe consequences for the 
majority o f humans. This smacks of speciesis lll and places anilllals in a precarious 
position. for even though they Illay have Illoved into the 111or,,1 sphere. they ex isl III 
a separate do main from humans. 
Aside from theoretical prob lems. S inger's approach presents a pu'tctical problem 
of measurement . Sentiellce is offered as the criterion for ha ving interests . This 
provides an entry point ro r explo ring the moral signi fi cance of animal s. It IS 
howev(:r problematic on two counts. The first ha s to do \\oith the r.-,ct that pain IS 
respon ~ i ve - it is experienced in response 10 stimulation . Because of this it call 
only bl! <measured ' afier the stimulation has occurred. Therefore, a being needs to 
sutTer i., order ror us to sce the wrollgne!'>s of an actioll . S inger would respond that 
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si nce the minillli "tl tion (lrptl;n tlllri ~II ITe rillg is the gott l of IIti lity the ~lIflcr jn g ofa 
few j ~ ; ,lcceptahlc pro\ idee! that the major it y benc fit ~ rrom t ., he p~i ll fe lt by some 
would .l lcrt liS to Ihe \ ... t(Hlgnc"~ nf an acl. It , ... o1lId Ihe 1 he nUl' I1Hu ~ 1 duty to 
ensure that the tlct was no t repea ted Thi s would Jll evelll Ihe major il y of 
individual ~ from sunc ling 111(' sa me pain This does tlo l change the f~1(' 1 that a 
wrong ha~ to occur in Ol der for us to kno w that it is wrong 
A second concern . expressed by .I 0 htl SO Il , is that il is « 1101 (11 jOlls ly dimcult to 
weight the compara ti ve pl easuf(,c; and ptlins of diffelc nt people, 0 1 even the 
different pletlslIres and pains o f the same person" (Johnsoll 199 1. 186). The 
suffering o f any human ca n never be ohjecti ve ly known as a maller of fa ct , but 
rather can o nly be known through observing thcir behavior or li stcning to their 
accuun t u fth " pain. Neither nbsel vation nor velbal account is an adequate means 
fo r detenninillg the eX<lct (tlllount of suffering that any human e'<pericllces. It 
therefore becomcs impossib le to cO l1l pare the sulTcring of humans If assessing the 
pains of hulllans is a d iOicu lt task. it can only be 1I10 re so \\helc the di vClsf' ranges 
of nor,· humans are concerned Since anima ls are unab le to comlllunicate verbnlly 
we h:n'e to determine the amount of su ffering through nbservatiull alone This 
relies o n the assumption that all beings w ill exhibit the salll~ responses 10 the same 
dcg l"ee£ of pain. This is absurd. for even among humans diflerent individu als have 
differe nt pain thresho ld s and accordi ngly respond to pain in dilTere nt ways. Not 
offering an adequate m etlllS to go Clhou t weig hting the sufTerings of difle rcnl 
bei ngs renders it dimeult. to implemcnt this approach successfull y (Jo lmson 199 1: 
188), 
A furth er p roblem wi th Singer 's ;tpproach is that it does not prevent species 
extinction. This is a result o f two facto rs: the cri te rio n of sentie nce. and the scope 
of moral consideration. The criterion of sentience fuellses mo ral cOllcern directly 
onlo the suffer ing o f the indi vidual. Since a spcc ies is no t a sen tie nt being. it is 
clear that the de mise of a species is no t or moral concern . In respo nse it could be 
argued t hat. governed by the principle of utilit y, actions al e cOllsidcled to be rig ht 
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or \vlong inl crm.;; "rhow they be!lcfit or harm thc lIlajOl it)' of individua ls Since a 
spc(;ics is a co llection o f ind ivid ll fl ls it wi ll be preserved Ilowcver. thi !; cOlTlmits a 
conrept ua l fl aw. in that fl species is nol si mpl y a collect ion of ind ividuals, but is 
the b io logica l vehicle tha t cont ains the gCllctic in formatio ll 10 CIlSUle the conti nued 
cxi~ t c nccs of fu lul C sllch ind ividuals Si nge-r's fl pproach o nly ack nowledges the 
scnti ent ind ividual a nd no t thc bio logica l group to whi(:h lhe ind iv idual belongs. 
S inee I he lIl inilll isfl t ion of su ffering is hi s main goal. 1)1" Jv ided tha t the indi vidual 
animc, ls do nol su lTer \V hile the species itself d ies UIII. 110 major wrong is 
committ ed 
Singer's approach (l lso elm.'.;; nol hel p to plevent species ex tinction for anot her 
reaso ll . the lim ited scope of Illoml considerat ion. According to Si nger it is mora ll y 
wrong to inni et needless suITel illg o nl o indiv idu fl l scn tie nt be ings. <Needl ess 
su lTering' in thi s sense is so meth ing tlm! o nly humans Cit ll inO icl 0 111 0 ot hCl beings, 
Illnki ng it w 10 ng 10 II Cit l thc m as ft 1I 1~<III S to our own ends I\ s slIc h, nOIl- humans 
cannot commit mura l w long<;. 11 fo llows lhat the natura l !;ulTeri ng of a ni mals do 
no t fall into the scope of moral concern (1Iarg rove 1992: 14). Singer's attitudc 
toward wild anima ls is Ihat \Vc ~hou ld simply "sto p intel fering wi th them ... (and) 
leave the m a lonc as IIlllch as we puss ibl y can" (Singer 1 ()90: 226). Excluding w ild 
a nimals from the scope o f moral concern places the species in a precarious 
position. Igno ring the natural sune ring o f the wild indi vidual entail s ignoring the 
pligh t o f that indi vidua l. Lefi unchecked thi s could. in ex treme cases. lead to the 
spec ies po pulation numbers diminishing to criti ca l levels . Once a cert ain cri tical 
level has been reached the o nly way to save the species v/ould be to intervene w ith 
speci21i sed breeuing programmes. Unfo rtunate ly. S inger 's 1110ra l crit erion does not 
consider the species as worthy o f mora l concern , no r does hi s scope make 
intervention morall y justifi ed in the case o f wi ld anima ls . 
Singer's ethic o f bio-cultlll e ent ail s that we no t only ado pt a morall y ig no rant 
stance toward wild animals, but that slIch a stance is ex tendcd toward the natural 
e nvironment. S inger ITIfl inlains that \Ve should no l medd le ill the a ffairs of nature, 
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as an v l-lIi Cmpl 10 11111n i pulnt c th e I1fl lw"n] wodd c on onl y CI1I1 ~~ jJ.rf'nI (',. ccolOMic.1l 
disasters, " \Ve ca nnot ,lIld should 1I0 t pulice nature" (Sing,e r 1990 226) S ince the 
consequences of hUrlll-l1l Rction alo ne hilve 1110ral sig nificance, the natural world 
una ffected by hUlllan aCli (l l1 is mo rall y in sig nific;m1. Ilowevcr. it could be argucd 
tha t very few places re main in the wolld Ihat a le no t in some way a lTected by the 
dealings o f humanit y. c;: ince the consequences o f SCl me or U UI acti uns arc not 
limited to specific al ea'\, but ex tend g loball y to affect the entire biosphe re of the 
p1<l'flet. 42 Changes in the Emth ' s biosphere affect changes in the eco c;:ystems in 
which sent ient bei ngs li ve. 'I hCICf(lre, we should not mo rally ignore the nat ural 
world or the wild anill1 <t ls tha t ex ist in il Singer would deny the logic of fo llowing 
cOlHequc.nccs to thi s ex tent, c la iming that if sentience is the crit e rio n for moral 
standing and the scope of 1l10 ral concern is limited to human action then the ethical 
focus sho uld be limil ed specifica lly to the direct sufTering o f sentie llt be ings 
innic ted by humans. 
It is S inger's OpllllUIl Ihal illuminating o ur own unnecessary cruelt y toward 
ani1l1als makes a s ig nificant contrihutio n lie argues that ~peci es i ~ 1 ideology is 
fundam e nt a ll y WIOllg and be li eves that it can be chall enged th roug h exposing 
huma n actions toward <lnim als (I S nHt li c ious and uncaring. by pl·o posing Ilew mo ral 
understamJings and by practi s ing habit s tha t conform to Ollr new beliefs. Ado pting 
a uti litarian approctch with senti ence as the crit e rio n o f moral standing " le l1ds itself 
to Ireating animal s as objects o f Illo ral concern" (Jo hnson 199 1: 50). Extending 
morality to include beings other than humans brings w ith it an aware ness tha t 
humanit y is not above the rest o f the creatures that co-inhabit thi s planet. 
It is Singer 's conviction that we need to make a «radi cal break with more than two 
thousand years o f Western tho ug ht abo ut nnimals" (Singer 1990: 2 13), and that the 
hard ~st break tha t we will have to make is wilh «the assumptio n that huma n be ings 
42 111ese include affects of global wanning, nuclear pollution and the increas ing human 
POpuliltioll as di sclIssed in Chapter Two 
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come fiT SI <lnd that nny ploblem about nl1 i1ll <l ls canllo t 11(' ClI I111HlIah lc to 
problems nboll t h Ul11iHlS" (S inger 10 90 ' 2 1 C)) 
I\ s argucd ill m y critique, Singer 's appro~ch f~vollrs beings that have distinc tl y 
human c haracteri stics - sc lf-coll scioll c;ness and rationali ty . While grounded 0 11 Cl 
l~oncept i o n of equalit y, Si nge! 's CJl'prO[Tch implies a Illora l hiera rc hy wit h hLlmall-
like beings appearing at the top, receiv ing the greatest (h:,~ree o f moul l concern. 
Thi s renec ts the CU ll cnt moral stalll s qllo. In lig ht o f the ahove u nc is len 
wOl1d~ril1 g w hether Singer's approach is ' radica l' e nough 10 bleak with slIc h a 
pcrvafo ive and widespread I\ttitucie (S inger 1990- 230). It appears Ih(l( speciesisl1l is 
so dec:oly in grained in o llr cullure and understanding that if il s foundatio ns <\vere 
knock( ·d Ollt from under it, new roundations wi ll be found, o r else the ideological 
positio n w ill just hang there. dery ing the logica l equi va le ll ' of the Iflws o f grav it y" 
(Sin~cr 1990 2 11 ) 
Singer argues tha t the int clests of a ll sent ient beings a ffected by 1\ 11 Rt:l ion should 
be taken into accou nt and given the sa me weig ht as the like interests of any other 
senti ent being This makes a pos itive contribution to expanding th€' 1110ral sp here, 
throug h exposi ng the cruel and inhumane treatment o f animal s in the flgricu ltura l 
and scientific indu stries and by presenting a rational argument for vegetariani sm. 
By presenting a much sill1pl er theoreti ca l framework, in compari son to Regan's. 
Singer provides a straightforward and easy to accept approach. Iron ically. the 
appeal o f Singer' s work is rooted ill that fact that " he has reall y put forth nothing 
new" (Callicott 1998 : 10), demanding simpl y Ih'H the class ical utilitarian va lue 
theory be consistently flpp li ed . 
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5 
1""11 Tayl" .. : I\lol 'ally (',,"side";n~ Living Beings 
Paul W . Taylor is pru lc<:so l elllcrilu s of philosophy at B If)ok lyn Coll ege, The Cit y 
UniVCls it y o f New YOlk . 111 Ne.\jJec:l /ul' Na t/l r e Taylor present ":, in response 10 the 
criti ca l impact or hum an civi l ;(;a l;on 0 11 the I1 tl lural (, Il Vir0 111nCIlI. a compl ex moral 
sys te m designed 10 guide hUIIWIl actiuns toward wild li vi ng CI11it ;c<; (Taylor 
1986:9) 
This moral system ('u llsiSI!' or Ihlcc components: a belief-system, all attitude of 
I especl and corresponding rul c~ o f conduct. The bel icf-systelll . rele rred 10 "5 the 
biocenlr ic out look 0 11 natlllc. is cOII<; litulcd by fOllr core beliefs: The (jI SI is that all 
ll1 eJl1bl~ rs orllle cO ll1l1 1uni ty of lire ore equal ; the second IIHH the comllHlnil y or life 
is dependent upon the exi"tence o f (111 it s mcmbers; the th ird IIHlt (Ill li v ing beings 
are tdco logical cent lCS I)f life: whilc the final CO I C be li ef denies human 
su pericri ly. The bioccntric oulhlok provides a fram ework 111(11 makes adopting the 
attillld ~ of respect for nature int ell igi ble . The att itude of respect fo r nature 
incorporales concepts of lhe good and inherent worth. and IS made manifest in our 
actio ns and ou r character . Recognis ing a ll li ving things (IS l'qu (l l beings. descrving 
of moral consideration, is indicative of Ihe att itude o f re~peet fOI natlll c. Taylo r 
argues Ihat the attitude o f lespect fo r nature is an ultimate moral altitude 
Com mitme nt 10 the att itude of lespect rhr nature results in a commitment 10 
w hatever rules embody respect for nalure Taylor out lines four basic rules of 
conduct. These are the ru les of nOl1male fi c ie nce, noninterference. lidelit y and 
restituti ve justice. To avoid conn iets occurring between the rules. pi iorily relation s 
are suggested. It is Taylo r's opinion that moral rules alone are insumcie nt to live 
an ethica ll y informed life, but that standards of charac ter arc also essenlial. Taylor 
in no way allempts 10 suggest that his 1II0ral system shou ld replace the system of 
ethics \Ve currently use. Rather, hi s intention is fur both systems to operate 
simultaneously. Accepting that confli cts of int erests will i!ri se he offers priority 
principles to resolve the m. 
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Fo do w ing 11 I II lH otlgh c:< posit ion ofTaylor ' s I henl v, il (.'1 it iqur '" ill he ('(1I1 <: trll cted 
Tay lor eSHlblishes a general undcl standing of hi s mond system by contra sting it 
w ith trmlitional (l llthropoccnlric ethics Anlhropoccllt! c ethics hestows a value 
ont o the environment that is determined by the needs and int erests of humans. 
A ccordingly. the duties owed to the nalllr~1 world .tlC deri ved fl om the duties \VC 
owe to humans. Outside of human needs and inlercc:.ts nature has 110 va lue, 
Taylor's llIural systCIl1, 011 the ot her hand, recogni ses (In inherent valuc that 
belongs to all li v ing beings " simpl y in virtuc of their being members of the Earth's 
C'Olllll1ullil y of Life" CI'<1y lor 1986' 13) As sllch, the duties owed to the natural 
world are not de,lclmincd b y the duties tiT<1' we o we 10 othe r hunHHl beings, but 
ratiler «arise 1'1'0 111 celtnin IHoml rel<1 tions ho lding between ourselves and the 
natural world it self' (Taylol 1<,,)86 ' 12) Because Taylor's ethics is 11 0 t grounded in 
hUIlI<tn va lue, ou t 011 the v<1luc that all beings possess inherently, it is Icfelrcd to as 
life, :::entrcd or hi(}cell/I'h ' c /Mc,\ tI, 
Thc first component of his 1110! nl system, the bio('('nlric' a"t/ook Oil ita/lire, 
explains the order of nature cllld humanity's place w ithin that Older, There ~re four 
con: beliefs that constitute the biocentric outlook , The first is that human beings 
are ('qual members of the cuml1lunit y of li fe. Thi s is !'<Ioted ill li ve realiti es, All 
l iving things have certain bio logiclI l amI phys ica l requirements in order to survive, 
Thus. in order to preserve our existence and li ve at an optimal level o f well-being 
we should make the biological requirement s of survival our normative guides 
(Taylor 1986: 103), 1\11 li ving beings have a good toward which they stri ve. The 
good of all is subject 10 en vironmental conditions beyond our control. We are, 
thus, in the same existentia l situation as any ot her li ving being in that neither the 
41 Taylor distinguishes between hum:,!11 ethics, environmental ethics cmd the ethics of 
bioculture. firmly establi shing that hi s bioccntric approach is intended to be applied to the 
natural world. 111is excludes artifi cia ll y created environmellts that are entirely under 
human control (Taylor 1986: 53-58) , 
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re(1li~~Rliol1 of our good 1101 the SII CC'C!':S of our e'<. islt.'llcc c 111 he g ucu a nl ccd (Taylor 
1986: 105). Aside from Ihe cap(lcit ies of freedom p;\lli c\ tl~r 10 humans (!i·ee will, 
autunomy and social freedom), all li ving things (He free to prolllote ~Ild protect 
the ir own good accOlding 10 Ihe nalwal laws. '1 hi s is a Il<'ltural fl eedolll rrom 
const raints . Therefore, \VC t'tlllSl illlt c a communit y of bei ngs on the gn)llllds that 
we share this COlllllHlIl vt1 lue (Tt1vlor ]1)86: 111). FUl1hennore, \vf' !': IHH"e ~ common 
cvolu tionctry origin wi th evelY o ther li vi ng being. We are thcrerClre the plOdllcts or 
It slnH.:ture o r rea lity that is responsible for the creat ion of every ot her living being 
(Taylor 1<)86: 113). Laslly , hWlIflllS arc en tirel y dependent upon the rest of the 
living world , whil e the lest of the world relies 011 humanit y for nothing (Taylor 
1986: 11 4). It is therefore misgui ded to conceive of ourselves as separCltely 
existing beings. These five Iluths should make us realise that we Me one with the 
rest of crea tion, eqwlllllelllbC'l s orthe communit y oflife_ 
Secondly, the cOlll1l1unit} or lire ic; inl egrall y depencient upon the ex iste nce of all 
it s members. No cOllllllunity is an inciepe nde nt unit (Taylor 1<)86 ' 11 7) The 
survival of rlny si ngle being or population group is no t only dependent on the 
physi cal conditions or its inlln ediat c environment, but also on the relationships that 
exist between the beings that consti tute that environment. Interactions among 
groups or individuals and thei r phys ical environment are part of an intricately 
woven web. The difTere nt ecosystems that constitute Ihl! comlllunity of li fe fit 
together in ways sllch that ir onc is radica lly c hanged, structural changes will 
necessa rily occur ill others. Thi s is no t to suggest that the biocclltric out look is 
holistic or organicist i ll nature, sincc such views ofier no account of the 
individual's place in the communit y of life other than ho Vl its pursuit of the good 
contributes to the overall functioning ano well -being of the system (Tay lor 1986: 
11 8). Instead, Taylor views the natural world as being ethically relevant through 
the existence o flhe indi viduals that const itute the natural e ll vi ronment. 
Thirdl y. all living beings (lIe recognised to be teleological centres of life. pursuing 
their own particular good in ways specific to thei r particular natures Oy 
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tcl CO IOg lCU I CCIIII C I ayhH 1Il('llII" 11 h etng'S In t e lnal ttlllc tlllll i "1.' <"Ind ex tcrnal 
aclivitie~ that Hie "(t ll goa l-OIit'lltatcd. having the const:lIlt tendrncv to mainl:'lill the 
orgal1i~Il1's existence Ihlollgh lime and 10 cnable it to sllccessfu ll y pcdorm those 
bio lo!! ical o pcrCl tions whcreby it lepr(ldllCCS it s kind and continuously adapts 10 
changing cll vironment al event s. <HId cnnd itions" (Tayllll 1986: 12 1- 122). Each 
li ving being has a unique life of i!.') uwn, and cani es oul its lire runctions accolding 
to the nature or its spccies (Taylor 1986: 120). Such beings h.we a good because 
they c'( hibil organ ised behaviour. Accoldingly. both consciolls and uncoll sciolls 
beings can be teleological cen ll cs of life, wi th a particul ar way of respondi ng to 
the environment and inl Crtlct ing wi th o ther orga niSllls This definition of a 
teleolo!:,ical cent re of life excludes comput ers and machines. which aspire to 
achieve end s or goa ls that are not purposes of their own, but includes all plants and 
animals (Taylor 1986: 124). Objective openness to the ex i ~ t ence and unique nature 
of all living beings result s inlhc abi lity 10 see the life of allY living being as being 
the !'>3 1ll C as ours. Accl..H dingl y. if wC" call accept that humans posses:- inhcrent 
wOIth, then we {'an only agree Ilmt all li ving beings do so too (Tayhll 1986: 128 ) 
The fourth core belief, the 1110 '-' inlport ant element for taking the att itude of respect 
for nature, is a total rejectio n of the superiorit y of the human species. Taylor 
explo res two commonl y accepted argu ment s for the superiorit y of humans and 
find s them to be unsound . Onc cla im to human supcliority is based on the fact Ihal 
human beings arc diffcrcnt fi'om other bei ngs, possessing rationality. autonomy 
and free will. These abilities are judged to be desirable and good. Taylor argues 
that using standards based o n human goods to judge non-humans commits a 
categOlY mi stake, since entities can only be judged correctly if they fa ll within the 
scope of thc standard being used . Therefore, "onc cannot validly argue that 
humans are morally superior beings on the grounds that thty possess, while olhers 
lack, tht: capacity to be a moral agent" (Taylor 1986: 112). ;\ second claim to 
human superiorit y is made 0 11 the grounds that humans possess a greater inherent 
worth than any other being, therefore human interests deserve priority ovcr the 
inte rests of allY other beings. Explol ing arguments from the Greek, Christian and 
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C'n rI CS ;<l 1l II":'Hlili o!l <;, 11'<: wl' 11 n<; n c nlll c ll l p ' U' II'-" IIIH''''' .... 011 ""pp"'l in U Ihi . , -111;111 , 
Taylol fin ds that all fmu ;lI e bilSC(\ llpon similar cOIl('cptmd ('oll fu <: io l1 <: (Taylor 
1086· 135- 15 1) ' I'his l11<lkes t l1(,111 unacceplable as Ihey ,lie based 0 11 llllsound 
rC<l soning 
'1 hat a I"ollclu <: ioll i <: supporled hy all I.IIISotllld argument does nol fl llhllnatically 
imp ly the conclusio n is fnl'ic The tmnsitio ll from the groundlessness of human 
sll pcliOJit y 10 its deni<l l is <lc hi cved by "C(~epli llg Ih ~ I1I" o.; t tlll ee core beli efs o f the 
biocent ric outlook on nat Ul c ( r ay lor 1986: 151) Human sll periorit y is denied 
since it "does lIo t fit coherently inl o thc vicw of nature .'tIlt! life conta ined in the 
first three e le111e1lt s u f the biocentric outlook" (1'aylor 1C)86· 154) According 10 
the conceplllnl framework of the lJ iocell tric outlook the idea o f Inulla ll superiori ty 
is an unreasonable and ;1Iatiolla l bias ill Oll r own fav(lur (Taylor IORC, ' 155). 
Rejecting the idea o f human slI pcricH ity SUpp 011S Ihe " rind/de (!f ·vu·cies 
impurlialily. which coun t ~ every species as the same HS any oth{'r species, with 
evelY bei ng possessi ng the sa me degree of inherent worth 
Taylor ofTers two reasons fo r accepting the biocenlric outlook 0 11 natu re. The first 
tries to show that the lJ iocentric olltlook sa ti sfi es basic crilr:ri a, while the second 
argues lor the rational acceptance of slIch crit eria. The otltlook «exemplifi es a set 
ofpror t!rtics that satisfy cellain classical, we ll established cril eria for judgi ng the 
acceptabilit y o f philosophica l wOlld views" (Taylor 1986 158) The biocentric 
out look \)rovides a co mprehensive and encompass ing view of the world, which 
excludes no living being (j'01ll its explanation. The four core beliefs work together 
in a mutua ll y re inforcing and systematic way. with 110 inconsistencies among 
them. The ideas and concepts of the biocenlric outlook can be stated with clarity 
(Taylo r 1986: 160). while it s content is supported by empirica l fac ts that are 
depend ent o n and shaped by the phys ical and biu logicn l sciences. Ilowcver. the 
fact that it fu lfil s certain required criteria does not necess itate the acceptance oflhe 
biocentric out look . Rather what is shown is that it meets the standard cri teria for 
jUdging the acceptabi lity o f a world-view (Taylor 1986: 16 1). A world-view is 
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Ill1dcn;l ood 0' n hc li c r- s)'~ t c nl thnt plovidcs ft gCTJc , al iscd concept td' , cR I;t y . To 
accept n \Votld-v ic\\' with good glOlIlId ') OTJ(" I1 ccds 10 lw 11 COlllpctcnt cvn luator. 
Rationalit y, being fact uall y illfOllllcd with suITi(';cnt Clllpili ('a l kll()\\kdge and 
ha ving a hciglll cncd flWCl.lCtH'SS of Ica lily. ale outlined as ne('e~smy Cl(;.pCCIS of 
heing a compet ent eva lufllor (Taylor 1986: 163 ). Taylor find s lhal idea ll y 
competent eva lll<Hors would II "C the cstabli shed Cli lelia as Icsts for the ovelnll 
tldcquacy ofa Wo, Id-view, tllclcfcHe conc lud ing that the biocentlic Olll lonk ca ll be 
judged 10 be all acceptaule wt)lld-vicw ( raylor 1986 16(1) 
Accepting the biocentric outlook Oil IHllllle. constit uted by the fuul core bc li cfs, 
provid(!s us wit h a Illap fOl untie1standing the na tural world. C'xpltlining our 
bio logica l natu re and de-scl ibing the ecological si tuation. Jt also he lps to increase 
Ollr aVlareness o r thc wodd around us and encOlll agr" eth ica l illlpaTlialit y. 
Furth€ 11ll0l e. Ihe bioccnt, ic out look. which views a ll be ings as equal mcmbers of 
one CClll lllllllil y and promotes the idpa that each li ving tltin lf. has Cl good ofi'" own, 
SlIPPOlt '. I Ite adopt io n of I he second componcnt - I he all ilud,! or respect fllr nature. 
Understand ing the alii/fide (!/ re.v'ec:/ for nature reqUIres understanding two 
concepts: the goud ofa being. and the inherent worth ora being (Taylor 1986· 60). 
/\ being can be said to have a !!,ood of it s own if it makes sense to say that 
something is productive or cOlllllerplOducti ve ror th:H particular bei ng (Taylor 
1986 : 6 1) . , .yhat is productive for a be ing is that which contribut es toward s or 
safeguards its good What IS counl elprodllctive fo r a being is that which is 
detrimental to its good. A being's good can therefore be ei ther adva nced or 
hinde red. Benefits bring about or pi eserve conditions that arc fa volll ab le to a 
bei ng, whil e harms create unr.1votlrable conditions or remove fa vourable 
conditi ·:ms. Terms such as favourtlble and unfavourable apply only 10 beings 
whose we ll -being can be advanced or Icdllced . Since it is only mea ningful 10 say 
this orbeings that have a good of their own. an enlit y~~ wcll ~bc ill g is synonymous 
with it" good (Taylor 1986: 62). 
q2 
I1 is commonly (Icceplcd 111,,1 bcings that have a good of their own have to ha vc 
intercst s, goals or cnds towClrd which they aim ·"'Iylor identifies clear ditTercl1ces 
between a being havi ng int erests in somet hing and somethi ng that is in a pal-ticular 
being's int erest. Having interests in somet hing amounts 10 the subj ective 
valuations ofa conscious being, and are merely apparent goods (Taylor 1986: 64). 
COllvcl sely, so mething that is in a being's interest is (In objecti ve fact that 
contributes 10 the ovcrall well-being of that being. such as the nutriti ve and 
environmental cond itions necessary for growth and rerJ loductioll This is a true 
good.44 Taylor 's theory of respect for nature is concerncj only with notions of the 
tme good. Si nce hoth plants and anima ls can be treatt.-d in ways that are either 
favcmable or unfavourable to their existence, their Nell-being call be eit her 
harmej or benefited . Since well-being is synonymous \"Iith the idea of the good, 
Tay',u·'s theory accepts that all plants and animals. hOVlc:ver difTerent they appear 
to luman beings, are beings that have a good of their o~ 1 (Taylor 1986: 66).4~ 
To h ·}.-'c thc attitude of respect ror nature " is to regard till: wild plants and animal s 
of the Earth's natural ecosystems as possessing inherent worth" {Taylor 1986· 
.w Taylor's distinction between apparent goods and true goods is si milar to Regan's 
distinction between preference interests alld welfare interests. 
4-' TIle conditions that constitute a particular being's good depend entirely upon the 
category of species the being belongs to, for what is good for one species may be 
detrimental to another. Taylor uses this to extend the idea ofth", good from individuals to 
the good of species and biotic communities. However, this is merely a statistical 
exteD.iion, since tile population or cOllllllu nity as a unit is not recognised to have a good of 
ils OWll, but rather is constituted by the good of its members. A ·;cordingly, the good of a 
specie:; or community is "determined by the median distributiun point of tile good of its 
individu:.1 members" (Taylor 1986: 69). Tlle range of applicatilll of the good therefore 
applit:! directly to individual beings, and statistically to populal;ol1s and ecosystems 
(Tayl" 1986: 71). 
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7 1).'16 Respect is conrerred onto thesc beings because they ,HC recogni scd to 
possess inhercnt worth . Inhcrcnt wort h may there rore be thought or as uthe 
rundamcntal va lue-presupposit iOIl of the altitude of respect" (Taylor 1986: 7 1). In 
order for mora l agents to recogni se the ethical rightness or wrongness of treati ng a 
bei ng ill a particu lar way. they need to recognise that that being has in herent 
worth . 'fa expla in inherent worth , Taylor cont rasts it wi th no tions of intrins ic va lue 
and inhere nt value. Int rinsic va lue is described to be a positive va lue atlributed to a 
satisfactio n producing experie nce for a conscious being This is commo nl y 
accepted to be a practi cCl I o r cOlllmercia l value that is confer red by humans onto 
no n-human entities. Inherent vCl luc is g ivcn to objects or places that arc 
aesthet ica ll y or cultura lly enriching Such obj ects o r plac'!s do not have a use o r 
commercia l va luc, but ho ld a deeper spi ritua l va lue. Ths va lue. however. st ill 
relies upon the subjecti ve va luations o f consc ious beings. 
Unlike the above, inherent worth is independent of being val ued by conSCIOUS 
bei ngs. and is independent of its lI sefuln ess 10 any other heing (Taylo r 1986: 75). 
To as~el1 that a being has inherent worth enta ils two mOlal judgements: that it is 
deservi ng o f moral consideration; :'lI1d that moral agents h<-ve a dul y to protect and 
furthcl the good of such a being, fo r its own sake (Taylor 1986: 75). Furthermore. 
the concept of inhere nt wOl1h is independent of any system of merit (Taylo r 1986: 
76). As a consequence all beings that possess inherent worth are accepted to do so 
equall y. Accordingly. any being that is accepted to have inherent worth ho lds the 
same 1110 ral status as every other being, humans included. It is therefore wrong to 
use any being that has inherent wOl1 h merely as a means to any human end . To do 
so would confli ct with the inherent worth that the being possesses. Accepting the 
inherent worth of al1living beings makes the protection and promotion of the good 
of each being that has inherent worth an ultimate good. There fo re. it is a matter of 
'"' 111e range of app lication of tile concept of inherent worth dele -mines the sort of beings 
that ar; to be mora ll y considered. According to Taylor aJlliving beings, plants and 
animals, have inherent worth . TIlis is the only coherent way of '\ lewing them g iven the 
acceptance of the biocentric outlook (Taylor 1986: 80). 
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mOrAl principle Ihnl mnrnl ngcnl:ol ("onsider Ill" good or nll h"ill~S Ihnl P()~RCo::.,. 
illhcn :l1t worth .H 
The att itude of respect for I1ntu re is madc man ifest in tit ·! way thnt wc act and ill 
the k; ,d of people Ihat we arc (Taylor 1986. 80). General Icspccl fur nature j" 
shown w hen actions arc pcrformed "out of consideration and conccrn for the good 
of wi ld living things" (Taylor 1986: 84). It is essentia l that the intentions of the 
action are directed toward the benelit of wild beings, with the goal to preserve 
them in their natural state. These actions must be perrollned as a matter of moral 
principle a nd Ilot out of Cl desire to rulfil one's own illteresls. or out or feelings of 
love or care (Taylor 1986: 85).41t On ly when the aim of preserving and protect ing 
wi ld beings has an ethical significance can it be said to express the attitude of 
respect for nature (Taylor 1986: 86). HOur character expresses respect for nature 
when it enables us to see clearly what those dut ies, ob ligations and responsibilities 
are and to carry out their requirements in diflicuh and complex situat io ns" (Tnylor 
1986: 88). We are able to do this by possessing a set of dispos itio ns. <1'J It is Ihus 
---------
.J711lis. appears to suggest that it would be wrong not only to eat animals but also plants -
for pl?nlS and anima ls possess tJle same inheren t worth as humm beings. lllis seems to 
place human survival in a preca rious pos ition. Taylor address!", this by cla iming that, for 
purp('! :es of survival, it is acceptable for humans to eat oUler li\ ing beings. To do 
other .... ise wou ld be to give those other beings more inherent wllrth than humans (Taylor 
1986: 193), However, since a vegetarian diet consu mes fewer br!illgs than an omn ivorolls 
diet it, is morally preferable . 
.. , Subjective feelings interfere with the ability to t reat all li ving beings in an impartia l 
light . 
49111ese dispositions are classified into fou r types, each constitut ing an aspect of the 
attitude of respect. TIle valllational dimension is the disposition one has to confer 
judgements of worth onto all wi ld living tJlings, rega rding them as being possessors of 
inherent worth . llle conative dimension is the disposition to aim at avoiding harming 
natural li ving tJlings and to preserve their existence. TIle practical dimemion is the 
dispositjon one has to act according to certain reasons . 111is encompasses the abi lity to 
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tllat Ihe attiltlde (lf respect for nature IS cxpres"icd both III the conduct and the 
char. lctcr of I he mora I agent. 
The ~ ttitlld c of respect for nature is a moral al/ilude Such an altitude does not 
derelld upon subjective feelings. but rather depends upon the adoption of a va lid 
system of ethi cal norms (Taylor 1986: 9 1). As a moral atti tude respect for nature 
will a lways assume priority over any other social or curl.lIral norms, since «actions 
i nc ~1I1sisten t with respect for nature can never be justified on non-moral grounds" 
(Tay.or 1986: 92). Not on ly is the attitude of respect fo " nature a moral atti tude. it 
is also an ultimate attitude. A der ivative mora l attitude is specilic and derivable 
frolll a more general moral altitude. An ultimate mora l attitude serves as the 
ground for all deri va tive altitudes, and it cannot be explained with reference to an 
even more genera l alt itude. The att itude of respect for ll<1ture is an ultimate m Ol al 
atlitudc. as il is a basic moral altitude frolll wh ich all specific atti tudes of respect 
toward nature arc derived . It is not grounded withi n a higher mora l att itude, neit her 
can it be justifi ed by appca ling to a more fundamental moral princi ple or 
commitment (Taylor 1986: 98).50 
eva luate, make decisions and to exercise st rength of wi ll . Ha \ ing the attitude of respect 
for uature requires that we act in certain ways and for certa in reasons. nle affective 
dimwsioll is the disposition (0 have emotions or feelings . ll1i :. allows us to feel pleased 
when nature is treated in a respectfull11anner, and disp leased when it is not (i'aylor 1986: 
80-34). 
jO TIll'> poses a problem for its j ustification, since all moral re;,sons are themselves 
grounded upon the ultimate attitude of which they are derivatives . However, adopting the 
attitude of respect for nature involves a commitment to til e va lidity ofa whole ethica l 
system. In order to just ify the attitude, the va lidity of the whole ethical system that 
embodies it needs to be shown (Taylor 1986: 98). Taylor achieves this by expounding the 
belief-system, the biocentric outlook, which underlies the attitude of respect for nature and 
by attempting to demonstrate that it is acceptable to moral agents . 
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The third cOl11ponen t nfTlly lor'!, hioccntri c ethic is the llccompnny ing 11101'01 I"lIll.!s 
that guide human action toward the environment. These are informed by the 
attitude or respect ror nature and include both rules or right conduct and standards 
or good character (Taylor 1986: 169). 
Rnles (gemtduct speeiry the general kinds or action that we should or should not 
pt:rronn. These rules can be overruled provided that there is suitab le just ificat ion 
supported by an appeal to valid moral reasons (Taylor 1986. 17 1). As such they 
<Hr: only prima fade and 1I0t absolute. The Uule of NOl1male/icence slales that we 
have a duty not to harm or destroy any being that h~s a good of its own (Taylor 
1986 : 172). The ru ndamental princ iple behind this ru l ~ is that we should not harm 
these things that do not cause us h11rl11 . 
The Uule (if NOllillteljert!llce instructs us to respect the freedom or living beings. 
Thi s requires that we reli'a in from restricting their freedom . Adherence to this rule 
manifests itselr as respect ror the integrity of nature (Taylor 1986 176). 
Consequently. we are required to show disinterest regard ing naturally occllrri ng 
events. Observing dis interest in the natural world requires that we be imp,'111ial to 
a ll li ving beings and not favour onc species over another (Taylor 1986: 178). 
The I?lIle (~f Fidelity requires that we do not dece ive or betray the lmst that 
individual bei ngs place in us (Taylor 1986: 197). Th;:. makes it wrong to capture 
b~ i Tlgs with the purpose of harmi ng or killing them. 51 To do SO is to treat 
individual s as if they possess no inhere nt worth or less inherent worth than humans 
and is thus incompatibl e with the attitude of respect rOi' nature (Taylor 1986: 182). 
The o nly instance where infideli ty is morally acceptahle is when the being that is 
d",;eived stands to benefit rrom the act of infidelity (Taylor 1986: 184). 
'1 111is includes fishing, hunting and trapping, all of which are practices that deceive 
be ings in an attempt to benefit the deceiver. 
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The H"If! of Hesf;f"';1'£, .I11W;C(' instnlcts us to restore the balance whcn a moral ru lc 
is broken (Taylor 1986: 186). When a va lid moral rule is broken, a wrong is 
cOlllm itt ed. This rule requires that the wronged being be compensated in ,Ill 
attempt to restore. promote or protect it s good. This includes instances where the 
violation was morall y justified. ~2 Taylor acknowledges tliat these rules do 11 0 t o ne r 
an ex haustive account of our moral duties. Because of this. we are instructed to 
allow the attitude of respect for nature to inform our actions as " right act ions arc 
always actions that express the altitude oftespect for nature" (Taylor 1986. 171) 
In in :;tances where the application of the rules result s in (.~on nicting duties, priorit y 
relations are suggested (Taylor 1986: 170). Tayla r does th is by identifying the 
soure-cs of cannict between the rules and then assigning comparat ive weight s 
according to their ethica l importance (Taylor 19i6: 193). The rule of 
nonilll erference does 1101 conllict with the rule ofnonmaldicence si nce a hands-otT 
applPilch to the natural world will ll ul rt:suit in (lilY h <1" 111 being caused. Acts o f 
fideE~y and of rest ituti ve justice can ofien conflict with the duty not to harm. In 
upholding the attitude of respect for nature, Taylor feels that the duty of 
nonmaleficence shou ld oUl weigh the duties of fidelity and restitutive justice 
(Taylor 1986: 193). Conflicts that occu r between the duty to na ninterfercnce and 
the duty to fid elit y are less simple. While the rule of noninterference guides us to 
leave wild an imals a lone and the ru le of fid elity requires us to fosler and support 
bonds o f trust between animals and humans, there are instances where trust needs 
to be broken in order ta maintain noninterference. Similarly, there are instances 
where the duty to not interfere can be overridden by the duty to fidelit y. In such 
ambiguous instances fide li ty should take precedence over noninterfe rence, 
provided that: trust cannot be sustained without interference; the interference is 
mini:nised; no serious harm is caused by the interference; and that those beings 
~2 An:1 act of harm has to be balanced by an act of good. TIle l.uger the harm, the larger 
the r~qllired benefit . Since "the perpetrating ofa hann calls fOI·the producing ofa benefit" 
(Ta).br 1986: 19 1), where the wronged being cannot be compensated. e.g. because it is no 
long~r living, another being should be compensated in its pla<:, :. 
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in terf .. ~red with experience positi ve benefits (Taylor 1986: 1C)6) Concerning 
rcstit ll li vc justice, it is OOCII the case that ba lance ca ll110l be Icstored wilhou t 
int erfer ing. In such instances, rcsti tutive just ice is a llowed 10 outweig h the duty to 
noninterferencc provided that no unacceptable harm is caused (Taylor 1986: 196) 
finall y, in instances where there is conni ct between fidelit y and rcsti tuti ve justice. 
restituti ve justice out weighs fidelity, provided that sumcient good is brought about 
and no serious harm is innicted on the being whose trust is broken (Taylor 1986: 
197) 
Living an ethically informed li fe toward the environment is not only achieved by 
conformi ng to a set of mles. we are a lso required to develop certain standard" of 
cllOrac l er . The attitude of respect for nature is evident in onc's character when one 
has (l!veJoped the necessary virtues that "enable one to deliberate and acl 
consi ~; tentl y with the fou r rules of duty" (Taylor 1986: 19"). Taylor argues that the 
development of such virtues is mo rall y obl igatolY on two .. o!fOunds . Fi rstly, they are 
neces: alY fo r correct moral conduct. Having the disp(.ls itions that make up a 
virtuo'JS character is necessary to deliberate clea rl y about the best course of act ion. 
Since certain acts are obligatory. and certain virtues ale necessary in o rder to 
perfo rm those acts, it foll ows that the development of chose virtues is morally 
obligatory (Taylor 1986: 2 14). Secondly. we are not morally complete lIntil our 
inner character aligns perfectly with our external practice (Taylor 1986: 2 15). It is 
our duty to become fuller moral agents.53 Accordingly, attaini ng the necessary 
virtues is morally obligatory in it self. While being compl etely virtuolls is beyond 
the reach of ordinary human beings, the will to develop and improve one's 
goodness of moral character. thereby improving onc's moral self. is of utmost 
importance. Thi s is somethitlg that cannot be forced upon another but can onl y be 
~J Moral agents have the capacity to act mora lly. TIlis entails. among other things. tlle 
ability to: make moral judgements; consider moral possibilities; make moral decisions on 
the ba s-is of well thought out reasons~ and carry out moral decisi ons in a decisive manner 
(Taylor 1986: 14). 
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achieved through autonomous decision . There is no true cOlllmitment tn ndes or 
conduct. unless the w ill to cOlllmit comes n om within 
Whe n onc adopt s the attitude of respect for nature aCli" ilies such as cutt ing down 
natural forests , draining swa mps or destroying fresh -wHer ecosystems will not be 
engaged in lightly. Acknowledging the inherent wortn of all beings results in 
ackllowledg ing the impol1 ance of thei r interests. This ofien leads to Illoral 
dil emmas s ince there is no set way to determine whose interests should be given 
priorit y. One of the difficulti es in dealing with competing claims is that humans 
are said to have moral right s while plants and animals do not.
j4 
This appears to 
suggest that they hold a position of moral priori ty. Taylor rejects this, s ince 
possess ing moral rig hts does not support the right to exploit nOll -humans for 
human benefits, nor does it imply that non-huma ns have less inherent worth than 
humans (Taylor 1986: 26 1) Moral rights merely presuppose a re lationship of 
equality among light-holders that ill flU way illlpl ies a relationship of inequality 
between right -holders and nOIl -right holders (Taylor 1986: 26 1). 
In o rder to deal with compet ing interest claims, Tay lor develops a set of fiv e 
priority principles designed to operate as moral guidl.>s. The Prillciple (!f Self-
lJej.'l1ce states tha t it is permi ssible for moral agents to protect the mselves again st 
harl1lful beings that are not 1110ral agents (Taylor 1986· 264 ) In instances where 
harm is imminent we are justified to use only the I( inimum amount of force 
requ ired. provided that no other option is avai lab le, It) prevent that harm from 
occurn ng . This principle does not just ify the harming of beings that do not eau se 
us harm. 
~4 Taylor deliberately omits the notion of plant and an imal rights from his environmental 
ethic, since he feels that everytJl ing which a va lid system of rights could achieve can be 
simila rly accomplished by adopting the ideas of respect for nature and recognising the 
inherent WOrtll of living beings. Adopting the attitude of respect for nature provides "a 
solid basis for rejecting any hUl11an-cente red viewpoint that would just ify an exploitati ve 
attitude toward tJle Earth 's wild creatures" (Taylor 1986: 226). 
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nit! PrillC.:iple (?f Pr()p()rtioJlality applies 10 cases where the basic interests of 11011-
humans connict with the no n-basic interests o f hUlllans. Basic interests are those 
primary goods or necessary condi tions that are rfquired for the proper 
maint enance and development of a being. Non-basic int.!rests are "the particular 
end s 'NC consid er worth seek ing and the means we c(' ll sidcr best for achieving 
them that make up our individual va lue systenu." r r", ylo! 1986: 273) NO li-basic 
inlen::;ts are o f two types There are those whi ch arc essentially incompatible with 
the atlitllde of respect for nature. They deny the inher<'nt worth of non-human 
indi vrduals and accordingly treat Ihem purely as instru :-nental means to human 
ends. Conversely. there are those non-basic interests that arc not in themselves 
incompatible with the att itude of respect for nature, but have consequences that arc 
(Taylor 1986: 276). The pri nc iple of proportionality concerns itself with the first 
kind of non-basic human inl erest. In instances where the basic interests of nOI1-
humans conn icts with this kind of nail -basic human interest, "greater weight is to 
be given to basic than to Ilo ll-basic interests" (Taylor 1986: 278). As such the basic 
interests of non-humans take precedence over the non-basic interests of humans. 
1he Principle vf Minimum Wrong applies to situations where the no n-basic 
interests of humans, that are in thcmselves compatible with the attitude of respect 
for nature. connict with the basic interests of nOIl-htlll1ans. These non-basic 
interests play a significa nt role in the development of c ivi lised life and the good of 
individual moml agents (Taylor 1986: 28 1). In such insta:tces, when the sati sfying 
of th,~ non-basic interest is so important that even thost: who have adopted the 
attituce o r respect for nature would choose the non-basic interest over the basic 
intere~ts or non-humans, it is permissible to do so (1 aylor 1986: 283). Two 
constraints apply. Firstly, that as little harm and destnlct io1 is caused to the natural 
world as possible and secondl y. that there is no better alternative available by 
which those non-basic interests can be attained. 
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7he IJ";IIl:II ,le (?f IJ;sfrihuti\'(' Justice app lies to cases where the basic int erests or 
hUl11ans confl ict wi th the basic interests of non-humans Accordi ng 10 this 
principle, all basic int erests earlY all equa l weight , and so the basic interests of a ll 
beings should be g iven equal consideration. Accord ing ly, we arc required to share 
the resources of Ea l1 h. anti recugnise the rig ht to ex istence of all be ings Ilowevcr, 
clashes arc unavoidable. Instances of hulllan subsistence arc a case in point. Where 
killing wi ld plants and animals is necessary for human survival it is mora ll y 
perm ssibl e to do so (Taylor 1986: 293). This is an extremely difficu lt principle la 
apply s ince «even the fai rest met huds of d istribution cannot guarantee perfect 
equal ity of !reatmc nt " (Taylor 1C)86: 292). 
Beca11se of this, Taylor offers n,e I'rim.:iple of Uesti t -dh'e .ills/ice that app li es 
whe l1 !ver the principles of minimum wrong and distri ,)utive justice have been 
applied . This princi pl e ensures lint! some form of compensat ion is de li vered to 
balance out the resulting injustice. Two guidelines are o fTered : the greater the 
harm, the greater the compensa tion ; and the health or the community or ecosystem 
is more important than the good of the indi vidual , since the good of all individuals 
is dependent upon the health of the ecosystem (Taylor 1986: 305). Taylor is aware 
that there will be complex instances where solutions will not be atta ined by 
appealing to these priorit y principles alone. In such cases we are required to appeal 
to «the ethical ideal that underli es and inspires the whole structure of priority 
re lations" (Taylor 1986: 264). This ideal is described by the biocentric out look and 
informed by the attitude of respect for nature. 
Tayll) r' s biocentr ism mark s a radical shift in the exlellsionist approaches. The 
works of Regan and Singer draw heavily on prev iously articu lated theories in an 
effort to provide acceptab le ethical fram eworks to support their respective ethical 
opin~u tl s . A negative consequence of thi s is that they inadvertent ly adopt the 
prim:iples and concepts of the theory that they extend, theories that are inherently 
anthn>pocent ric, resulting in a narrowness of focu s and I.pplication. This explains 
why tneir theories are disposed to acknowledge the moral stand ing of higher order 
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animals only Cllld tcnd, in instances or conflicting. interests, to favour ilulllan 
interests over the interests of other beings with moral standing. Furthermore? by 
drawing from theories that focus on lhe indi vidual a lone, these eXlcnsionist 
theories have retained an entirely individualistic focus . The environment as a 
whole is not an individual being. and therefore exists in a realm beyond the sphere 
of moral concern and consideration. This results in an inability to provide adequate 
normative gu idance on purely envi ronmental issues (Des Jardins 1997: 125-26). 
In contrast. Taylor allempts 10 construct a systematic and comprehensive ethic of 
the envilOllmcnt. Decause of this. his biocentric ethic has a mllch wider range of 
focus a"ld applicatioll than the theories proposed by Regan llnd Singer. Arguing for 
the equal inherent worth of all living beings, Taylor cOlll mi ts his ethic to a 110n-
anthropocentric approach that does not favour any species This is supported and 
inforl11l :d by the four basic beliefs of the biocentric ou ~ l ook . Accordingly, in 
matters of eth ical concern, all living beings are to be g iven equa l moral 
consid natioTl. While Taylor's approach, like those of Regan and Singer, is 
essentially individualistic, his out look recognises that the good of the ind ividual 
depends upon a healthy environment and that the commu nity of life as a who le is 
integrall y dependent upon the existence of all its members. As such, Taylor ' s 
biocentrism ,-ecogni ses the et hical relevance of the natural world through the 
existence of the indi viduals that constitute it. 
In addi tion, the approaches of Regan and Singer focus on the cri teria of moral 
considerat ion, and how we ought to act toward morally e ligible beings. Their 
ethics amounts to an al1iculation of rules to guide our behaviour toward particular 
beings (Des Jard ins 1997: 133). These theorists make the assumption that moral 
agents, as rational beings, will automatically follow their prescriptions provided 
that they are rationally just ifi ed. Taylor, on the other hand, by including the 
fundamental attitude of respect that we shou ld adopt, not only places an emphasis 
o n wh:lt we should do, but also on the kind of person we should be. This presents a 
fuller, morc encompassing ethic not only of rules and duties, but also of personal 
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According 10 Dlamini (homosexuality in the African context) he explores the different 
definitions people globally have with definitions of what homosexuality is. 
Homosexua li ty a sexual attraction to (or sexual relations with) persons of the same sex 
(oxford di ctionary). It can be bio logica l in the case that the person is born with o r it can 
be a leamed behavior. Homosexual is a word sometimes used to describe men being 
sexually and emotionally attracted to men and women being sexually and emotionally 
attrac ted 10 women. This word has a very clin ica l feel and sound to it and is therefore not 
commonl y used in everyday speech. It is much more common to hear people speak about 
gay people or gay men and lesbian women. This experience of same-sex orientat ion can 
be described as same-gender attraction (Marc ionis & Plummcr). 
Biologica ll y. homosexua li ty is geneticall y con trolled whereby in males there is a female 
chromosome resulting in femin ine bchavior or outcome. This can have implication in the 
honnone levels. instead of testosterone there is a female concentration because of 
biologica l factors e.g. a hennaphrodite. Although some argue that homosexuality has no 
biologica l origin, the issue is still debatable. 
In a study done to showcase the attitudes of racism on homophobia (Christ ian eth ics 
today- Issue 040 Volume 8 No 3 June 2002) a young whi te boy said he knows what's its 
like to be black because he was a homosexual and therefore thi s showcased the kind of 
anitudes that he had rece ived from soc iety. Compari ng homosexuality can be compared 
with racism as members of society disp lay prejudice att itudes towards homosexua li ty 
regardless of the origin o r understanding of lhe behavior. In Marcionis & Plummer 
(sociology) prejudice, racism, and stereotype are linked in that they are all based on the 
ideas of ethnocentrism. Prejudice and discrim ination are sa id to reinforce each other in 
that hate is the core out look. People lend to disc riminate homosexuals, ca lling them 
names and go on to add biblica l notion of crcation of Adam and Eve not Steve proving 
ignorance of lacking knowledge. According to Desmond Tutu, not only is homophobia 
inhuman but it is also unchristian and so he says its an evil act to deny homosexuals 
freedom to practice they behavior it is not ev il being homosexual. Countries like 
Zimbabwe ravo r homophobic attacks and some actua ll y have punishment so harsh that it 
results in death penalties fo r practic ing or be ing seen portraying homosexual vehav io r. 
-
A lot of criticism has been focused on homosexuality being unAfrican, this is however 
not the case according 10 sociological and anthropological researc h. In homosexuality in 
the African COlllext- Dlamini he explores the ex istence of homosexuality in African 
culture 10 prove that it did not come from the western cu lture nor did it come from 
colonial damage. Within the A fri can cult ure homosexual bchavior is traced back to the 
periods of migrant laborers where young boys where made makhotis by the work ing men 
for sexual benefit since they were away from the ir w ives and contact with women was 
minimal. Wc also see this homosexual bchavior being admired in the games that child ren 
used to play, were in the case of mother and fat her they would onen use the same sex 
parents. When missionaries came to Africa , they preached ideas that were against 
homosex ual behavior saying that it is a sin, mcaning thallhey were trying 10 changc the 
state of sexual ity amongst the natives. 
-
chamctH This hera ld s a shin in the phi losophica l perspEc ti ve on ethics, which 
avoids a narrow-minded understanding or the moral agcllt as a purely rational 
being, by recogn isi ng the important ro le that the character of the moral agent plays 
in relation to making ethi cal deci sio ns. 
Advantages aside, I.andman identilies a conceptual problem wit h the notion o r 
inherent worth. Extending the 1110ral community to include insects. plants. and 
micro-organisms is problematic because. for a being to be va luable and therefore 
have 1110ra l sta nding. it is essential that it have feelings or well being. Any 
ex perience wi ll be subjectively pl easant or unpleasant ror a sentient being. This 
will be positively or negatively valued by the experiential being. The particular 
kind of experi ence benefi ts or harms the sentient being in ways that matter to it. 
" Each sentient being is thererore va luable in itself. whethu or not it is va lued by 
other 'laJuers" (Land man 1995 : 12). Since only sentient beings can be va luable in 
themselves. they are the only beings that arc descrving :,f moral considerat ion. 
Accor,~ illg l y, non-sentient beings. such as insects, plar,ls and mi cro-organisms 
only f.ossess a val ue in relation to the va luations of sentielll beings, Taylor would 
respollj Ihat inherent worth is bestowed direct ly onto beings that have a good of 
their () Nn. Si nce the good of a being does not depend upon the capaci ty to feel 
pain, the possession o f inherent worth does not require lilal a being has to ha ve 
interests or that it must take an interest ill it s own li Ce (Taylor 1995 : 127). 
Accordingly, Taylor feels justified in proclaiming that all livi ng beings have 
inherent worth. 
Inherent worth, for Taylor, is ind ependent of ei the r the intrinsic o r instrumental 
valuations of a human valuer and is independent of the good it can contribute to 
any conscious being (Taylor 1986: 75). In reaction to this Landman argues that it 
is contrad ictory to talk of a va luer-i ndependent va lue since all va lue is dependent 
upon a va luer in two ways. either a being is a centre of va lue it self. and therefore 
valuable to itself, or something is va lued by a value:' (Landman 1995 : 14). 
Calli<;ott would agree with Landman that value is entirely dependent on the 
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valualions of Cl valucr Ilowcvcr, in support of Taylor, it is his contention that 
while;· entities have a va lue because of a va luer it is possible for those entities to be 
valued ror thcmselves, independent of the needs and inlcle515 of the va luer 
(Calli r;ott 1995.45) . III this regard we can accept Taylor's notion of inhercnl worth 
as bei 19 independent or the needs and interests ofa vc:lluel 
There is also a practical problcm of cOllnting the wO l1 h of every living being 
TayJor 's approach recogn ises the equa l inherent worth in all li ving beings. To say 
that all beings possess a worth equal to ours "means that we owe duties to them 
that are prima facie as stringent as those wc owe 10 our fellow humans" (Taylor 
1986: 152). While this is a commendable egalitarian proposition it appears to 
present a practical impossibility, for moral agents would have to count the inherent 
worth of all those affected by their actions. Since Taylor argues fQr the inherent 
worth of a ll living beings. we would have to consider the consequences of our 
actions not only for other humans. but a lso fo r animals, insects, planls and micro-
organisms. This would require a «level ofatlention and care beyond the abilities of 
most people" (Des Jardins 1997. 142). 
Taylor would respond that, because hi s approach is not grounded on a principle of 
utilit) , I.he count ing of va lue is not central to determinirig good ethical conduct. 
Rath(~\', the att itude of respect for nature should be used to guide our actions. While 
this d(:nies the need to count the inherent worth of every life affected by an action, 
it dQ(:! ~ not diminish moral agents' responsibility to cons :der which lives will be 
affect~d by their actions, which course o f action is the be~,~ to pursue and how best 
to compensate those indi viduals that are harmed or interfered with. 
French points out that, while Taylar's egalitarian approach rejects the idea of 
human superiority and is committed to species impartiality, hi s priority principles 
allow for situations where it is morally acceptable for humans 10 kill nOIl-humans 
(French 1995: 40). 
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Thc pl'inciplc ofsclf:-dcrc llce is illtended to be "species-blind" (TuylO1- 1'J86 265) 
However. wh il e it does not favour anyone dangerous species over ano ther it is 
apparent that this principle privileges Illoral agents over moral paticnts'i5 . since it 
just;iies the killing of harmful moral patients but not of harmful mora l agents. 
Clearly hUI113nil y is favoured over and above ot her beings. Taylor would disagree 
with this since the category of moral agenl s includes Inore than humans a lone_ 
Whil! this is tmc, ;1 does not change the fact that all1ll)sl all humans are moral 
agenls and most non-humans are moral patients, thereb) providing "wide-ra nging 
just ificalioll for <lcts by humans that harm animals. mic..-o-orgal1isllls and 1'lal1l$" 
(frel",h 1995 : 49). 
The principle of proportionality maintain s "greater weight is to be given 10 basic 
than non-basic interests, 11 0 matter whal species. human or other. the competing 
cla ims arise from" (Taylor 1986: 278). This appears to be a fair principle. placing 
the immediate biological nnd environmental needs of all beings over and above the 
psychological and cultural n('€'ds of humans. Taylor then goes on 10 suggest the 
princ iple of minimum wrong, which ho lds that certain highly valued non-basic 
human interests have a greater weig ht than the basic interests of non-humans 
(French 1995: 49). This implies thal there are some non-basic human int erests that 
are more important than Ihe basic interests or l1o n-hl' mans. Thi s places nOI1-
humans in a precarious position as Iheir basic needs are trumped by certain nOIl-
basic human needs. 
Taylc,r would respond that only non-basic human intere.ils that further the social 
and cultura l interests of humanity are to be regarded a:; more important than Ihe 
bask interests of non-human beings. However. " if IlOr.-basic interests can out-
weight basic interests. then the di stinction between basic .lnd non-basic is rendered 
deeply prob lematic" (french 1995: 50). In addition, Taylor propounds a theory 
l' A moral patient is "any being that can be treated rightl y or wrongly and toward whom 
moral agents can have duties and responsibilities" (Taylor 1986: 17). l-Iumans can be bOlh 
moral agents and moral patients. 
106 
that is grounded upon the equal inherent wort h of all beings As such humans are 
recognised to carry the same worth as all other li vi ng beings. Things becomc 
problematic when hurmlll culture is int roduced as carryi ng moral weight , when 
what dctermines human culture is human interests, which themselves are said to 
carry no more weight than those of plants and animals This implies that «human 
cu lLure has c!'pcc ially weig ht y llormi1live value, but human life doe!' not" (French 
1995 . 50) 
The principle of di stributive justice maintai ns that the basic int erests of all beings 
are eq ual. This egalitarian principle is contradi cted by t1C princ ipl e of self-
defence. which favours basic human interests over nOli -human basic interests~ and 
the principle of minimum wrong, which favours some hUllla n non-basic intcrests 
over thf: basic interests of non-humans So, while the principle of distributive 
justice cI';I1I Cl llds that an equal propol1ion of available resoUl ces be shared among 
all beings with inherent worth. Taylor justifies the harmill ~ and killing of n011-
humans t.) prevent harm to moral agents, to guarantee the hl, man food supply and 
for the dcvelopment of the human ci vilisation. Accordingly, it is clear that Taylor 
does not include plants and animals in the equal distribution of resources. 
Together these concerns make the scope of Tay lor's biocentric approach unclear. 
While stressing moral equality, informed by the princ iple of impartiality. Taylor 
«regu la rl y formu lates hi s princ iples so as to justify all sorts of cases in which 
human s may ki ll or injure animals and plant s" (French 1995 : 50). lnsisting on 
principles that do not practica ll y govern moral judgement about concrete duty 
"purchases little normative work at high cost in conceptual contribution" (French 
1995 : 57). Accordingly, when faced with concrete conflicts between 
anthropocentric and biocentric ethics there is no clarity "about the moral 
grounding of our final, concrete, normative weightings" (french 1995 : 50). 
Taylor's approach can also be criticised for being incapah le of preventing the 
extinction of species. Since only individuals are recognised as having a good of 
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their own. Taylor's biocentric ethics is linable to extend moral concern beyond the 
indi vidual to include the species. III response, it could be argued that the second 
core belief of the bioccntric outlook acknowledges the intcrcollnectedness of the 
biotic community - that all beings arc essential to the cont inued ex istence of the 
integrity orlhe system. Along sllch lines the significa nce of the species as a whole 
would be recognised and adequately protected. While this is true. Taylor 
speci li cl ll y denies that a species ean be a moral subject, si nce it is merely a «class 
name. and classes themselves have no good of their own. only their members do" 
(Taylor 1986: 6905). A species. for Taylor, is si mpl y a collection of individuals. 
Becalls(: of this the good of a species is reduced to a statis~ica l recognition of the 
good o f the indi viduals that constitu te it (Taylor 1986: 69). Accordingly, 
mainta;ning the good of the indi vidual ensures the good of the species. 
Unfortu,lately this represents an over-si mplification of tlte category of species. 
Unlike an abstract class. it can be argued that a species can evolve. develop into 
new species, "'become endangered. go ext inct, and have interests distinct flom the 
interests or their members" (Slerba 1995 : 192). Since a species call be benefited or 
harmed in ways different from its individual members. it makes sense to say that 
the species has a we ll -being Ihat is distinct from the well -being of its indi vidual 
members. Hence a species can be said to have a good of it s own. Excluding the 
species from moral considerat ion Taylor's approach Hdoes not recognise inherent 
worth in enough entities to ground an environmental ethic adequately" (Johnson 
199 1: 183). 
It is s imilarly apparent that Taylor's approach excludes the non-living component 
in natural ecosystems from moral consideration . Natural systems are regarded to 
have all ethical relevance based upon the recognition of the inherent worth of the 
individual beings that exist within them (Taylor 1986: 18). Thi s is problematic as 
it reduces the environment to a co ll ection of individuals, thereby neglecting the 
compic:< ity of the interrelationships that exist between indi vidual beings and 
ignorip g the vi tal role that the biosphere plays in relation to the individuals and the 
communities that exist within it. Such reduct ion is a dangeri.>us oversimplification, 
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for th.~ e llvironll1cnt is fnr morc th~n the slim nflhe indivlduill s that occur within il 
Faihll c to recognise the complexit y of the natural en"irunment (~ouhJ r e~lIlt in 
actions that afe not only dil cctly damaging to ecosyslem~ but that also impact 
indirectly on the individuals that ex ist wi thin them. 
Taylor would respond that by adopting the attitude of respect for nature onc's 
intentions and actions would be "directed toward not interfering wit h or harming 
animal s and plant s in natural ecosystems alld to preserving their wi ld status for its 
own sake" (Taylor 1986: 8S) This amounts to a hands-off approach. suppurted by 
the rule of nail -interference. This would ensure that nature would remain 
unt.ouched. thereby reducing any possible negative human impact on the natural 
environment. Ilowcver. in cCI1ain instances non-intervention could lead to greater 
eea ll_lg ica l damage. If, for example, a certain species of predator was allowed 10 
flourish unchecked. its population numbers could spiral out of control. Allowing 
the pn!dator species to become prolifi c could result in it'i prey species heco ming 
extiL1: t. Surely ill sllch cases " it is in the interest of certain wild species and their 
envilOnments that humans intervene periodically to maintain a balance" (Sterba 
1995 203). 
Taylor argues that all livi ng beings have inherent worth and are thus deserving of 
moral consideration . By expanding the scope of moral standing to including all 
li ving beings and by recogni sing the intcrconnectedness of ecosystems and the 
beings that exist within them. the natural world gains an ethical significance in a 
way that was not achieved by other eXlensioni st approaches. Problematically. by 
constructing a criterion that acknowledges the moral standing of individuals alone. 
non-individual entities such as species, habitats and ecosystems are morally 
ullconsiderable as entities in their own right. Taylor creates a strong base for his 
approach by formulating hi s theory in terms of Aristotelian character ethics. 
However. emphasising standards of good character and the right kind of attitude 
negates the need for having a comprehensive system or- rules. As such, Taylor's 
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atll: mpl at comhining a systcm of character cthics with a complcx system of ru lcs 
aprears somewhat cxcessive. 
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6 
F:valuatillg the Extcllsiollist Approaches 
As argued in Chapter Onc. we arc currently facing :lJ1 environmental cnSIS of 
immense proportiulls TrCldiliollal Hnthropocentric ar,)roaches 10 ethics do not 
ext!lld m.oral stand ing beyond the human rea l Ill . This has resulted in the 110n-
hum an world being valued for its instnlmcntal, ecol1o'n ic, and aesthetic potential 
alone. Occause of this 1 argued that all anthropoccntri, : approach is inadequate 10 
addless the current environmental crisis. 
It would seem plausible that " progress could be made in ending the environmenl~1 
c ri s is by challenging anthropocentric ethical norms and extending moral 
considerat ion 10 non-human beings" (Zimmerman 1998' 3). Following this line of 
thought , two general approaches have developed : an cxtensiollist approach and a 
holi~tic approach. The lirst seeks to extend 1110ral consideration beyond human 
individuals to include at least some non-human individuals. while the second, 
adopting an ecologica l understanding of the world , argues for the moral 
consideration of w ha les - species, ecosystems and the biosphere. In an effort to 
investigate the first approach thoroughly, l explored the approaches of the main 
pn:ponents of extensionist theories viz. Regall, Singer and Taylor, who argue for 
th(~ moral inclusion of mammals, vertebrates, and all li ving things respectively. In 
onle~' to establish an understanding of the second, holi ~t jc approach, I will outline 
thf~ land ethic of Aldo Leopold (1995). Following thi s. I will compare and contrast 
an t1ropocentric, extensionist and holistic approaches in an effort to expose the 
sir;1 i1arities and differences that exist between them . This will show that the 
exh~,lsionist approaches have much in common with anthropocentric approaches, 
which leads Callicott to conclude that the extensioni st approaches arc incompatible 
with an environmental ethic. 
It is the task of this chapter to explore, in the light of this claim, the adequacy and 
applicability of the extension;st approaches. 
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Ecolctgist Aldo Lcupold (1887-1948) is widely held 10 be the luunding father of 
envir.)nmenlal ethics for propo~ing the land ethic (Calli coLt 1995a· 30) Leopold 
understands an ethic to be a mode of guidance that rest s 011 the premise that the 
individual is a member ofa community . Our natural instinct is to compete against 
others for survival. To counter this an ethic promotes co-operation with other 
indi viduals in the community (Leopold 1995: 143). Anthropocentric approaches 
limit the Illoral communit y to human individuals, while extensionist approaches 
argue for the inclusion of al least some non-human individual s in the moral 
community . Leopold recogni sed Ihat traditional approaches 10 ethics ignore Ihe 
human-environment relationship. leaving it ror Ihe most Paft 10 be characterised in 
economic lerm s. Property is genera lly understood as a private possession, its 
di sposa l determined by economic advantage rather lIHIIl by morality (Leopold 
1995: 142). Leopold argues that it is wrong to view land as property. as it is not a 
cOIll Jllodity that belongs 10 us, bUf rather a community 10 which we belong (Pierce 
& Van de Veer 1995: 110). 
The flotion or land as community is informed by the laml fJyrclll1id Sun energy is 
seen .0 flow through the biotic circuit. The base layer of Ihis circuit is so il , which 
supports plant life. on which insects feed . Small ani 11a ls, such as birds and 
rode.lts, subsist on the plants and in sects. larger creaturer. on them. and so on, wit h 
large carnivorous animals at the apex. «Each successivt: layer depends on those 
below it for food and often for other services. and each in turn rurnishes food and 
services to those above" (Leopold 1995: 147). Lines of dependency for food and 
services are called food chai ns. Each species represents one link in many chains. 
The land pyram id is constituted by a complex tangle of food chains and its proper 
functioning "depends upon the co-operation and competition of its diverse part s" 
(Lcopold 1995: 147). According to thi s conception land «is a rountain or energy 
nowing through a circu it of50i ls, plants, and anima ls" (Leopold 1995: 147). The 
land pyramid conveys three basic ideas: the land is not simply soil~ indigenous 
plants and animals are essential for the continuation of a healthy energy circu it ~ 
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and the manipulation of nature by humans is very dilferenl from evolut ionary 
char .~es (Leopold 1995: 148). Because the land is comprised of complexly 
int er ,;o nnected relat ions, change in one part of the cil ..:~uit entai l adjust ments in 
many other parIs. 
The land et hic "simpl y en larges the boundaries of the co mmunity to include soil , 
waters, plants. and animals, or collectively: the land"' (Leopold 1995 : 143). 
Beccwse the land is recognised to be a member of the cOlll lllunity Leopold would 
argue that it should be morall y considerable. Furthermore, since the land is integral 
to the successful functioning o f the entire communit y Leopold asserts that the 
rightness of act io ns should be determined on the bas is of the ir contribution to the 
overall functioning of the land and wrong if they affect it negatively. 56 This is 
evident when he Slates that «a thi ng is right when il tends to preserve the integrity, 
stabi lit y. and beaut y of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwi se" 
(Lcopold 1995: 150). As such, the land et hic e ffecti vely revises the role of humans 
in nature, from owner and dominator to member and equal subject. 
S6 Since the primary focus of Leopold ' s hol istic approach is tJlC integrity of the biotic 
coOl P 'lImity, it is commonly understood that the interests oftho individual are subordinate 
to th t: interests of the biotic community. Because the land ethi~ . would justify the 
sacrificing of an individual for the good ofthc biotic coml1lul lily, Tom Rcgan charges 
holism with environmental fascism (Regan 1988: 362). In def0.3nce of holism, it is argued 
that Fegan 's case for tJle rights of anima ls, which locates 1ll0r;\1 standing in tile individual 
alone, is an equally extreme position (Johnson 1991 : 176) . Fmthermore, the preservation 
of the individual is "pre-empted by tJl e preservation of the integrity, stability, and beauty 
of the biotic community" (Ca llicott 1995b: 155). Respect for tJlC community implies a 
respect for a ll the members of the community. As such tJl e land ethic can be said to ha ve 
"a holi st ic as well as an individualistic cast" (Callicott 1995b: 155), providing a well-
formed tJl eoret icai basis for including members of the biotic community and tJle biotic 
community itse lf. 
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for Leopold thi s ethical ol/lIook is "an evolutionary possibilit y and an ecological 
necessit y" (Leopold 1995: 143). 11 is possible, s ince human psychological and 
cognitive capacities are sulTi cicn l1 y advanced to conceptualise and accept it , and 
necessary, si nce hu manity has the co ll ective power to «destroy the integrity. 
diversity, and stabilit y of the ellvironing and supporli t'g econulllY o r nature" 
(Call icolI 1995b: 155). 
Becal':;e the extension isl lheo ries expand the mora l sphere to include at least some 
non-human indi viduals it was assumed that they were all ies with ho listi c 
approach cs to the environment. In reaction, 1. Baird Callj( ~ott (1 995a), in " Anima l 
Liberation: A Triangular AfTai r", argues Ihal ant lll opocentric ethics and 
extension ist approaches have more in common with onc ano ther than either have 
with an enviro llment al et hic (Ca ll icott 1995a: 57) . 
Extensionist and ho listi c apr' ·"llches are similar in that they extend moral 
consideration beyo nd the human realm to include non-humans. The former 
extends moral consideration to mammals, vertebrates and all li ving beings, in the 
cases of Regan, Singer and Taylo r respectively, whi le the latter places direct moral 
consideration onto natural systems (Callicott 1995a: 3 1). furthermore, bot h 
approaches see the ex tens io n of et hics from huma ns to non-humans as a 
progress ion in the unfolding of human consciousness. For animal li berationisls, the 
quest · o attai n animal equality is the next great challenge in the liberation struggle. 
For I. eopold extending ethics to include the land i ~; a part of our moral 
devel·,·pment (Leopold 1995: 143). 
The IIIO St notable difTerence between extensioni st and ho listic approaches is that 
differt.'nt theoretical foundation s inform them . Exterlsionist approaches are 
groundcd in an atomistic understanding of the world. Individual entities are 
recognised to be indepcnd ent of onc another, each pursuing it s own specific 
interests. Communit ies a nd groups are understood simpl y as collect ives of 
individuals. Moral consideration is therefo re directed specifi ca ll y at the ind ividual. 
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Acts me right or wrong depending on h{lw they alTect indi viduals who have moral 
sl<1 l1ding. I II conlrn sl, holistit,; "pproHchcs arc grounded ;n an cco logici1!! ), informed 
view of the world . Relationships between entities and the natural enviromne nl are 
recognised 10 be of utmost significance. The individual exists within and 
cont ri butes to the system . The system in turn sustains the ex istence of the 
indi vi dual. Becau se the systel1l is essential to the ex istence of the indi vidual and 
supports many different types o r individual s~ it is given a higher ethica l priority 
than the individual. The optimal fUllctio ning of the biotic communi ty is «the 
ultimat e measure of the moral va lue. the rightness or wrongness, of action" 
(Ca liicott 1995a : 39). 
A s(:cond notable difference that can be drawn bet ween extensioni st and holistic 
approaches concerns the allocat ioll of va lue . EXlensionist approaches limit va lue 
considerations 10 the individual alone. wh ile holistic approaches confer va lue 
directly ont o the whole system rather than onto the part s that exist within the 
system. Furthermore, extension ist approaches, as we have seen in the precedi ng 
chapters, bestow this value equall y onto all individuals that are recogni sed 10 have 
moral stand ing. Conversely. ho li slS, such as Leopold, who acknowledge the 
primacy of the well-being of the bio tic whole. only attribute value to individual 
beings in terms of the contribu tion that they make to the functioning of the biotic 
community. Accordingly, the va lue that individual beings possess will vary from 
species to species - a bird from an endangered species would be given a higher 
va lue than a bird from a common variety since species diversity e nhances the 
evolutionary potential of the biotic community. In certain cases, va lue could also 
vary between individuals of the sa me species. For examjJle, a conservationist who 
works to preserve the natura l environment would have '3 higher value because of 
her contribution to the biotic community in comparison to the businessperson who 
does flot contribut e to the development orthe biotic com:nunity. 
Thirdly, because these two approaches have diO"erent theoretical foundations, and 
then:fore allocate va lue to dilTerent entities and in different ways, they propound 
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equality of a ll individuals with mora l standing. Emphasising care and concern for 
all morally considerable individuals. extells io ni st approaches project a cosmic 
vis io n of inl crspecies harmony. governed by rcspect for olher beings This is 
problematic in that such a vision denies the Darwinian explanation of life as a 
struggle fo r ex istence, whcre the survival of a being is ensured only at the expense 
of anothcr. In light of this, exlensionist approaches ca ll be scen as misguided 
att cmpts to widcn " the anti-Ilatural prophylactic ethos of comfoll and soO 
pleasure" (Callicotl 1995a 55) from humans to non-humans. Holistic approaches, 
o n the other hand, afC more concerned with the Ilalllral function ing of the 
cn·rironment , and accordingly support a cosmic visicn that celebrates a ll things 
natura l and wild. They wou ld therefore demand that restrictions be placed on the 
human cOlllmercial and domestic spheres (Ca lli cott 19C)5a: 54). 
Fi r al1 y, different cosmic visions result in different out looks and att itudes toward 
wild nature. The extcnsio ni st approaches of Regan ane Singer concern themselves 
willl the treatmcnt of animal s by humans. Si nce most unfair treatment o f an imals 
by humans occurs in the agricultural industry and scientific laboratories these 
approaches focll s the ir attentio n onto dumesti c animals. A consequence of their 
moral focus is that they ignore the plight of wi ld animals and nature. Oecause the 
fun ctioning of the biotic communit y is of primary importance for the holi sts, wild 
animals and indigenolls plants occupy a place of importance within the biotic 
community which domestic animals do not. In thi s sense, Taylor 's approach, 
which is primarily concerned with the treatment of wild plants and an imals. shares 
a kinship with holism. According to holism domesticated animal s are man made 
artefacts, unnatural and potentia lly ruinous to the biotic community (Cal1icott 
1995a: 50). Therefore. such an approach would ho ld an att itude of indifference 
tm"ard the plight of domestic animal s, choosing to focus on the health of the 
whole biot ic commun ity instead . 
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In lig ht of the above. the simi lari ties that exist betwcC'1I c;' Lellsionist and holi stic 
approad'cs appear tu he "rather superfi cial and to concea l slIbstn'l ta of thought and 
va lue which are not at all si milar" (Ca llicolt 1995a: 34), Th is being the case, it 
would be interesting to high light the differences and similarit ies that exist between 
extensionist and anthropocent ric approaches, 
It has been shown that the pri ncipal difference between the theories of Regan. 
Singer and Taylor and their anthropocentric predecessors «li es in the choice o f the 
ethically enfnmchis ing property or chllracteri stic" (Callicott 1998 ' 12-13) Whil e 
traditional theorists propounded characteristi cs excl usive to humans. Reg<l ll . 
Si nger, and Taylor have developed the irs to include human beings as we ll as a 
range of non-humans. thereby extending moral standing beyond tradi tional 
bOllndar ics. 
As has heen remarked in previous sect ions of this thesis, a ,':ommo n feature Or both 
ex ten si-:. nist and anthropocentric approaches is that the ir theoretica l foundation s 
are lar:!ely info rmed by an atomi stic understanding of the world . As a result 
indi vidual beings alone are recogni sed to be o f moral sign ficance . The atomistic 
paradigm ensures that certain groups o f individua ls are included in the moral 
sphere, while others are exclud ed, Even Taylor 's biocentri sm, which «stretches 
thi s familiar pattern of mo ral reasoning to its limit" (Callicott 1998 : 13) by 
including all li vi ng individuals, excludes non-ind ividual natu ra l entities such as 
species, ecosystems and the biosphere. Whi le the extensioni st approaches have 
provided new issues to debate and discuss, the fact that they subscribe to the same 
basic reductive paradigm as anthropocentric approaches result s in the blind 
acceptance and re-entrenchment of basic underlying moral principles, 
Extending moral considerat ion beyond the human sphere mak es the extensioni st 
approaches theoretica lly J1o n ~anthropocent r i c , However, all three extensionist 
approaches, when faced wi th situat ions that requi re moral dl!cisio n making, favour 
human interests over non-human interests . The fact that R egan draws his line of 
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mora l considera tion at conscious. self-aware animals a llows him to include a ll 
mammal s into the Illoral sphere . Ilowever, u to equa'.e hav ing interests with 
awareness of interests ... is to bias our understand ing of what it means to have 
interests in a mentali stic and. hcnce, a biologicn ll y pa"ochi al way" (Pox 1<)90. 
\66) This amounts to replaci ng prclcflexive human c haL villi s lI1 wit h raliolla\ sclf-
conscious human chauvinism Accord ingly, Regan is guilty of favouring di st inctl y 
human capacit ies. 
Singer adopts the I3cntlH'lmite criterion of sentience in an aHempt to Hvoid the 
charge of speciesism, and to includ e all vertebrates in the moral sphere. 
Unfortunately he contradi cts hi s non-antllropoccntric position by adding rat ionalit y 
and self-consciousness as re levant crit eria when dealing wi th issues of death. Thi s 
places a premiulll 0 11 human- like capacit ies, unfairly favou l ing those beings that 
arc most similar to hU11lans. while the Illoral status of non-human-like beings is 
disadvantaged or completely ig nored. Th is allows the interests of animal s " to 
count only when they do not clash wit h human int erests" (Singer 1990: 2 12). 
Taylor attempts to avoid this charge by committing hi s approach to the principle of 
spe(;' es impartiality . Hi s moral criterion includes all beings that have a welfare . 
Thi s allows him 10 extend moral consid eration to all li ving be ings. Despite thi s 
orierl talion 10 the living world , Taylor constructs moral principles that frequently 
allo ·ly· human interests to take priorit y over non-human i -Herest s. Because a ll three 
extensionist approaches favour - to a greater or lesser degree - human interests 
over non-human interests, they can be charged with having an anthropocentric 
bias. 
In this chapter I have emphasised the similarit ies that exist between extensioll ist 
and ant hropocent ric approaches. Nevertheless. it wou ld be wrong to conclude that , 
si nce an anthropocentric approach is inadequate 10 an environmental ethic, 
extensionist approaches are similarly inadequate. To do so would fal sely stretch 
the claim of similar ity to one of identity. 
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To say that all ethical approach is adequate 10 an enviror menta l ethic impli es thal 
it is capable ill and by itself of fulfilling the role of an environmcntal ethic , An 
cllvilOllmental et hic is understood to be a systemat ic account of the 1110ral relations 
between humans and the ir environment (Des Jardins 1997: 9). The environment 
was ~cfined as the world in which we are enveloped and immersed, including both 
indiv idual living creatures and non-living, non- indi v'dual entities. This al1-
inclwave sphere was earlier referred to as the <greater environment' In order to 
account for the moral rc lations that exist between humans and thc greater 
environment, an environmental ethic should ha ve a sufficientl y wide focus , This 
wi ll ensure that it provides a suitable basis from whi ch to evaluate and guide 
ethical behaviour toward all entities that exist in and constitute the environment. 
Furthermore, because an et hic is a system of guidance. an environmental eth ic 
shou ld have outcomes that would ensure the protection and maintenance of the 
greater cllvironment. For an ct hical approach to fulfil the role of an envi lonmental 
et hic. it makes sense to demand that it reflect both the focus and the objectives of 
an environmental eth ic . 
The t:xtensionist approaches make a concerted effort to e:ctend 1110ral consideration 
from humans to at least some non-humans. In thi s regal d they can be said to be 
conglUOllS with the focus of an enviro nmental ethic. 
I-Iov. ever, because all three extensionist approaches limit their focus to the needs 
and interests of morally considerable indi viduals, those fDn-individual enti ties that 
rorm part of the greater environment are not morally considered . Because of thi s, it 
could be argued that the extensionist approaches are not encompassing enough. 
Regan would disagree~ arguing that if the individual is given moral considerat ion, 
then the environment in which the individual exists will also be considered (Regan 
1988: 363). His line o f argument is easy to follow. Mora ll y considerable 
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indi vidua ls should 110 1 be harmed q Individuals requi re eel-uti li hasic hio logica l 
necessities fi-om the cllvilo nmcnt in order to su rvivc. Indivi duals wi ll benefit the 
most from their environment when it is in a healthy state. It fo llows then that wc 
have a moral duty 110t 10 d isturb the environment, for it ;s that very environment in 
which those indi vi dua ls live and re ly upon to li ve a flllln fe. 
Wl ule thi s argume nt has considerable rneriL . it dol'S not guarantee the moral 
cOll sideration o f the g reater environment. Regan limit s his l1Jora l considera tion to 
mentall y normal mamma ls. Thi s ensures that the hab it ats in which mamlllals exist 
would Icccive indirect moral consideration, and would therefore be preserved. 
Taking inl o accou nt that there arc infin itely morc creatures on th is planet than 
mammal s, there would be extremcly largc portions o f the envi ronment that would 
not be considered at all. (New Zea land, for example, has no indigenous mammals> 
except for two bat species.) Regan's approach is thus not encompass ing enough. 
Singer a lTers a significa ntly broader moral criterio n that includes all vertebrates 
As such. the habitats tha t SuppOi1 all vertebrates would be indirectly considered . 
Si nce there are sig nifica nt ly more vertebrates than mammals, a grea ter portion of 
the environment would be morall y considercd. However, because Singer is chic fl y 
inte rested in the commerc ial dealings of humans toward animals. he present s what 
ca n be termed an ethic of bio-cultu re. Focllss ing Oil domestic animals alone, 
Singer' s approach ofTers less of a moral account for ti ll! greater environme nt than 
Regan' s. 
In ~Olltrast to Si nger. Tay lor's biocentrism focuses enti'·ely on human interactions 
in natural environments and compl etely ignores the domestic sphere. Because it 
reccIsnises the inherent worth or all living be ings and the dependency of the 
ind ividual on the environment. it can be argued that Taylor's approach is more 
encompassing than the approaches o f Regan and Singer While this is tme, it must 
be remembered that Taylo r prescribes the rul e of non-interference. making it a 
~7 Singer and Taylor would support th is statement as well. 
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moral duty to refrain fW111 int ervening in nature where direct human interaction 
has Ilo t occurred.~x While there is strong agreement that we should try 10 preserve 
at leas t a portion of the natural wodd from substantial human inlerle rence. it is 
short-sighted 10 assu me that nature, even in its wildest slate, is beyond the 
inOuence of human activity Non-interference then is not necessaril y the best 
option to provide a basis fi·olll which to protect the greater environment. 
Theoretical focus aside. it is important to remember that l he purpose of an ethic is 
to provide Cl guide for beha viour with the aim of achi eving morally desirable 
outcOl11es. It was suggested that an environmental eth ic should aim at preventing 
the 'ila nipulation and destruction of indi vidual entitics and natural systcms. An 
asses~ment of the adequacy of the extensionist approach€:s wi ll , therefore. only be 
complete ifil explores the consequences of lhei r appl icatioll . 
Whil e the approaches of Rega n, Singcr and Taylor appear to be IhcOI elicall y 
enlightencd in compari son to anthropocentric systems of elhics. inasmuch as they 
argue for Ihe moral inclusion of at least some non-human beings, a ll three 
approaches have been shown to have an unstated moral bias in fa vour of humanit y. 
Human interests lend, in Jllany instances, to take precedence over non-human 
interests. As such, when applied 10 situations where 1110ral decisions nced to be 
made concerning the greater environment it is probable that these approaches 
would in many cases lead to results that favour human interests . As the current 
environ mental cri sis is largely the resu lt of an out look that prioritises human 
interests, it can be argued that the app lication of the extensionist approaches could 
lead tJ consequences that are similarly destructive to the greater environment. 
Arguing for the moral considerat ion of individual entities effectively excludes 
non-individual entities fr0111 moral considerat ion. In formed by an atomistic 
---------
~. It would be fair to claim that all three extensionist approaches support, to a greater or 
lesser degree, a genera l hands-off approach to the natural envirC111l11cnt . 
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undcrstanding of the world , thc extcnslonist approachcs acknowledge the intcrcsts 
of thc individual alonc_ R.cgan's approHch recogni ses the inherellt va lue of sclf-
aware individuals; Singer's approach the moral standing of sentient individuals; 
and Taylor ' s approach the inherent worth of all living individuals Because species 
"re regarded to be simply collections of individuals, they arc not recognised to 
havc intcrcs ts apart frolll the interests of the individuals that constitute thelll . Thus. 
no direct Illoral significa nce is conferred onto them, thereby providing no moral 
grounds for the preservation of species. 
This is prob lematic, for a species IS not necessarily the same as a collection of 
individuals. To be a member of a particular species IS not simpl y a matter of 
having certain characteristics and properties, but entails «being of a particular 
conplex genetic lineagen (Johnson 199 1: 155). Viewed in this way a species can 
be seen as «a n ongoing genctic lineage sequentially emhod ied in different 
orga nisms" (Johnson 1991 : 156). Consequentl y, it is I at only the individual that 
co:. ,1ts in the evolutionary scheme of things, but also I he species because " it is a 
dynamic life form maintained over time by an informed genet ic now" (RolstOIl 
1988: 143). As such, the individual can be seen as the token and the species as the 
type, and " the type is 1110re important than the token" (Rolston J 988: 1 tl3). Along 
such lines, killing an individual Ileed 110t be too serious a matter if it is replaceable 
through reproduction . However, causi ng a species to go extinct permanently ends 
the possibility of a particular group of individuals ever existing again. 
Since evolution occurs through existing species and their variety of genetic 
information, the greater the genetic variation, the more evolutionary possibi lities 
there are. The ext inct ion of a species not only means the end of life for a group of 
indiv idual s, it also entail s the cnd of a particular generat ive process. Thus, the 
extHlction of species Il Ji IS in a diminished gene pool, and accordingly less 
evo lutionary possib iliti es. Because they are unable to offer moral recourse to 
protect species from extinction, accepting the extensionist approaches is likely to 
contribute to the destruction oflhe greater environment. 
122 
In re!'ponse. an exlensionisl could argue that species ex ti".~lion would not occur 
provided that the good of the individual is maintained. 1 his is a Sh0l1 -sigl1tcd 
respons(: 'i ince a species is inseparable from the ecosystem in which it ex ists It is 
determined by and depends upon its environmental niche. According ly, savi ng the 
li ves o f indi vidual entit ies is not going to preserve the species if the habitats in 
which those species exist are destroyed . In order 10 effectively save a species, tile 
system in wl1i ch the species occurs needs to be preserved . 
None of the c,< lcnsionist approaches provide direct moral grounds for the 
preservation of thc habitats and ecosystems in which species and the ir indi vidual 
members exist. Regan ' s approach. when dealing wi th issucs that in volvc both 
morall y considerable individuals and the environment , will a lways favour the 
interests o f indi vidual s, treat ing the environment as a warclwlIse of resources. The 
environment cou nts only in so far as it benefits the morall y considerable 
indiv idual. Beyond the satisfact ion of the needs and interests of such individuals 
the environment has no moral va lue. As such, Regan 's approach does not appear 
to provide an adequate basis on which to develop an environmental ethic. This 
comes a~ 110 surprise. for Regan states that his rights based approach and an ethi cs 
of the en vironment «are like oil and water: they don't mix" (Ilegan 1988 :362). 
Singer's approach recognises the moral standing of senticnt beings alone. The 
environment is not a sentient being and so the interests of the environment are of 
no moral concern. This translates into a hands-off approach to the natural world . 
Consideri ng the potentially devastating consequences that may arise as a result of 
the escalating human population, the increasing demands for energy resources and 
the pollu tion of the planet's natural systems, this is definitely not the best way to 
deal with the current environmental crisis. Furthermore, considering that Singer's 
approach treats morally considerable beings as replaceable items, it provides no 
arguments against also treating the environment as a replaceable item. Singer's 
view would give us no reason to oppose the replacement of the natura l world with 
a synthetic one. in which real trees are substituted with plastc ones, provided that 
the aggfl!gate suffering ofsentient beings was not increased. 
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While T~ ylor 's bioccl1tric appro~ch can be com rl1 endeo for recognising Ihal all 
living beings ~re directly dependent 011 the environment ror their survi va l, and that 
the int egrity or nature plays a sig nifica nt role in dctf'rmining the rightness or 
aCli'Jtl s, the understa nding o r eco-systems propounded by it is dangerously 
silf·pli slic. Because inherent wOI lh is bestowed Ol1to entities that exhib it orga nised 
behaviour alone. ecosystems are not recognised to 1ave ::my inherent wonh. 
Rather, the moral st<l tu s o f' ecosystems is reduced to a mere statistical 
reprcscntation or the goods or the individuals that ex ist within thel1l . \Vhether or 
not ecosystems ha ve morally considerable int erests is highl y debat abl e . That 
ecosystems are greater than the SlIlll or the indi viduals that exist withi n them is 
not. Fai ling to recognise the complexit y of the natural environment cOllld result in 
consequences that are fl ot only directly damaging to ecosystems, but also 
indirectly damaging to the indi vidua ls that ex ist within them. 
Above I have shown that , while a ll three extensionist approaches sati sfy the 
requirement that an environmental e thic should extend Ihe foclls of moral concern 
bcy .)nd the human realm, neit her Rega n's nor Singer's approach ofTers a foclIs that 
is t=lIcompassing enough. Taylor' approach. 0 11 the oth",'1' hand. includes all li ving 
bei r gs and in thi s regard ca ll ue said to have a signific.'l ntl y encompassing focus. 
Locking into their applications, it is evide nt that none of the extcnsionist 
app -oaehes would meet the objectives oran environmelltal ethic. Because they are 
bia '3.ed in ravour of humanit y. do not provide a mo ral ~ ';COllIH fo r the presefVation 
of srJccies and do not provide an independent moral account for ecosystems it is 
highly doubtful that they wou ld prevent the manipulation and destl1lction of the 
vast variety of individual entities and natural systems that constitute the greater 
environment. Since none of the extensionist approaches satisfies both the rocus 
and aim of an environmental ethic. none of them fulfil s the role of an 
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envi ro lllllental eth ic. TilcrerOTc. Iile eXlensionisl appJOachcs ~l1C inadequate to an 
cll vironment<1 1 cl hic. yl 
Thi~ supports C'a llicott's lugu menl , which ack nowlcdg(:s that while extclls ioni st 
<1ppwachcs arc compatible with an anthropocentric approach they arc 
incommensurate with an envirollmcnta l et hic. Decause cAlcnsion isl approaches are 
incolllpat ibl e with an environmental et hic, and because, environmenta l concerns 
arc less or an issue invo lving individual living beings, and more or an Issue 
pertaining to species. ecosystems and the entire planeta ry biosphere. it is 
Call kott's contention thal extensioni st approaches an! «uuerly unpracticable" 
(Call kott 1995a: 58). Thus. Call ico tt wou ld argue that c,. tensionist approaches are 
not only inadequate, but that they are also inapplicabl e 10 an environmental ethic . 
In contrast to Ca lli cott . who asscrts that an ethic that recognises the moral standing 
o r individua ls is inco mpat ibl e with an ethic that attributes moral va lue to wholes, 
Lawrence lohnson argues that it is possible to "develop a coherent ethi cal scheme 
to serve as a comlllo n fou ndation ror the ethical dcal ings with ot her humans, with 
non-human indi viduals. and with ecosystems and othcr environmental wholes" 
(Jo hnson 1991 : 230). Exploring both indi vidualistic and holi stic approaches. 
Johnson find s that anthropoccntric and cxtensionist approaches, whi le advocat ing 
different kind s or treatment , agree that the interests of morally considerable 
indi\" lduals are significant (Johnson 199 1: 97), while ho li stic approaches argue that 
non-Indi vidual entities have interests that are morally significant (Johnson 199 1: 
148) From thi s he concludes that the consideration o r well -being interests IS a 
shan!.:J feature of all three approaches. GO As such. Johnson argues that 
39 Wh,le Norton would oppose my claim conceming the inadequacy of an anthropocentric 
environ mental et1lic, he wou ld agree with me thar the extension ist approaches are not 
adequately suited to an envi ronmental ethic, for "an adequate environ mental ethic 11111.\·/ 
flot be limited to the considerations of indi vidual interest" (Norton 1995· 187). 
60 Interests, in both senses are understood to be "a funct ion of ... well-being needs" 
(John,on 1991: 14 1). 
125 
;ndi v;du <l li stic and ho listic approaches are not so dilTerenl While thi s common 
grou nd of interests plOvides the theoretical link to join these dincrent approaches 
together.; t does not necessitate that the connicting interests of di verse entities will 
be cO'cct ivc ly and consiste ntly dealt with (Joh l1 soll 1991 : 235). 
Johnsoll acknowledges that whi le there "re clear cJilTerences between the demands 
of individualistic and ho listic theories, since both suppc n vastly different and onen 
conflict ing interests, «there is 110 need 10 absorb the fo rmer in to the latter, or to 
redllce the latter to the forlller" (.1ol1n50n 1991 : 238). To do either would negate 
important factors and thus lead 10 moral short-sight p.dness, since uatom islll or 
ho li sm on its own, either one wi lhout the other is 1I0 t only incomplete, it IS 
int;ohercllt " (John son 199 1: 239). Adopting a pragnltllic approach ,61 Johnson IS 
Ic ~ ;:: concerned with developing 11 unified theory of ethics than he is with finding 
prMtical solutions to current environmental problems. I\ccordingly. his aim is not 
to develop an absolute standa ro o f reference from whkh onc can determine right 
or wrong act ions, but rather to creatively mediate between the various eonnieting 
va lue c laims (Parker 1996: 27). In order to do so it is essential to recognise the 
moral significa nce of all things that have well-being interests (John son 199 1: 238). 
This is not to suggest that the interests of individual s and wholes are equal, but 
rather that interests exist 011 more than one level. These difTerent levels of interest 
are not only understood 10 be interdependent , but also "distinct and not 
interreduciblc" (Johnson 1991 : 243). Thus the interests of individuals as well as 
whales are both morally sig nificant. Because these diITerenl interests will not 
6 1 Pragmatism, as a school of thought, developed in reaction to traditional absolutist 
cOllcepts of epistemology. metaphys ics and value theory. It demands a refocusing on what 
actually ex.ists, rather than on what philosophical theory suggests that we should find 
(Pmker 1996: 23). As a result a pragmatic approach to eUlics "maintains that no set of 
ethical concepts can be the absolute foundation for evaluatilll1 the rightness ofollr actions" 
(Pa-ker 1996; 26). According to a pragmatic ethical account dlere call be 11 0 ultimate list 
of virtues and moral principles, or an account of good that can dea l with every practical 
sitlll~ion adequately. 
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ah"lay!' be compatih le. eonllicts of interests will arise. lr. lesolving such con nicts 
o f in terests. Jo linso ll acknowledges tha t in so me instances the in terests of the 
indivi dual wi ll take priority over the interests of the biot ic C0I11 I111lll ity. w hil e in 
other instances the interests of the biotic commu nity will lake priority over the 
int erests of individuals (JohJlsoll 199 1: 24 1). 
Such ,Hl approach would sec m 10 warrant a com pl ex sel of principles ill order to 
determ ine the priority of the dilTcrent interests True to the pragmatic outlook, 
whi ch states that "cvery s it ua tion must be appraised on its own di stinct telms" 
(Parker 1996: 33). John son does not offer any. Si nce a pragmatic approacll does 
not ~tt emp l to dimi nish the conniclS that exisl amongst various parties with 
opposing interests. it does not Iry 10 provide a simpl e means for determi ni ng whi ch 
i J1ler~SI S take preference over ot hers In this regard Johllson' s approach does not 
cOlllmit the mi stake made by Taylor, who, in altell1 pti r.g to provide a complex 
hierarchy of ru les, slIcceeds merely in presenting a cU IPbersome approach which 
Hpur: hases litt le normati ve work at high cost in concept.!a l contributio n" (French 
199; 57). 
Decause Johnson' s approach does not reduce the compl ex ity of the world 10 a 
single uni fied explanat ion. il remains open to a wide fi eld of explanatio n and 
understanding, allowing for the application o f a range of establi shed ethi cal 
theories. Alo ng such lines. the approaches of both Singer and Regan are 
recognised to offer valuable insight s lhat can be applied to dealings between 
humans and some non-hu mans (Johnson 199 1: 192). They contribute to the 
broadening of our ethical horizons, expand ing our awareness that the interests of 
both human and non-human COllnt morally, while simultaneously helping us to 
understand why and how Ihey counl (Johnson 1991: 193). 
Singer 's utili ta rianism de-emphasises the importance of lo llowing rules. and helps 
us to direct our thoughts onto the consequences of our actions. In addition, it 
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provides an ethicfl l fram e of rercrence ror dealing with allima l ~ 111 artificitt lly 
const ructed find contlOllcd environments. 
Regflll ' s dCOlllology. on the o ther hano, reminds us that the interests of morall y 
considerable beings should not be infri nged by appea ling to the pr inc iple of utility. 
It also provides a strong et hical fj·alllewolk from wh ich we ca n demand certain 
rights for animals. Il owever, since the ethical ent it lement of anima ls is the 
philosophical goal of both Regan nml Singel. the application of their approaches 
would be irrelcvant , and therefore inapplicable, in affairs that do not directly 
involve human act ions toward moral1y considerable animals. 
Taylor', approach has considerable merit III that it st resses the importancc of 
culti va t' tlg an att itude of respcd toward nature. J0 l111 S011 maintains that such an 
attitudE"' will only help us find practica l solutions if we are aware oflhe complexity 
of cx is(!T1cc. together with lhe vast anay of interests. Taylflr's biocentric outlook 
providci an extensive fi-amcwork to infol"ln such awarr~ ness . Because Taylor 
argucs ·'or the inherent worth of all living indi viduals, his appro~ch has a wider 
applicability than thc approachcs of Rcga n and Singer. However, because it 
focuses on the inherent worth of ind ividua ls alone it neglccts to account , morally. 
for the larger biot ic commun ity. As such it s application would be lim ited to 
instances whcre the interests of humans confli ct wit h the interests of individual 
plants and animals. 
It is apparent that Callicotl and Johllson propose contrary views. Calli COlt , 
following a monistic out look, assumes that a sing le unified ethical thcory is 
necessary to provide an effecti ve and coherent means for dealing with competing 
value claims. Accordingly. hc claims that only holistic approaches to 
environmenta l cthics are adequate and because the eXlensionist approaches are 
inadc(ITlatc, they are also inapplicable. Johnson, on the othcr hand, adopts a 
plurali 5!·dc outlook that assumcs that a l1Iultiplicity of et hical approaches can 
l egitim ~.t el y coex ist. since the plurality of moral truths can not be reduccd into a 
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unifying principle (Des JU1(lills 1997. 2~2) t\ccordingly, he fu gues Ihlll. w hile 110 
singl ~ approach 0 11 it s own is adequate as an environmental et hic, the extensionisl 
apP](J«clies are app li cable provided lhat they are releva nt to the situations to whi ch 
they are applied This be ing the case, it appears that 10 answer the question 
whether th e extensionisl approaches are applicable to al'· envirollmental etllic. we 
will have to resolve the debate between moral monists and moral pluralists Thi s 
option would indeed provide an answer that either the eXlensioni st approaches are 
not applicable, ir Callicou's view is supported. or that they are applicable. ir 
Johnson' s view is supported 
Gearing in mind the scale and severity ur the environmental CriSI S and 
acknowledging that both views make valllable contributions to the field or 
environme ntal ethics. it is my contention that a choice does not have to be made. 
Rather the lwo views can be synthesised in a coherent and userul way. 
Acknowledging the interest s or the biotic whole in no way entails a denial or the 
interests of the individual s that exist within the bio·'a. The biosphere is the 
collt-:ctive environment that contains al1 li ving and non-living entities. However, il 
is not separate from those individuals. for they all contribute in their own ways to 
its (ontinued rllnctioning (Wilson 1995). Since the bimphere is neither reducible 
to th~ aggregate of all living individuals, nor a separa"! entity. it can be said to 
have· interests that are neither separate froTl1llor reducib le to the aggregate interests 
of all living individuals (Johnson 1991 : 265). Thus, to claim that ecosystems have 
interests that COUllt , in no way implies that those are the only interests that count. 
Thererore, Leopold ' s claim that acts are determined to be right or wrong regarding 
how they affect the integrity orthe biotic community should by no means be taken 
as an exhaustive definition or right and wrong (Johnson 1991 : 177). 
The land ethic is well suited to deal with matters concerntng the greater biotic 
community. However, because it is primarily concerned with the biotic whole. it 
does not provide a comprehensive moral accOllnt and is not appropriate for dealing 
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\vith (;onnicting interests helwcen individuals. Si nce a ~)' s l cm of ethi cs is intended 
to guide human act io n. and human actioll a ffects both individuals and biotic 
wh'J lcs. it follow s that w here holi sti c approaches are Inapplicable indi viduali sti c 
appfoaches should be app li ed. Accord ing ly. accepting Leopold ' s ho listi c approach 
should in no way imply a denial of other ethical approaches 
Thi s is no t to suggest that the va riou s approaches have an equal level o f moral 
autho ril y . Rather. the different approaches sho uld be allocated va rying degrees of 
llIoral authorit y. according to their scope and app li cability. Alo ng slIch lines. 
atomistic approaches arc directly applicable to situatio ns involv ing individual s 
However, si nce atomistic approflches focus all the individual a lone. and s ince 
huma n action has a general tendency to have conseque nces that extend beyond the 
immediate realm of the individuaL their level of mo ral authority cannot extend 
bcyond the moral consideration o f the individual In thi s regard it makes sense 10 
have an encompassing mo ral fnlTnework from which to Icgulal e and modcl'flte all 
elhi~a l decisions. A larger morc c ncompass ing and environmentall y aware 
fran 'ework should approve the final moral decis io n. Th iS wi ll ensure thal we wi ll 
act in suc h a way that the consequences of our actions arc not detrimental to the 
gref.ter envilonmenl. Beca use of t il e broadness of scope <;.)fthe holisti c approach. it 
mal:~s sense that the land e thic shollld assume thi s info rmative and authoritat ive 
role to guide our moral actio ns.6l 
Call il'o tt affirms the adequacy of the la nd e thic and denies the adequacy and 
applicability of the extensionist approaches, while lohnson denies the adequacy of 
any single approach and accep ts the app li cabilit y of all approaches. Above I 
sketched a syste m whereby it is possible to synthesise these seemingly opposing 
62 Norton, who is clea rly an anthropocentrist. in a loose sense of the word. but not an 
individualist, expresses a similar idea. He recognises that , while human interests are 
important. preserv ing the complexity and di versity of the biological world are more so, 
since these constitute the overa ll context Olat is life. It is essentia l to preserve this context 
s ince major changes in the larger systems could lead to major disruptions in human 
activities (Norton 199 1: 189). 
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views in ~ man ner Ihal docs nol reduce Ihem to plura li 'ilic relat ivism Accordingly, 
il 's possible to accept thc land cth ic as providing an c(1compassi ng ethical outlook 
to direct our actions toward the overall functioning o f the biotic com11lunity, while 
al the same time acknowledging that the extensio ni st approaches are applicable to 
situations that invo lve conni cts between morall y consi.lcrab le individua ls. 
TI e CIlIll o r this thesis was to exa min e the adequacy and app licabilit y o f the 
e:: tcnsionist approaches to an envi ronmental ethi c. I conclude that nOlle of them is 
in it self suffic ient to address the concerns of the greater environment. Only a 
ho li stic approach. such as Lcopold 's, whi ch takes the integrity of the biotic 
community as a moral guide is suitable to deal with issues of global reach such as 
pollution, destruction of the rain forests, species extinction, elc. However, this 
does not mean that the eXlensionist approaches have no ro le to play in the 
envirollmental arella. 13cctl ll se huli sm neglects to cOllsider the small er pari s that 
m ake lip the who le, the ind ivid unl is by-and-Ia rge neglected. It is here tha t the 
exten sio ni st approaches have a ro le to play, ensuring the moral consideration of 
indi vidual be ings. And it is along such lines that I can conclude that while 
extensio ni st approaches arc not adequat e, they can be applicable. 
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Conclusion 
T lwrc Cil ll be 110 denying thiil. co llectivel y, human act ioll ha s devastat ing 
consequences for the gleetter environment. If we do n OI change the ways in which 
we act. it is highly probable thalthe planet Earth, as wc currently know it , could be 
folt!ver lost. While I accept that the plilnct may have rt~general i ve capacities I am 
a lso oflhe opinion that such capaci ties can easily be overloaded (HId exceeded . 
An) living entity is biologi c(l ll y equipped to regenerate ils physical being over the 
natural period of its life span . By thi s I am not re ferring to the ab ility to procreate 
but rather the capacity the li ving hody has 10 maintain its intcfllal biila ncc through 
the process of hOllleostasis. Any li ving entit y i.;; constantly exposcd 10 changing 
external conditions, such as nuctuating temperatures, availabi lity of food and 
water. various bacteria alld virll ses, etc. An entity's biological system responds to 
these conditions. by constant ly making internal adjustmcnts, through a system of 
feedback loops. In sllch ii manner it is ab le to perpetuate its existence in the face of 
adversity . However, thi s capacity is not unlimited. Sometimes the external 
conditions are so extreme that the biological system is unable to maintain its 
normal balance. In such instances the internal balance i'i offset to the point that the 
organism weakens and dies. 
This analogy is no t an altempl to suggest that the Earth is a living organism but 
rather that , like biological beings, it is a system that l"'as a tendency 10 maint ain 
some form of equilibriul11 . Atmospheric pressure, temperature and chemical 
cor,lposition oflhe soil, ai r and waters have maintainec; fair ly constant levels over 
the' last few thousand years. However, if humanit y contnues to pollute and destroy 
the natural world at the rate that it currently is, it is possible that we llIay cause too 
much damage, innict too many altered condit ions for the planet to mainta in its 
current balance. If this occurs, the equilibrium may shin and setlle well beyond 
current boundaries. resulting in severe negative implicat ions for many of the li ving 
entities that rely upon the planet Earth for thei r ex istence. 
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Our actions arc infu rmed by our perceptions u f the world. our understanding of il 
and ()ur place in it. If wc wish 10 change our actions it 1'Ollo"'Is that we need to 
change our perceptions The way that we Lllld ers l ~nd the wodd is informed by a 
host of influences: cultural and religiolls beliefs, polit ical and economic pract ices, 
moral values, habit s, ex periences and so forth . This be:ng the case, if we wish 10 
trarsfonn our perceptions it makes sense that we quesli(lIl our most basic 
ass·.l l11 plio ns. The quest for an environmenta l ethic 1:1cilital es thi s process in tl mt 
we lire requ ired to quest ion Ollr va lue syslems, attitudes and moral outlooks 
Traditional approaches to elhics were shown to be, fur the 111051 1'<111. 
anthropocentric. Anthropocentric approaches to ethics are characterised by a 
disii'\ctly human-centred va lue system. Hum ans are '/ iewed 10 be va lu able in-
themselves, and are thus seen to possess intrinsic value, whi le the non-human 
world is viewed to have Cl human-dependent va llle only. According to this view the 
on ly dut ies owed to the environ ment are indilect, der ived from human interests 
Since only human interests arc acknowledgcd to cou nt ill morally signi ficClllt ways. 
natul'e is aflen treated plIIcly as a resource to serve short -term human int erests. 
Some protagonists of anthropoccntric vicws argue that by appealing to the right s 
and interests of future generations the long- tenn c llvironmental concerns of the 
ecologically mindcd wou ld be suffic iently protected. It is an accepted f.1Ct that the 
natura l world is the result of an ongoi ng process s}:anning millions of years. 
De:troying a natural environment brings all end to a c:mtinuit y that can never be 
replaced . Since value increases with scarcity, the less there is of a certain item. the 
mOle valuable it becomes. The natural world is shrinking at a phenomenal rate . It 
is therefore acceptable, in anthropocentric terms, to talk of the natural world as our 
' heritage' ~ whieh we need to preserve for the use of future generat ions. 
As.de frol11 in stnllncntal and econo mic considerat ions, there are also aest hetic and 
spiritual considerations. We preserve and cheri sh great works of art because of 
their cultural, aesthetic and spiritual signifi cance. Accordingly, we bestow an 
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intrinsic va lue onto thern In si mila r ways we call rec~ivc aest hetic pleasure and 
spi lltlla l lIplil1mcnt {i·om being in nature. If wc dest10 y natural wilderness today 
we dcny future gencrations the 0ppol1uTl it y of aesthetically and spiritua ll y 
enriching ex periences. Therefore, wc should preserve nature. In these ways «a 
human-centred ethic can he the basis of powerful mgllJ1lents for what we might 
call <cnvironmental va lues'" (Singer 2000: 93). 
Such an appeal is indeed a viable means for transfoflil ing a focus on immediate 
short-term human interests to include more long-tclm human interests, since 
focllsing on the needs of future generatio ns will promote the adoption of 
conservat ioni st and preservationist attitudes. However, conserving and preserving 
the natural environment for the benefit of humans alone «represent s not only a 
d cluded but also a dangerous orientation toward the world" (Fox 1990: 13). It is 
delusional in that such an approach incorrectly assumes that humans belong to a 
category that is separate from the rest of the natural world . There is sumciellt 
empiri cal evidence to support the perspective that we are biological 'equals' with 
other species. We are governed by the same basic needs of survival (food, water, 
safety and securit y), we rely on the same environment to fulfil these basic needs, 
fai:l.lre to obtain these basic needs results in death, and "ye are driven by the desire 
to procreate. Furthermore, we are all products of the 3ame evolutionary process. 
This is in no way an attempt to deny human uniqueness. I1owever, while we have 
capacities and capabilities that make us distinctly human, other species "re also 
un i...lue in their own ways. Any attempt to collectively assimilate non-humans to 
th<: category of inferior humans succeeds only in degrading their existence by 
failing to respect them for the capacities and capabilitie:: unique to their being (Fox 
1990: 15). 
Grounding the conservation and preservation of the natural world on a purely 
anthropocentric value system is dangerous, in that only those entities recognised to 
be of value to humans are preserved, while non-valuable entities are neglected, 
manipulated or completely destroyed . Anthropocentric approaches are largely 
134 
informcd by an atollli stic understanding of the wolld . Such an outlook places 
primacy on the indi vidual entity as an isolated unit As such. a lack of v(l luc is 
characteri stic not only o f nOli -human individua ls. but also of cntire ecosystems 
(Leopold 1995: 1'16). Inasllluch as a large proportion of entities, indi viduals as 
well as species and biotic comJ1lunities, are not recognised to have any economic, 
aesfhetic or spiritual va lue, they wou ld not be preserv~d . This is problematic in 
that the va lued petrt s of the biola requ ire the non-valued pal1s in order to fUllction 
suc..:essfull y. While it could be argued thett anthropocentric dea lings wi th thc 
na tural world are neither ullnatural lia r unethical there \:an be no denying that the 
scope and rate of human environmental impacts are al a critical level (Callicott 
19\''1 : 15). 
In the body of the thesis, I argued that an anthropocent. ·ic approach is inad C<luale 
as an environmenta l ethic. Firstl),. anthropocentric assumptions were shown to be 
largely responsible for the current environmental cri sis. The perception that value 
is located in and emanates from humanity has resu lted in the understanding that 
human life is the ultimate va lue. This has directly contributed to enlarging the 
human population. Increa sing population numbers together wit h the material 
de mands of modern society place ever increasing demands on energy and food 
su pplies. This is not to say that every improvement in the standard of li ving is 
necessarily wasteful of energy or polluting to the planet, but rather it is the 
cumulati ve effect of these improvements that is damaging to the environment. The 
abu ~ es facing the great.er environment as a result of the energy crisis and the food 
dem':lI1d are clearly manifestations of anthropocentric views that treat the natural 
environment merely as a resource, an instrument for human ends. Secondly. 
beciJuse the environmental cri sis stretches beyond mere human concerns to include 
a ll li ving and non-living entities that ex ist on this planet, it was recommended that 
an environmental ethic should have a sufficiently wiue focu s. Anthropocentric 
apP '",)aches are not encompassing enough because tJ1ey recognise the moral 
stal1lhng of humans alone. 1hirdly, it was suggested thlt an environmental ethic 
should have outcomes that benefit the greater environment. Anthropocentric 
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appn .. )achcs nrc on ly ~unccrned with human interes ts . i\ mo ralit y tha t a ttrihutes 
in trinsic va lue to humani ty alone, serves humanit y a lone. Accordingly_ such an 
approach has outcomes that favour humans to the detriment of the greater 
cnvironment. In light of th is it has been suggested that " the cnvironmental crisi s 
will not be resolved until we break wit h tradition aNI acknowledge that non-
hu ma n nature also has mora l standing" (Varnct 1998 . 5) 
Ethica l extensionist theories challenge the anthropocentric out look by arguing for 
the nclusion of at least SOI11C Iloll-humans into the moral sphere. Regan, fo llowing 
a classica l right s based approach, "'gtles that self-aware anima ls are subjects-of-a-
life. Subjects-of-a -life are inherently va luable and are tl·erefore deserving of moral 
consideration. While Rega n's cthic essentially extends r.lOnt l consideration only as 
far as mammal s, arguing for their rights ensures that we are morally bound to 
protect their interests. Singer, following the utilitarian approach of Jererny 
Bentham, argues that thc capacity to suffer is morally significa nt. lie therefore 
argues for the 1110ral consideration of a ll ~ent i ent beings. This extends the sphere of 
ethics beyond the rea lm proposed by Regan, to include all vertebrat es. Singer 
does, however, limit the right to life to beings that are capable of forming 
preferences about their futures, thereby e ffectively excluding most sentient 
animals and some humans (Elliot 1995 : 9). Taylor, proffering a strong version of 
biocentrism, argues that all li ving beings have a good of their own, a goal to which 
they strive. Having a good is synonymous with well -hei ng. Beings that have a 
well -being are inherently va luable. Inherent wOl1h is possessed equally. and so all 
living beings deserve equal moral consideration. 
While extensionist approaches argue for the inclusion of at least some non-humans 
into the moral sp here, like anthropocentric approache~ they argue that the duties 
and responsibilities owed to the environment are detelTnilled by the interests of 
morally considerable indivH 'l Is. As such, it is argued that they perpetuate the 
basic reductive assumptions oflhe anthropocentric paradigm (Rodman 1977: 95). 
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In an attempt to develop n ne\V pm ad ig lll and approach 10 the cnvironlllf'nlal 
situation most environmental ethicists have tUl ned to the science of ecology. \Vhich 
recogni ses the importnnce ur the sys te llls in which indi vidual orga ni sms ex ist. Out 
of an ecological understanding holi stic approaches 10 ethics ha ve developed. 
whi ch, ill contrast to traditio na l antiuopoccntric and extensioni sl approaches, dc-
emphasise the value of the indi vidual li ving organism in fa vour of extending moral 
considerat ion to interconnected whales - species, ecosystems and the biosphere. 
According to such accoun ts the environment is owed direct mo ra l considera tion, 
independent of the interests of individua l beings that ex ist wi thin it. Primarily 
concerned with the bioti c commu nity as a unifi ed coll ecti ve. thi s represen ts a 
distinct system of ethics, which IS different from anthropocentric and extensioni st 
"Ppr,}(tches both in theory and application. 
Ca lli ~ot1 argues that the extensionist approaches ere not adequate to an 
environmental et hic, since they have much in coml1lon with anthropocentri c 
approaches and anthropocentric approaches arc inadequate to an environmental 
ethic. I argued that thc extensioni st approaches are inade<luate to an environmental 
ethic on the grounds that none of them sat isfy the requirement s that an 
environmental et hic should have, namely an cncompassing focus together wit h 
outcomes that protect and benefit the greater environment. 
Adopting a moni stic out look, Callicott argues not only that the extensio ni st 
approaches are inadequate to an envi ronmental ethic, but al so that they are 
inapplicable. In order to explore the applicability of the extensionist approaches 
from an alternative perspective I introduced Johl1son, a moral pluralist and 
environmental pragmatist, who argues that, while no approach on its own IS 
adequate to an environmental ethic, a ll approaches have degrees of applicabi lity. 
I suggested that these contrary positions could be syntheBised in such a manner as 
to retain the fundamental suppositio n of each. Because the environment is such a 
vast ll1d all-inclusive sphere I suggested that an envirormental ethic should have 
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an informative framework to ensure that we do not choose actions that have 
consequences that are detrimenta l to the environment. S:nce a holistic out look is 
concemed with the integrity ofl he whole system it was reasonabl e to assume that 
such an outlook is well suited to this task . However, since holi sm concerns it self 
with the bio tic whole alone it tends to neglect the individua l. Accord ingly, I 
proposed that. guided by a ho listic outlook, the individua li stic approaches could be 
applied provided that they are re levant to the pal1icular moral situation. To this 
end, Regan 'S approach is useful when defending the rig hts of mammals; Si nger's 
approach has practica l merit when dea ling with the mi strea tment of domesticated 
animals in the agricultural and scientific industries~ while Taylor's appro(lch is 
applicable ill instances where human int erests connict with the interests of wild 
non-human indiv idua ls. 
This is not to suggest th(l! slIch a system wou ld fUllction successfully as a 
comp rehensive environmenta l et hic. Onc of the major dillicu lties would be that 
moni:aic approaches, which are fairl y rigid and intolerallt of other views, would 
have to be app lied in pragmatic ways. which demand fl exibility and tolerance in 
working towards achieving common goals. However, th is presents no immed iate 
cause for concern since the development of a comprehensive environmental ethic 
is beyond the scope of thi s thesis. 
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